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The growing perception that environmental benefits and burdens
have been inequitably distributed has sparked the recent emergence
of a movement for environmental justice. The environmental justice
movement, originating as it did from the civil rights movement, has
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inevitably confronted environmental laws, lawyers, and institutions.
Civil rights advocates and environmentalists each bring their respec-
tive histories and modes of discourse to the environmental justice
debate. That intersection of race and environment has not been un-
troubled.
As a consequence, the literature addressing environmental justice
treats environmental laws and lawyers with a measure of skepticism.
The literature presents environmental law as, at best, a strategically
useful tool to stop unwanted land uses. At worst, it presents envi-
ronmental law as both a significant cause of disproportionate bur-
dens and as a possible impediment to the achievement of social jus-
tice. While certain aspects of the skepticism may be warranted, it is
important to avoid letting past tensions obscure the positive role that
environmental laws could play in the pursuit of social justice. This
Article takes one step toward bridging the gap between environ-
mental laws and justice by exploring some of the conditions under
which environmental laws can contribute to social and political de-
bates about fair treatment.
Part I describes the emergence and nature of the environmental
justice movement by presenting an analytical framework for identify-
ing and distinguishing the two forms of justice raised by the move-
ment: (1) justice in the existing distribution of environmental bene-
fits and burdens ("distributional justice"), and (2) justice in the
decisionmaking processes that determine the distribution of envi-
ronmental benefits and burdens ("political justice"). Part I considers
the strategies environmental justice advocates have suggested for ad-
dressing both of these forms of environmental justice.
In order to illuminate the way in which those in the environmental
justice movement have perceived the environmental movement and
environmental laws, Part II provides a short history of the environ-
mental movement and its somewhat tense relationship with contem-
poraneous civil rights and social justice movements. It then reviews
the perspectives on environmentalists and environmental law exhib-
ited in the environmental justice literature. Numerous authors ob-
serve that participants in the environmental justice movement feel
alienated from the traditional environmental movement. They also
note the ways in which environmental laws have caused, not solved,
environmental problems in poor and minority' communities. While
1. While the term "minority" may be considered pejorative under some circumstances,
the expression is used because it captures the essence of the environmental justice claim: the
persistence of unfair treatment against certain minority groups. It is because of their status as
minorities (in the political sense) that minorities (in the ethnic sense) risk unfair treatment in
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recognizing the strategic value of environmental laws in particular in-
stances, some of the literature expresses concern that the use of envi-
ronmental laws could have detrimental effects on the long-term
struggle for justice.
Part III then focuses more specifically on the movement's quest for
political (as distinguished from distributive) justice. Achieving politi-
cal justice is about changing the political dynamic so that all groups
are treated fairly in decisionmaking processes. A legal victory against
an unfair decision-whether on civil rights or other grounds-is only
one element in the pursuit of the broader social, political, and cul-
tural change necessary to achieving political processes that fairly con-
sider all citizens' interests. The pursuit of political justice must occur
in the decisionmaking culture and its social and political context.
Part III focuses on the role of environmental laws in political debates
about fair treatment.
Communities claiming political injustice frequently encounter
enormous difficulties in demonstrating to the broader body politic
that they have been or are being treated unfairly. Part III examines
the circumstances in which environmental laws could assist in identi-
fying and communicating political injustice. By requiring decision-
makers to meet certain criteria, conduct certain types of analyses, and
explain !lheir decisions, environmental laws illuminate the decision-
making process. Where they reveal irregularities or irrationalities,
the evidence produced through the operation of environmental laws
may cast doubt on a decision's legitimacy. Once the legitimacy of a
decision is in question, it becomes possible to infer the presence of
discrimination.
This pattern of analysis-using irregularities to infer discrimina-
tion-is nothing new. It is similar to the reasoning utilized in
"disparate treatment" cases under the employment discrimination
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 The egal ar-
guments presented in a Title VII case correspond to the types of po-
litical arguments that are likely to arise when siting opponents assert
"disparate treatment" in the political forum. Under Title VII, a per-
son claiming disparate treatment must present a prima facie case that
an adverse employment decision was made despite that individual's
a political process controlled by ethnic and political majorities.
2. This Article addresses the use of environmental laws in the political dynamic associ-
ated with siting decisions. It does not address the separate question of the role of environ-
mental laws in proving discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause or statutes prohibit-
ing discrimination.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
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qualifications.4 In a claim of unfair treatment in the environmental
justice context, opponents would claim that the decision in question
was made despite its failure to meet the qualifications established by
the relevant environmental criteria. To use the siting of an undesir-
able facility in a minority neighborhood as an example, environ-
mental laws may reveal that the site was selected despite its failure to
meet the necessary qualifications.
Moreover, just as an employer in a Title VII case is likely to present
a nondiscriminatory justification for its employment decision, a deci-
sionmaker in the environmental justice context is likely to present a
nondiscriminatory justification. Then, like the employee in a Title
VII case, those concerned about the fairness of the decision may be
able to present information obtained through environmental laws to
demonstrate that the decisionmaker's alleged justification is simply a
pretext. In a disparate treatment case under Title VII, such circum-
stantial evidence can be sufficient to infer discriminatory treatment.
In the environmental justice context, evidence amassed through en-
vironmental laws could likewise support an inference that the deci-
sion was influenced by unfair treatment of the affected poor or mi-
nority community.
A community's ability to communicate unfair treatment is an im-
portant step in increasing decisionmakers' accountability to all.
While not all claims of unfair treatment are legitimate, and while all
valid claims will not necessarily be aided by environmental informa-
tion, under the right circumstances environmental laws may assist a
community's ability to communicate to the broader body politic. En-
vironmental laws thus have the capacity to play a more significant
role in debates about justice than that currently recognized in the
environmental justice literature.
I. THE ENVIRONMENTALJUSTICE MOVEMENT
A. The Emergence of the EnvironmentalJustice Movement
While the phenomenon of environmental injustice is nothing
new,5 the development of the environmental justice movement as a
4. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
5. See Robert D. Bullard, Introduction, [hereinafter Bullard, Introduction] CONFRONTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS 9 (Bullard ed., 1993) [hereinafter
VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS] (noting that attacks against environmental injustice "predate
the first Earthday in 1970"); Deeohn Ferris & David Hahn-Baker, Environmentalists and Envi-
ronmental Justice Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS 67
(Bunyan Bryant ed., 1995) (noting that"even before the '70s, people of color recognized link-
ages between social justice and environmental protection issues"); Rachel D. Godsil &James S.
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self-conscious movement is relatively recent. The question of envi-
ronmental justice was brought to national attention by the 1982 op-
position of an African-American community in North Carolina to a
hazardous waste landfill.6 The resulting national exposure prompted
numerous studies of the distribution of environmental hazards. In
1990, the federal government weighed in when the Environmental
Protection Agency created the Environmental Equity Workgroup
("EPA Workgroup") to examine the distributional issues raised by
environmental policies and enforcement.8 In 1994, the Clinton Ad-
ministration issued an Executive Order designed to assess and ad-
dress the demographic issues associated with federal actions and to
improve public participation procedures Many state and local gov-
ernments have also responded with studies and legislation."0
Since most of the participants in the environmental justice move-
ment are community groups engaging in local action within their
communities, the movement is often characterized as a "grassroots"
movement." Local communities around the country have organized
in connection with specific objectives, such as opposition to the siting
of a waste facility, cleanup of a contaminated site, or a reduction in
Freeman, Jobs, Trees, and Autonomy: The Convergence of the Environmental Justice Movement and
Community EconomicDevelopment. 5 MD.J. OF CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 29 (1994) (noting that disad-
vantaged communities were concerned about environmental problems before the concept of
.environmental justice" emerged).
6. See, e.g., DAVID E. NEWTON, ENVIRONMENTALJUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 1-3
(1996) (discussing community's well-publicized opposition to the landfill); Benjamin F. Chavis,
Jr., Foreword, in VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 5, at 3 (same); Colin Crawford, Strate-
giesfor Environmentaljustice, Rethinking CERCLA Medical Monitoring Lawsuits, 74 B.U. L. REV. 267,
268-69 (1994) (same); Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incen-
tives on the Road to EnvironmentalJustice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 9 (1995) (same).
7. The studies include the following- U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF
SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES, GAO/RCED-83-168 (1983) (hereinafter GAO REPORT]
(analyzing demographics associated with hazardous waste sites located in EPA's Region );
COMMISSION FOR RACiALJUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE
UNITED STATES, A NATIONAL REPORT ON RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987) [hereinafter UCC REPORT] (reviewing
demographics associated with commercial hazardous waste sites and uncontrolled hazardous
waste sites throughout nation); U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY:. REDUCING RISK FOR ALL
COMMUNITIES (1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL EQurrY] (assessing evidence that poor and
minority communities are exposed to greater environmental risks than general population).
8. See Gauna, supra note 6, at 13 (describing formation of work group by then-EPA Ad-
ministrator William K. Reilly).
9. SeeExec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995).
10. See Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75, 79 & n.10
(1996) (noting that many states have legislation pending regarding the siting of noxious facili-
ties); Gerald Torres, Environmental Justice: The Legal Meaning of a Social Movement, 15J.L. &
COM. 597, 613 n.43 (1996) [hereinafter Torres, Environmental Justice] (listing state legislative
efforts).
11. See KATHLYN GAY, POLLUTION AND THE POWERLESS: THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENT 20-21 (1994) (describing environmental justice movement since 1980s as consisting
of local action groups); NEWTON, supra note 6, at 24-25.
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lead poisoning. 2 Despite the local impetus, however, many groups
move beyond the immediate problem. As Professor Eileen Gauna
has characterized it, "[e] nvironmental justice activists... [see] envi-
ronmental problems as only one part of the larger social issues of ra-
cism and cultural and economic injustice."'3
These grassroots campaigns for environmental justice follow in the
footsteps of the civil rights movement that preceded them. 4 Author
David Newton has observed that "[a]lthough the issues with which
environmental justice deals are environmental issues... [t]he politi-
cal philosophy that underlies action is a reflection of the civil rights
philosophy."' 5 Like the civil rights movement, grassroots groups fre-
quently engage in such "direct action" as demonstrations, picketing,
petition drives, and other forms of visible and participatory protest.
' 6
The emphasis on direct action and community participation is not
12. See Robert Bullard, Dumping in Black and White [hereinafter Bullard, Dumping in Black
and White], in WE SPEAK FOR OURSELVES: SOCIALJUSTIcE, RACE, AND ENVIRONMENT 4, 7 (Dana
Alston ed., 1990) [hereinafterWE SPEAK FOR OURSELVES] (discussing community groups' oppo-
sition to municipal landfills, lead smelters, and hazardous waste); see also NEWTON, supra note 6,
at 24, 173-206 (listing environmental justice organizations); Robert D. Bullard,Anatomy of Envi-
ronmental Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement, in VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra
note 5, at 24-25, 26-29 [hereinafter Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism] (noting wide vari-
ety and dispersement of environmental justice groups and summarizing several local environ-
mental justice initiatives). See generaly VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 5 (collection
of essays on various grassroots environmental justice initiatives); Regina Austin & Michael
Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-
Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL' 69, 72 (1991) (discussing grassroots organizations and their
goals); Torres, EnvironmentalJustice supra note 10, at 99, 601-02; Charles Jordan & Donald
Snow, Diversification, Minorities, and the Mainstream Environmental Movement, in VOICES FROM THE
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT: PERSPECTIVES FOR A NEw ERA 85-86 (Donald Snow ed., 1991)
[hereinafter VOICES FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT] (discussing growth of grassroots
environmental organizations). The 1994 Environmental Justice Resource Center directory of
local environmental justice groups includes hundreds of local and regional organizations. See
ROBERT D. BULLARD, PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS: 1994-95 DIRECTORY
(EnvironmentalJustice Resource Center 1994) [hereinafter BULLARD, PEOPLE OF COLOR].
13. Gauna, supra note 6, at 12; see also Luke Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental
Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 641 (1992) [hereinafter
Cole, Empowerment as the Key] (describing goal of grassroots environmentalists as "structural so-
cietal change" to achieve social justice).
14. See Austin & Schill, supra note 12, at 74 ("The minority grassroots movement draws a
good deal of inspiration from the black civil rights movement."); Bullard, Anatomy of Environ-
mentalJustice, supra note 12, at 22, 24-33; Robert D. Bullard & Beverly H. Wright, The Quest for
Environmental Equity: Mobilizing the African-American Community for Social Changes, in AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTALISM 40 (Riley E. Dunlap & Angela G. Mertig eds., 1992); Gauna, supra note 6,
at 12 (noting that many environmental justice activists were involved in civil rights movement);
William C. Scott, EnvironmentalJustice: A New Era of Community Empowerment, Political Activism,
and Civil Rights Litigation, 7 ENvrL. CLAIMSJ. 5, 11 (1994) (observing that grassroots environ-
mental justice groups have applied techniques of civil rights movement to environment prob-
lems); Torres, EnvironmentalJustie, supra note 10, at 601 (discussing relationship between envi-
ronmental justice and civil rights movements).
15. NEwTON, supra note 6, at 19.
16. See Austin & Schill, supra note 12, at 75 (describing "hands-on tactics" used in grass-
roots movements); Scott, supra note 14, at 11 (discussing forms of protest used by grassroots
movements).
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simply a tactical calculation. Instead, it arises from a fundamental
commitment to a participatory movement.'
7
The creation of a movement out of these diverse activities has been
facilitated by recent regional and national conferences bringing to-
gether activists and concerned scholars.'8 Various regional and cul-
tural organizations also provide forums for sharing information, as
do several publications. 19 In addition, a number of national organiza-
tions have turned their attention to environmental justice issues and
provide a forum for a larger perspective on local activities.20 None-
theless, the heart of the movement remains in its grassroots activism.
B. Defining EnvironmentalJustice
The birth of the environmental justice movement brought to-
gether two concepts that had rarely been joined: "environment" and
'Justice." 2' As indicated by the definitions of "environmental justice"
and related expressions by activists and observers,2 many different
17. See Austin & Schill, supra note 12, at 75 (stating that commitment to direct participa-
tion is "a matter of belief"); Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 639-40, 647-50, 657-
59, 661-63 (discussing reasons for community-based movement); Rachel Godsil, The Steets, the
Courts, the Legislature and the Press: Where Environmental Struggles Happen, 5 POVERTY & RACE 6, 8
(1996) [hereinafter Godsil, Environmental Struggles];Jordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 87.
18. These conferences include the "Michigan Conference on Race and the Incidence of
Environmental Hazards" (January 1990), sponsored by the University of Michigan School of
Natural Resources, the "First National People of Color Leadership Summit on the Environ-
ment" (1991), "Opportunities for Exchange: Communities Promoting Environmental Justice
Through Educating, Organizing, and the Law" (March 1996), as well as numerous regional
gatherings. See Crawford, supra note 6, at 271 nn.15-16 (describing national and regional con-
ferences); Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 5, at 68-69 (same).
19. See NEWTON, supra note 6, at 24-25 (listing regional organizations and publications
linking community groups).
20. Such organizations include the Washington Office of Environmental Justice and the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights' EnvironmentalJustice Project.
21. Cf Gauna, supra note 6, at 2-3 (referring to "environmental racism"). The terms
.environmental racism" and "environmental equity" have also been used to describe the
movement and its concerns. See, e.g., Bullard, Introduction, supra note 5, at 5 (using term
.environmental racism"); ENVIRONMENTAL EQurry, supra note 7, at 1 (using term "environ-
mental equity").
This Article uses the term "environmental justice" because it is the broadest of the three. Al-
though the term "environmental racism" captures the sense of discrimination often associated
with the movement, it falls to capture the injustice that white communities may also face. Use
of the term "environmental justice" does not mean that race issues are irrelevant; instead, it
broadens the range of relevant issues. The term "environmental equity" rings too weakly. It
implies that the underlying problem is simply one of doling out the pie of environmental
harms in equal slices. It fails to capture the concerns about unfair treatment that also charac-
terize the movement. The term "justice" better captures the combination of distributional and
political issues that the movement confronts.
22. Attorney William Scott has collected a number of these definitions. He notes that Dr.
Benjamin F. ChavisJr. has defined "environmental racism" as:
[R]acial discrimination in environmental policy making and the unequal enforce-
ment of the environmental laws and regulations. It is the deliberate targeting of peo-
ple-of-color communities for toxic waste facilities and the official sanctioning of a life-
threatening presence of poisons and pollutants in people-of-color communities. It is
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types of issues are encompassed by the term.
1. Defining "environment"
The conception of "environment" in the environmental justice
context refers to attributes of the physical environment that affect
any aspect of a community's well-being23 The environment is shaped
by the entire panoply of land uses, including the location of residen-
tial, commercial, and industrial development and the particular
characteristics of those land uses. Undesirable land uses like waste
disposal facilities, polluting industries, prisons, and homeless shelters
24are frequently termed "LULUs": Locally Undesirable Land Uses.
Both the physical consequences of undesirable land uses-such as
increased health risks or noise pollution-and the socioeconomic
consequences of land uses-such as aesthetic impacts, stigma, or de-
creased property values-are "environmental" impacts.25 Environ-
also manifested in the history of excluding people of color from the leadership of the
environmental movement.
Scott, supra note 14, at 8-9 (quoting Dr. Chavis' 1993 testimony to United States House of Rep-
resentatives' Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights).
Mr. Scott notes that Professor Robert D. Bullard defines "environmental racism" as:
[A)ny policy, practice, or directive that differentially affects or disadvantages (whether
intended or unintended) individuals, groups, or communities based on race or color.
It also includes exclusionary and restrictive practices that limit participation by people
of color in decision-making boards, commissions and regulatory bodies.
Id. at 9 (quoting Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Environmental Racism, in NATURAL RESOURCES
AND ENVIRONMENT, Winter 1993, at 23).
Mr. Scott also quotes the EPA's definition of "environmental justice" as:
The fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, incomes and educational levels with
respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws,
regulations and policies. Fair treatment implies that no population of people should
be forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of the negative environmental impacts
of pollution or environmental hazards due to a lack of political or economic strength.
Id. (quoting United States Environmental Protection Agency, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE INI-
TIATIVES 1993, 1994, at 19); see also NEWTON, supra note 6, at 3-5 (defining "environmental eq-
uity," "environmental racism," "environmental discrimination," and "environmental justice").
23. This conception of the environment is purposefully broad. See Robert D. Bullard, En-
vironmental Justice for All, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION 11 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994)
[hereinafter Bullard, Environmental Justice for All] (defining "environment in very broad
terms... as places where people live, work, and play").
24. See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of
Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1001 (1993) [hereinafter Been, Undesir-
able Land Uses] (enumerating examples of LULUs); DenisJ. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY,
and the Problem of DistributiveJustice 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 437,437-38 (1988) (same).
25. The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), which mandates environmental
impact statements for federal actions having significant environmental effects, similarly consid-
ers the social consequences of land uses a type of "environmental effect." See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8
(1996) (defining, pursuant to NEPA, environmental "effects" to include impacts that are
.ecological ... aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, or health"); see also Stephen M.
Johnson, NEPA and SEPA's in the Quest for EnvironmentalJustice. 30 LOY. LA L. REV. 565, 579-88
(1997) (discussing socioeconomic effects as "environmental effects" under federal and state
environmental review statutes); Heather E. Ross, Comment, Using NEPA in the Fight for Environ-
mentalJustic, 18 WM. & MARYJ. ENVrL. L. 353, 357-60 (1994) (discussing consideration of so-
1997]
THE AMERiCAN UNVERSiTY LAw REViEw [Vol. 47:221
mental issues have been in the public eye for some time; what the en-
vironmental justice movement adds are the ethical and political jus-




The types of justice relevant to environmental justice disputes can
be classified into two primary categories. One form ofjustice is dis-
tributive: environmental justice concerns are raised by the dispro-
portionate burden of environmental hazards or undesirable land
uses borne by low-income and minority communities.2 The second
form ofjustice focuses on the political process:' environmental jus-
tice concerns are raised by the discriminatory manner in which deci-
sions with environmental consequences are made.28
The environmental justice literature includes a great many things
under the rubric of 'Justice" with relatively little analysis of the form
and nature of the justice being sought.30 While any given instance of
perceived environmental injustice may involve claims of both dis-
tributive and political injustice, the two forms of injustice present two
different kinds of injuries and may require two different types of so-
lutions.3'
cioeconomic effects as environmental effects under NEPA).
26. See Bullard, EnvironmentalJustice for Al4 supra note 23, at 11, 22.
27. Professor John Rawls' A Theory ofJustice describes one form of distributive justice. Al-
though Rawls acknowledges that inequality is inevitable (and in some cases desirable), he ar-
gues that, where inequality exists, the determination of whether an act is "just" turns on
whether it tends to increase the welfare of the least advantaged. SeeJOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 7, 60-62, 75-80 (1971). "Justice" is thus a function of the distribution of benefits and
burdens. See Been, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 24, at 1028-55 (discussing distributive jus-
tice); Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Quest forEnvironmentalJustice, 20 ECoLOGYL.Q. 721,
746-49 (1993) (discussing distributive justice and Rawls' difference principle).
28. See RONALD DWoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 273 (1977) (describing "right to
treatment as an equal" in the political sphere); H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 167 (1961)
("It is... clear that a choice, made without prior consideration of the interests of all sections of
the community[,] would be open to criticism as merely partisan and unjust."); Been, Undesirable
Land Uses, supra note 24, at 1063-65; see also Foster, supra note 27, at 748 (arguing that consid-
eration of decision-making processes is necessary to pursuit ofjustice).
29. See Been, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 24, at 1060-68 (discussing theories ofjustice
based on the "process" by which LULUs are distributed); Foster, supra note 27, at 746-49
(discussing and distinguishing issues of "distributive justice" and of justice in decisionmaking
processes); Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and DemocraticJustice, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ.
431, 451 (1994) [hereinafter Torres, Environmental Burdens] ("Ifjustice is to be achieved, one
must consider not only the distributional impacts that environmental remedies will have, but
also the decision making process by which such impacts are allocated.").
30. See Been, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 24, at 1006 (noting need for clarification of
term "justice").
31. As discussed further below, the relationship between distributive and political justice
presents its own set of complex issues. See infra Part I.B.3.
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a. Environmental justice as distributive justice
Many communities suffer the ill effects of environmental problems
or the stigma of socially undesirable land uses. To some extent, all
communities must be expected to bear some such burdens as un-
avoidable by-products of a complex industrial society. But whether
these burdens are "equitably" distributed among communities is a
central theme of the environmental justice movement. Analysis of
this question is fraught with difficulty. Much depends upon how
relevant communities are defined 32 and upon what constitutes a
"proportional" distribution of desirable or undesirable land uses.
There are no easy or absolute answers to either of these questions.
However, that it is difficult to define an abstract measure of
"community" or "equity" does not mean that unfair disparities do not
exist. Nor does it mean that communities are never justified in feel-
ing "put upon" by a disproportionate burden.
The environmental justice literature includes frequent reference to
studies suggesting that minority and low-income communities cur-
rently endure undesirable land uses to a greater extent than other
communities.' Two of these studies, both concerning the current
32. Defining what constitutes a "community" for purposes of evaluating the distribution of
environmental burdens presents a significant challenge. What percentage of minorities is nec-
essary to call a community a "minority" community? What income level is necessary to call a
community a "low-income" community? And where are the lines defining communities drawn?
Around municipal borders? By zip code? By census tract? By the subjective description of
neighborhood as defined by the individuals who perceive themselves to be affected by the ac-
tion? See generally Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Classification in Environmental Equity: How We Man-
age Is How We Measure, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 633 (1994) (discussing difficulties in defining
population types and communities' geographic boundaries); John J. Fahsbender, Note, An
Analytical Approach to Defining the Affected Neighborhood in the Environmental Justice Context, 5
N.Y.U. ENvm. LJ. 120 (1996) (discussing importance of boundary-drawing to assessing claims
of distributional injustice and suggesting factors to be considered in the process).
33. Few would say that a "proportionate" distribution means an absolutely equal distribu-
tion. If pure equality were required, then the goal of equality would end up trumping many of
the other factors that determine an ideal distribution. Zoning, designed to organize land uses
to eliminate undesirable land use conflicts, would be undermined. Various land use character-
istics used to determine the desirability of siting certain types of land uses in certain areas, such
as proximity to railroads for businesses requiring access to transportation or stable soils for
heavy structures, would also become irrelevant. A community's desire for a particular land use
would become irrelevant. While environmental justice advocates are critical of many zoning
ordinances for concentrating noxious uses in poor or minority areas and are critical of many
siting decisions for unnecessarily placing LULUs in their neighborhoods, they do not suggest
that equality should take precedence over every other concern driving land use decisions.
But once the goal of absolute equality is rejected, one encounters the difficult and value-
laden task of determining what distribution is "proportionate." See Been, Undesirable Land Uses,
supra note 24, at 1028-55 (discussing and critiquing various conceptions of fairness in distribu-
tion of environmental burdens); Blais, supra note 10, 100-08 (discussing multiplicity of factors
that may explain why seemingly unequal distributions may be considered appropriate or even
desirable).
34. The studies have been somewhat controversial. Criticism of the studies falls into two
categories. The first category of criticism acknowledges that disproportionate burdens exist,
THE AMERICAN UNWERsriY LAw REvIEw [Vol. 47:221
distribution of hazardous sites, were central to the development of
the environmental justice movement. First, in a 1983 study the
United States General Accounting Office ("GAO") found a correla-
tion between the racial and economic demographics of communities
in eight southeastern states and the communities' proximity to haz-
ardous waste landfills.ss The second well-publicized study on dispro-
portionate burdens was conducted by the United Church of Christ
Commission for Racial Justice, which evaluated the racial and eco-
nomic composition of communities surrounding contaminated
sites.3 6 The Commission Report, published in 1987, concluded that
race was the most significant factor in predicting the likelihood of liv-
ing near a hazardous waste site. The Commission's data indicate
that income was the next most important factor.m  A 1994 follow-up
study, Toxic Wastes and Race Revisited, found that the average per-
centage of nonwhites who live near hazardous waste sites had in-
creased since the 1987 study.9 Regional studies of the demographics
of hazardous facilities have documented similar distributional dis-
parities.0
but questions whether they are attributable to discriminatory treatment. See, e.g., Been, Unde-
sirable Land Uses, supra note 24, at 1014-15; Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority
Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103YALEL.J. 1383 (1994) [hereinafter
Been, Market Dynamics]; Richard A. Samp, Fairness for Sale in the Marketplace, 9 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 503 (1994); cf. Daniel Kevin, "Environmental Racism" and Locally Undesirable
Land Uses: A Critique of Environmental Justice Theories and Remedies, 8 VIIL. ENVrL. LJ. 121, 138
(implying possibility that disparate impacts might exist). The second category of criticism
questions whether the disproportionate burdens asserted by the environmental justice move-
ment exist at all. See, e.g., Blais, supra note 10, at 85-87; Kevin, supra, at 133-38; cf Blas, supra
note 10, at 80 (questioning whether admittedly disproportionate distribution of allegedly un-
desirable land uses is necessarily unfair from host community's perspective).
The distinction is important. Authors in the first category acknowledge the presence or
possibility of distributional injustice, notwithstanding their skepticism about whether the distri-
butional injustice resulted from political injustice. It is only the authors in the second category
who contend that the environmental justice movement does not present legitimate claims for
either distributive or political justice.
35. The GAO Report found that African-Americans comprised the majority of the popula-
tion near three of the four landfills identified within the study area. See GAO REPORT, supra
note 7, at 1. In addition, the landfills were all located in areas that were relatively poor. See id.
app. 1, at 4.
36. See UCC REPORT, supra note 7. The report found that the average percentage of mi-
norities located in communities near commercial hazardous waste facilities was significantly
greater than that of communities without such facilities. See id. at xiii, 13, 23. The UCC Report
also found that people of color were more likely to live near an "uncontrolled" hazardous waste
site, such as an abandoned facility or landfill, than whites. See id. at xiv-xv, 13, 17, 23.
37. See id. at 13, 15-16, 23.
38. See id. at 41-42.
39. See DR. BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA FITTON, ToxIcWASTEs AND RACE REvIsrrED 2-5
(Center for Policy Alternatives 1994). The updated study was co-sponsored by the United
Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, the Center for Policy Alternatives, and the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
40. See, e.g., Been, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 24, at 1012-13 (discussing studies in
NewJersey, Louisiana, Texas, Los Angeles, and Saint Louis).
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Studies of non-hazardous LULUs indicate that they are also dis-
proportionately located in minority or low-income communities.
While the evidence is somewhat limited, regional studies have docu-
mented disparate burdens of non-hazardous waste disposal facilities,4'
and of social service facilities such as homeless shelters, homes for
the mentally disabled, and halfway houses. 2
Environmental justice concerns are not only raised by the distribu-
tion of specific facilities or contamination sites;43 they are also raised
in connection with environmentally hazardous living or working en-
vironments." Studies have shown a correlation between race and ex-
posure to air pollution, between race and lead poisoning, between
race and pesticides, and between race and exposure to occupational
hazards.'
b. Environmental justice as political justice
Environmental justice implicates not only distributive justice, but
also political justice. What I term "political justice" concerns the
fairness of the decisionmaking process.46 Professor Ronald Dworkin
captures this conception ofjustice with his reference to the ideal that
all citizens should be treated "with equal concern and respect."4 7 For
41. See, e.g., Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 624-25 & n.17 (describing stud-
ies on distribution of garbage dumps).
42. See, e.g., Been, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 24, at nn.61-67 & accompanying text
(discussing studies finding disparities in the distribution of social service facilities).
43. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text (discussing distribution of specific LU-
LUs).
44. See generally RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR
DISCOuRsE 3 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) [hereinafterA TIME FOR DISCOURSE]
(containing studies correlating race and poor environmental conditions).
45. See, e.g., Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 625 n.17 (discussing studies
documenting such correlations).
46. Neither the imposition of an undesirable land use nor the denial of an environmental
benefit means, per se, that the decision to impose the harm or deny the benefit was politically
unjust. As Professor Dworkin notes, if a group's interest"is taken into account it may nonethe-
less be outweighed by the interests of others who will gain from the policy." DWORKIN, supra
note 28, at 273. Political justice concerns fair treatment; it does not guarantee particular re-
suIts.
47. Id. at 272-73; see also Been, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 24, at 1063-64 (quoting
Professor Dworkin and stating that decision-making process could be considered unjust if it
"failed to treat people with 'equal concern and respect,' instead valuing certain people less
than others"). Dworkin identifies two distinct forms of equality within the phrase"equal con-
cern and respect." DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 273. One is the "right to equal treatment, that
is, to the same distribution of goods or opportunities as anyone else has or is given." Id. In this
sense, "equal concern and respect" is about distributive justice. The second form of equality
within the phrase "equal concern and respect" is "the right to treatment as an equal." Id. As
Dworkin states: "This is the right, not to an equal distribution of some good or opportunity,
but the right to equal concern and respect in the political decision about how these goods and
opportunities are to be distributed." Id. The use of the term "equal concern and respect" in
this Article refers to this second form ofjustice.
Professor Dworkin considers the right to "treatment as an equal" to be more "fundamental"
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example, if an African-American neighborhood rather than a white
neighborhood was selected as the site for a new prison because the
decisionmakers valued the interests of the white neighborhood more
than the interests of the African-American neighborhood, then the
African-American neighborhood was not treated with equal concern
and respect. More generally, the familiar term "environmental ra-
cism" describes a type of political injustice-namely, the failure to
treat minority communities with the same concern and respect as
white communities.4
Claims for environmental justice often include both distributive
and political components. Using the prison-siting example, the Afri-
can-American community may be concerned about such issues as the
impact of the prison on the quality of life, property values, and the
like. But the community may be as or more concerned about the de-
cision as symptomatic of the lack of respect the decisionmaking body
has for the community. The community may view the decision as in-
dicative of their lack of status in the body politic.
4 9
than the "right to equal treatment." Id. In other words, he considers political justice to be
more important than distributive justice. While accepting his distinction between the two
forms ofjustice, this Article recognizes both as significant without attempting to prioritize be-
tween them.
48. Race-based injustice is only one form of political injustice. Siting decisions may favor
neighborhoods of rich potential political contributors rather than neighborhoods of poor un-
registered voters; neighborhoods of one political party rather than neighborhoods of another,
neighborhoods that have lobbied for their interests rather than neighborhoods which have
not; neighborhoods that decisionmakers relate to on a cultural level rather than neighbor-
hoods that are culturally distinct. In all of these instances, the disfavored community is not re-
ceiving equal concern and respect. That said, some forms of preference may be considered
more harmful than others. This Article presumes that preferences for dominant groups (such
as whites and the wealthy) at the expense of less powerful groups (such as minorities and the
poor) are objectionable because they are inconsistent with social justice.
49. Some have explained decisions resulting in disproportionate burdens by reference to
the burdened groups' lack of political and economic power. See, e.g., Anthony R. Chase, Assess-
ing and Addressing Problems Posed by Environmental Racism, 45 RUTGERs L. REv. 335, 346 (1993)
(suggesting that minorities' lack of political representation may be one cause of environmental
racism); Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 628 (same); Gauna, supra note 6, at 32-
33 (explaining view that poor and minority communities are intentionally targeted because
they lack political power); RichardJ. Lazarus, Pursuing"EnvironmentalJustice": The Distributional
Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 806-11 (1992) [hereinafter Lazarus,
Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice"] (suggesting that minorities' lack of political power may be one
cause of environmental inequities); Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90
MICH. L. REv. 394, 399 (1991) [hereinafter Godsil, RemedyingEnvironmentalRacism] (same); see
also Blais, supra note 10, at 90, 120 & n.184 (summarizing views of writers on this issue). The
problem, under this conception, is that the pluralist model of decisionmaking fails citizens
lacking political and economic power. Se Brion, supra note 24, at 439-54 (describing how plu-
ralist decision-making model fails to take into consideration lack of influence citizens, espe-
cially poorer citizens, have on siting decisions); cf. William A. Shutkin, The Origins of Environ-
mental Justice: The Concept of Environmental Justice and a Reconception of Democracy, 14 VA. ENVrL
LJ. 579, 579-80 (1995) (suggesting that environmental justice movement provides opportunity
to improve democratic participation in decision-making processes).
The implication of this assessment is that greater power would result in decisions that better
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There is some debate regarding the role that claims for political
justice-and more particularly claims of racial discrimination-
should play in the environmental justice movement. As Professor
Gerald Torres has observed, the environmental justice movement
arose out of the civil rights movement and is therefore inclined to
apply civil rights theories and approaches.f Environmental harms
suffered by minorities are often presumed to be a result of
"environmental racism.""' Professor Torres wisely cautions against a
premature allegation of environmental racism, particularly where the
movement presumes (without more) that existing disparities are the
result of discriminatory decisions.52 He observes that the reasons for
an existing distributional inequity may often be more complex than
is suggested by the allegation of racist intent.53 Professor Torres ad-
vises the environmental justice movement to use the charge of racism
carefully lest its importance and power be diluted by its application
to circumstances where its use may be unwarranted.54
Professor Torres, however, goes one step farther. He argues that
the movement's emphasis on racism "seems designed to begin a rela-
tively fruitless search for a wrong-doer, or in other words, the bad
person with evil intent .... [T] his is probably the wrong road to fol-
low if real changes for the communities at risk are to be achieved."55
Professor Torres acknowledges the existence of a "subcategory" of ac-
tivities that could be characterized as racist, or, in his terms, consid-
ered "part of a system of racial subordination." This subcategory,
however, is simply a "subset of a more general category of inquiry
that has as its object a close examination of the distributional effects
represent the affected community's interests. But the pursuit ofjustice as described in this Ar-
ticle-justice as equal respect and concern for all-would require that such respect be given
regardless of the political or economic power of any particular group. As a practical matter,
however, increasing the political and economic strength of certain groups would allow them to
fare better in a less than ideal political context. To the extent that a community is able to
demonstrate that it has been treated unjustly, its capacity to embarrass the decisionmaking
body with that proof could serve to increase the community's political power. Power may be
the only practical route to receiving equal concern and respect.
50. See Torres, EnvironmntalJustie supra note 10, at 602, 604.
51. See id. at 602-03. See generally ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990) [hereinafter BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE] (arguing that the
disproportionate presence of undesirable sites in minority neighborhoods is the result of racial
bias). Cases raising intentional racial discrimination in siting disputes have, however, failed to
meet the high evidentiary burden for proving discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause. See infra note 151 and accompanying text (citing cases and commentary).
52. SeeTorres, EnvironmentalJustice, supra note 10, at 603.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 602-05.
55. Id. at 602.
56. Id. at 604.
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of environmental policy. 57 Thus, under Professor Torres' charac-
terization, the pursuit of political justice is generally "the wrong road
to follow" and, even where merited, it is a sideline to the more im-
portant issue of distributive justice.
Professor Torres' concerns regarding the danger of "knee-jerk"
and unsubstantiated accusations of racism are well taken. That
charges of racism should be used cautiously does not, however, mean
that the pursuit of political justice should be minimized in compari-
son with the pursuit of distributive justice. In many local settings, the
political justice element of the environmental justice movement is as
central as the achievement of improved environmental quality.
When a legitimate question of fair process arises, the environmental
issue becomes "a single dimension of an overall social condition."'
As such, local grassroots debates about individual decisions with envi-
ronmental consequences become steps in a much larger effort to in-
crease the political status of the burdened community.
Questions of political justice arise in a number of different settings,
from the typical siting dispute to government policy, enforcement, or
remediation decisions. In the siting context, a question of political
justice would arise if a community believed that it had been selected
for an undesirable use due to the decisionmakers' failure to treat that
community with the same concern and respect given to other com-
munities.6 The environmental literature frequently illuminates this
form of injustice by reference to a California study on siting waste in-
61cinerators. In 1984, a private company, Cerrell Associates, com-
57. Id.
58. See id. at 602, 604.
59. Walter Willard, Environmental Racism: The Merging of Civil Rights and Environmental Ac-
tivism, 19 S.U. L. REV. 77, 80 (1992);see also Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism, supra note
12, at 30 (stating that"[t]he quest for environmental justice.. extends the quest for basic civil
rights"); Foster, supra note 27, at 748 (observing that "decisionmaking power and procedures"
and "social structures and institutional contexts," rather than distributive outcomes, are central
to environmental racism (quoting IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIF.
FERENCE 18, 20 (1990)));Jordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 90 (stating that, in environmental
justice disputes, the fundamental issues are "[w]ho shall choose, and how shall the choices be
made?").
Professor Torres' reference to "environmental policy" suggests that his focus may be di-
rected toward the environmental justice movement's critique of environmental law and envi-
ronmental institutions. In that limited domain, the search for a "wrong-doer" may indeed by
misguided and, potentially, counter-productive. Perceived more broadly, however, the envi-
ronmental justice movement's grassroots, localized thrust for greater fairness in local deci-
sionmaking has as much to do with political as distributive justice. As Professor Bullard has
stated: "What do grassroot leaders want? These leaders are demanding a shared role in the
decision-making processes that affect their communities. They want participatory democracy
to work for them." Bulard, EnvironmentalJusticeforAll, supra note 23, at xvii.
60. See, e.g., GAY, supra note 11, at 21-25 (describing tendency to target minority communi-
ties for undesirable land uses).
61. See Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism, supra note 12, at 18.
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pleted a much-publicized report on behalf of the California Waste
Management Board entitled Political Difficulties Facing Waste-to-
Energy Conversion Plant Siting.62 The report concluded that "all so-
cioeconomic groupings tend to resent the nearby siting of major fa-
cilities, but middle and upper socioeconomic strata possess better re-
sources to effectuate their opposition. Middle and higher socio-
economic strata neighborhoods should not fall within the one-mile
and five-mile radius of the proposed site."6
The implication of the Cerrell Associates' report is that decision-
makers should site facilities in poor rather than wealthy neighbor-
hoods to avoid the political opposition that wealthy communities
could more effectively mount. A siting decision supported by this ra-
tionale would fail to treat all communities with the "equal respect
and concern" essential to a fair decisionmaking process.
Most siting decisions are not, however, accompanied by the kind of
"smoking gun" presented by the Cerrell Associates report. Since
government and industry are unlikely to announce intentional dis-
crimination against low-income or minority communities, instances
of unfair treatment may be difficult to identify.6 A decision moti-
vated by discriminatory factors may be justified publicly with refer-
ence to allegedly neutral factors.6 In many cases, the discrimination
may be entirely unconscious.& Thus, instances of unfair treatment
may be more pervasive than is suggested by observing only explicit
acts of discrimination.67
Questions concerning the fairness of decisionmaking processes
also arise when federal, state, or local governments make environ-
mental policy decisions. 68 Environmental policy choices may favor
certain groups by providing them with more benefits or burdens
62. See id. (citing Cerrell Associates' report).
63. Id. (quoting Cerrell Associates' report).
64. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (suggesting that overt discrimination of post-
slavery era has been sublimated and is therefore rarely made explicit).
65. See id. at 319 (describing assertion that racism hides behind race-neutral justifications).
66. See id. at 328-44 (discussing psychological theories and evidence on unconscious ra-
cism).
67. Professor Blais' contention that "political and private officials who make siting deci-
sions are rarely accused of engaging in intentional, consistent race discrimination," Blais, supra
note 10, at 81, seems somewhat at odds with the depiction of the movement presented by its
advocates. Concerns about discrimination are often at the center of environmental justice dis-
putes.
68. See generally Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice," supra note 49 (discussing the sig-
nificance of governmental environmental policy decisions on distributional outcomes); Torres,
Environmental Burdens, supra note 29 (discussing importance of injecting environmental justice
concerns into governmental decisions affecting the environment).
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than others.' For example, if saving open space were to become a
governmental priority over slowing pollution in urban areas, that pol-
icy choice would be to the benefit of those already living in more re-
mote areas, such as the suburbs. Poorer urban communities would
be less likely to receive a benefit from such a policy choice. Thus, to
the extent that decisions are made that appear less likely to consider
the needs of minority or low-income communities, such communities
may not be receiving equal concern and respect in the decisionmak-
ing process.
Environmental enforcement decisions may also favor some at the
expense of others. Agencies lack sufficient funds to enforce every
violation, and enforcement agencies have considerable discretion in
choosing enforcement priorities.70 Enforcement issues arise in con-
nection with many different types of environmental laws, including
national, state, and local pollution control laws, laws establishing ag-
ricultural pesticide practices, laws to alleviate lead poisoning, and the
like. To the extent governmental decision-makers place less priority
on enforcement in communities of color and low-income communi-
ties, these communities may not receive "equal concern and re-
spect."
71
Where environmental contamination has already occurred, fed-
eral, state, and local governments likewise have considerable discre-
tion in determining how and when to remediate contaminated sites.7
If the government's remediation decisions are influenced by the
demographics of the communities adjoining contaminated areas, the
decisionmaking process could be considered unjust. According to a
1992 study conducted by the National Law Journal, uncontrolled haz-
ardous waste sites located near minority or low-income communities
69. See Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice," supra note 49, at 792-806 (discussing dis-
tributional implications of environmental policy decisions).
70. See id. at 816-17; see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (Brennan,J., con-
curring) (holding that agency's enforcement decisions are "generally committed to an agency's
absolute discretion").
71. See Robert R. Kuehn, Remedying the Unequal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 9 ST.
JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 625, 640, 648-51 (1994) (describing enforcement provisions of nu-
merous environmental statutes and suggesting that enforcement behavior may be skewed by
political pressures and racism); see also GAY, supra note 11, at 25-26. There is, however, rela-
tively little data on differential enforcement practices. See Gauna, supra note 6, at 34-36
(discussing enforcement of environmental laws and lack of data on differential enforcement
practices); Kuehn, supra, at 627-34 (discussing and criticizing exsisting studies on potentially
discriminatory enforcement patterns); Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentaLJustie, " supra note 49,
at 818-19 (same).
72. See, e.g., Wells v. United States, 851 F.2d 1471, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that
"[the Administrator's] decision to order further study" and not clean up site immediately"was
based on economic, social and political policy decisions" and was within the bounds of his dis-
cretionary power).
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are being cleaned up at a slower rate than hazardous waste sites in
other areas73 The study also indicated that the remedies chosen for
these sites were not as protective of human health as those selected at
other sites.74 Other studies, however, have been less conclusive. 75
3. The relationship between distributive and political justice
The correlation-or lack thereof-between distributive and politi-
cal justice has been a subject of much dispute. Does an unjust proc-
ess necessarily lead to an unjust distribution? Does a just process
necessarily lead to a just distribution? Or, phrased conversely, is an
unjust distribution necessarily the result of an unjust process, and a
just distribution necessarily the result of ajust process? What is clear
is that no absolutes can be stated; the extent of the correlation will
depend upon the particular facts associated with particular claims
and how those facts are interpreted.
The first question to be addressed is whether political injustice
necessarily results in distributive injustice. If a community consis-
tently fails to be treated with equal concern and respect, then an
unequal distribution of burdens can be expected, particularly over
time. If a county government consistently sites undesirable facilities,
such as landfills, jails, bus depots and the like in certain neighbor-
hoods because it values those neighborhoods less than others, then
the burdened neighborhoods are likely to have a disproportionate
share of undesirable facilities in comparison with more favored
neighborhoods. Thus, under some circumstances unjust processes
could lead to unjust distributions. Conversely, unjust distributions
could, under such circumstances, be indicative of an unjust process.
In a given decision, however, the failure to treat a neighborhood
with equal concern and respect does not necessarily result in an un-
just distribution. For example, a regional government concerned
about upsetting its wealthy supporters in a suburban community may
instead site a facility in a rural poor community. The decisionmaking
process could thus be considered "unjust" because it failed to con-
sider all communities with equal concern and respect. If the rural
73. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, UnequalProtection: The RacialDivide in Environmental
Law, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 21, 1992, at $1-$12; see also Kuehn, supra note 71, at 634-38 (discussing
studies of demographics associated with cleanup of hazardous waste sites, and noting that pres-
ence and extent of correlation varied by study).
74. See Kuehn, supra note 71, at 634-35 (presenting National Law Journal findings); see also
GAY, supra note 11, at 26-27 (same).
75. See Blais, supra note 10, at 87-89 (reviewing studies critical of contention of disparate
enforcement and cleanup efforts); Kuehn, supra note 71, at 635-38 (discussing studies of clean-
ups finding no disparity in cleanup rates or explaining disparity through reference to factors
unrelated to race or poverty).
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poor community contained few undesirable land uses, however, sit-
ing the waste facility in the poor community would not result in a
disproportionate distribution, notwithstanding the unfairness of that
decisionmaking process. Conversely, the fact that a decision does not
impose a disproportionate impact on a community does not mean
that the community does not have a claim of political injustice.
This begs the second question: does political justice necessarily re-
sult in distributive justice? If all communities are consistently treated
with equal concern and respect, one would expect that no group of
citizens would be forced to absorb a disproportionate share of unde-
sirable land uses. While any one community would have to cope with
the burden created by any particular decision, one would expect that,
over time, the distribution of burdens would even out.7 1 Conversely,
where undesirable land uses appear to be distributed in a manner
that does not require any one neighborhood to absorb a dispropor-
tionate amount, the distributive equity may be indicative of political
justice.
Nonetheless, under some circumstances, political justice may not
lead to distributive justice. For example, a decisionmaker may give
all communities equal concern and respect, but may nonetheless se-
lect a site that increases the distributional disparity between the se-
lected community and other communities. Decisions regarding the
siting of undesirable land uses turn on a wide range of factors.7
Thus, the suitability of the site based on nondemographic factors
may be important enough to override the unfair distribution that its
placement causes. 78
In addition, what some may consider an "unfair" distribution may
be a desirable distribution to others. For example, low-income
neighborhoods may encourage industrial uses in the hope of increas-
ing jobs.7 In such instances, the siting decision might serve rather
76. As discussed supra note 33, defining what constitutes a "disproportionate" burden is
itself a daunting challenge subject to varying interpretations. Because absolute equality in dis-
tribution is unlikely to be a desirable end, the task is to define what distribution is
.proportionate." To the extent that zoning laws concentrate land uses to ensure that no one
endures certain types of burdens, the concentration of land uses is not necessarily unjust.
Where the concentration impacts on certain residential users more than others, however, the
issue of proportionality arises.
77. See, e.g., Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D.
Tex. 1979) (observing the multiple factors relevant to siting decisions such as land values, tax
base, and health and safety issues), affd without op., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
78. See DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 273 (noting that even if a group's interest receives equal
concern and respect, it may nonetheless be outweighed by other factors).
79. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities [hereinafter
Bullard, Environmental Blackmail], in A TIME FOR DIScOURsE, supra note 44, at 82-95; Lazarus,
Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice, "supra note 49, at 808, 822-23.
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than disserve the poor or minority community.' Political justice-
treating all neighborhoods with equal concern and respect-may
mean creating distributional disparities where desired. Conversely,
the fact that a decision led to disproportionate results does not nec-
essarily mean that the decision was unjust.
The converse question of whether unjust distributions necessarily
result from unjust processes becomes even more important when
looking at distributional results over time. As previously noted, the
disproportionate result of a particular decision does not necessarily
mean that the process was unjust. More generally, what does the ex-
istence of current disparities say about prior patterns of decisionmak-
ing? There is some evidence that currently unjust distributions do
not necessarily result from past political injustice. Market dynamics
may cause demographic disparities to arise after a facility is sited.8' At
the time of a siting decision, an area may not be a low-income or mi-
nority area. The siting decision may, however, lower property values
and offer jobs, both of which may in turn attract lower income resi-
dents82 In addition, the siting of undesirable land uses may prompt
the departure of a community's wealthier or white residents.s Due to
economic constraints and housing discrimination, the community's
lower-income and minority residents may find it more difficult to
move, resulting in a higher concentration of minority and low-
income residents near the undesirable use than was present at the
time of the siting decision." Thus, a disproportionate burden could
arise even if earlier land use decisions were not politically unjust.
80. Professor Blais asserts that communities choose to take on environmental burdens in
exchange for non-environmental benefits, such as jobs and tax proceeds. If the pursuit of envi-
ronmental equity kept an already-burdened community from obtaining additional industry,
then the quest for environmental equity might deprive such a community of the opportunity to
obtain the non-environmental benefits. Thus, the quest for equity might work against the in-
terests of the communities it is designed to serve. SeeBlais, supra note 10, at 82-83, 105-08.
81. See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 34, at 1398; Samp, supra note 34, at 504-505. But
see Robert D. Bullard, The Legacy of American Apartheid and Environmental Racism, 9 ST. JOHN'SJ.
LEGAL COMMENT. 445, 460-66 (1994) [hereinafter Bullard, Legacy of American Apartheid]
(challenging methodology of Been's analysis of post-siting market dynamics and countering
assertion that disparities arose after siting); Charles P. Lord, Environmental Justice Law and the
Challenges Facing Urban Communitie, 14 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 721, 727-729 (1995) (countering asser-
tions that disparities arise after siting).
82. See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 34, at 1388-90; see also Blais, supra note 10, at 114-
15 (describing increase in number of minority residents in Richmond, California as response
to jobs created by siting of environmentally sensitive land uses).
83. See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 34, at 1388-90; Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental
Racism, supra note 12, at 21.
84. See Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism, supra note 12, at 21; see also Blais, supra
note 10, at 118-20 (recognizing lack of housing mobility for minorities, but asserting that that
problem should be addressed directly rather than through efforts to achieve distributional eq-
uity of environmentally sensitive land uses).
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A conclusion that a particular decisionmaking process under scru-
tiny is just, however, does not mean that the question of political jus-
tice is irrelevant.as While a siting decision may have been based on
an allegedly neutral factor, such as cost, that factor itself may be a
consequence of discrimination. 6 For example, where cost appears to
have been the driving force behind a siting decision, it must be asked
why land values are cheaper in minority areas. Where a low-income
or minority community advocates for an environmentally undesirable
facility to increase employment opportunities, it must be asked why
the poor and minorities must encourage industrial uses detrimental
to their health when wealthier communities are not faced with such
dilemmas. And with respect to disparities in distribution that arise
after a siting decision due to the higher mobility of white and more
affluent residents, it must be asked why it is easier for white or
wealthy residents to move away from an undesirable use than minor-
ity or low-income residents, even if the initial siting decision was not
discriminatory.8'
Thus, even if disproportionate burdens are not caused directly by
unfair siting decisions, they may nonetheless reflect deeper problems
of political injustice. For that reason, many in the environmental jus-
tice movement focus not only on particular local battles regarding fa-
cilities or environmental conditions, but on broader questions of so-
cial and economic justice as well.89
85. See GAY, supra note 11, at 28 (arguing that a recognition that minorities experience
disproportionate levels of environmental risk because of "housing patterns, land ownership
and use, and lack of political power" does not answer the underlying question of why these
conditions continue to be exploited).
86. See Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to Environ-
mental Racim 11 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 495, 496 (1992) ("Because racial inequalities snowball, it is
difficult to disentangle cause and effect... ."); Lord,supra note 81, at 728 (describing a variety
of social and economic factors that contribute to disparate siting in Boston area); see also Or-
lando E. Delogu, "NIMBY"Is A National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D. L. REV. 198, 206 (1990)
(observing that poor municipalities are increasingly reluctant "to see themselves as LULU
dumping grounds capable of being bought by market forces").
87. See GAY, supra note 11, at 21 (describing "job blackmail" which forces workers of color
to accept environmentally hazardous facilities in order to obtain jobs which are otherwise
scarce due to racial discrimination); Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism, supra note 12, at
22-23 (same); Bullard, Environmental Blackmail, supra note 79, at 82-95 (same); Lazarus,
Pursuing "Environmental Justice, "supr a note 49, at 808 (same).
88. See Lord, supra note 81, at 728 (describing limited housing options for people of color
in Boston); see also Blais, supra note 10, at 118-20, 126-27 (acknowledging that minorities and
poor have less mobility than others, but indicating that some may nonetheless prefer living
close to environmentally sensitive land uses).
89. See Dana Alston, Introduction, in WE SPEAK FOR OURSELVES, supra note 12, at 3 (noting
that communities of color have integrated environmental concerns into broader agenda em-
phasizing social, racial, and economic justice); Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 5, at 67 (noting
that "this struggle for environmental parity for all races is inextricably linked to an aggressive
overall social justice agenda"); Foster, supra note 27, at 731-38 (discussing need to move beyond
focus on disproportionate outcomes and beyond focus on individual acts of discrimination to
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C. Achieving EnvironmentalJustice
Many in the environmental justice movement are exploring
mechanisms to prevent environmental injustices from occurring or
to provide remedies where they have already occurred. Some of the
remedies directly address questions of distributive or political justice.
Other proposals, however, are more instrumental: they use legal
mechanisms unrelated to questions of 'Justice" to accomplish par-
ticular ends.
Most of the attention on the use of environmental laws in the pur-
suit of environmental justice has focused on their ability to provide
an instrumental means to the goal of stopping a project.9° A siting
agency's violation of substantive standards imposed by environmental
laws would provide one basis for a legal challenge. For example, if a
local government allowed a wetland to be filled without a permit, an
adjoining community could bring suit under applicable federal regu-
lations.91 Similarly, if a proposed development violated a local zoning
code, the violation could provide the basis for a legal challenge.
Violations of procedural rules, many of which are established by
environmental laws, present another potential basis for instrumental
lawsuits. For example, if a decisionmaking body neglects to provide
the required notice of a hearing, that omission could provide a basis
for a legal challenge-even if the lack of appropriate notice did not
consider social and economic context that leads to such disparities); Gauna, supra note 6, at 12
(stating that environmental justice activists "see environmental problems as only one part of the
larger social issues of racism and cultural and economic injustice"), 27-31 (arguing for "social
justice" perspective on environmentalism); Michael Gelobter, Toward a Model of Environmental
Discrimination, in A TIME FOR DISCOURSE, supra note 44, at 74 (arguing that environmental dis-
crimination should "be seen as the interaction of internal processes, external structures, and
wider ideological and historical contexts and understandings"); Michael Guerrero & Louis
Head, The Environment-Redefining the Issue in WE SPEAK FOR OURSELVES, supra note 12, at 11
(noting the importance of "defining how environmental issues fit within a social, racial and
economic justice framework); Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice, "supra note 49, at 825-26
(noting that "distributional inequities that appear to exist in environmental protection are un-
doubtedly the product of broader social forces" and that environmental justice problems will
not ultimately be solved without attention to broader issues of discrimination and poverty);
Torres, EnvironmentalJustic4 supra note 10, at 617-21 (suggesting need to place environmental
justice concerns within broader objective of achieving sustainable development).
90. See generally Luke J. Cole, EnvironmentalJustice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling,
21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 523, 526-28 (1994) [hereinafter Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation]
(describing use of environmental laws on behalf of poor and minority communities); Michael
B. Gerrard, The Role of Existing Environmental Legislation in the Environmental Justice Movement, 9
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 555 (1994) [hereinafter Gerrard, Role of Existing Legislation]
(discussing environmental laws that could be useful to communities opposing siting decisions
or seeking to improve environmental conditions).
91. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (regulations for obtaining permit to fill wetlands pursuant to the
Clean Water Act).
92. See Cole, EnvironmentalJustice Litigation, supra note 90, at 527-28.
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materially affect the decisionmaking process and its fairness.93 While
all of these legal challenges may accomplish the desired end (e.g.,
they may defeat a proposal to site a LULU in a poor minority neigh-
borhood), they do not directly address the perceived unfairness of
the decisionmaking process or its distributional outcome. Suits
about wetland permits, zoning code violations, or hearing notifica-
tions will not, generally speaking, raise the issues of justice that may
have motivated the suits. As stated by attorney Michael Gerrard,
"[w] here the communities are able to participate in the legal process
to fight facilities, often they are required to focus on objections that
are peripheral to their substantive concerns."94
The remainder of this Section explores mechanisms explicitly de-
signed to raise issues of distributive and political justice. As Professor
Vicki Been has suggested, such proposed remedies are best under-
stood with reference to the particular form of injustice they are in-
tended to cure. 5 The types of remedies can be grouped into the two
basic categories discussed above: remedies designed to achieve dis-
tributional justice, and remedies designed to achieve political jus-
tice.96
1. Achieving distributional justice
Remedies for distributional injustice include both preventive and
remedial approaches. The preventive approach involves the consid-
eration of demographic impacts in the decisionmaking process. The
remedial approach involves identifying and developing legal reme-
dies where a perceived distributional injustice has already occurred.
a. Improving distributional outcomes
The most well-known effort to improve the distributional outcomes
of environmental decisionmaking is President Clinton's February
93. To the extent that the procedural challenge goes to the fairness of the decisionmaling
process, then the environmental law claim would be more than instrumental; it would present
an issue of political justice. Such claims are discussed infra notes 145-49 and accompanying
text.
94. Gerrard, Role of Existing Legislation, supra note 90, at 559.
95. SeeVicki Been, Conceptions of Fairness in Proposalsfor Facility Siting, 5 MD.J. OF CONTEMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 13, 13 (1994) [hereinafter Been, Conceptions ofFairness].
96. Professor Been further differentiates the forms ofjustice in question. Under distribu-
tive justice, she considers conceptions of fairness requiring the equal division of the burdens of
LULUs, schemes that would equally disperse them, schemes that would equalize the benefits
and burdens of siting by providing compensation to burdened communities, and remedies that
would require more LULUs to be sited in areas currently free from them in order to address
the past history of undesirable land uses in minority areas. See Been, Undesirable Land Uses, su-
pra note 24, at 1028-52. Under "fairness as process," Professor Been considers remedies ad-
dressing intentional race discrimination and remedies to encourage "treatment as equals" in
the decisionmaking process. See id. at 1060-68.
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1994 Executive Order 12,898, entitled "Federal Actions To Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations."9 7 The Order addresses distributive justice as well asjus-
tice in the decisionmaking process.98 The Executive Order states that
"each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part
of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, dispro-
portionately high and adverse human health or environmental ef-
fects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations
and low-income populations....""
The Order further requires all federal agencies to develop an envi-
ronmental justice strategy that identifies the distributional implica-
tions of existing programs and requires the agencies to propose revi-
sions to improve distributional fairness.'0° It mandates that federal
agencies gather information regarding demographic consequences,' °
and requires government agencies to consider the demographic im-
plications of their decisions.'0 By explicitly requiring that demo-
graphic information be gathered and incorporated into decisionmak-
ing processes, environmental justice advocates hope that the
Executive Order will lead to a fairer distribution of the consequences
of federal agency actions.'03
The Executive Order makes clear that existing laws, such as the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), already require agen-
cies to consider demographic effects. NEPA requires the preparation
97. SeeExec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995).
98. The distributional aspects of the Executive Order are discussed here. The provisions
applicable to improving the decisionmaking process are discussed infra notes 141-44 and ac-
companying text, which address mechanisms for achieving political justice.
99. Exec. Order No. 12,898,3 C.F.R. § 1-101.
100. See id.
101. See generally id. § 1-102(b) (requiring interagency working group to collect data and
public input regarding environmental justice); id. § 1-103(a) (requiring agencies to assess pro-
gram impacts on minority and low-income communities); id. § 1-103(a)(3) (requiring im-
proved research and data collection on effects on both minority and low-income populations);
id. § 3-301(a) (requiring that epidemiological and clinical studies include members of high risk
groups, such as minority and low-income populations). The absence of demographic data and
data linking environmental conditions to health risks has been considered a major obstacle to
proving or addressing environmental justice problems. See Chase, supra note 49, at 347-53
(noting difficulties involved in relating environmental hazards to race and income); Crawford,
supra note 6, at 280 (observing the importance of more data "evidencing actual physical harm
to communities burdened by the siting of undesirable facilities" to bringing discrimination
claims under the equal protection clause). Because the Order requires the government to
gather needed demographic information, it has been considered a key step in overcoming this
obstacle. See Sebastian C. Pugliese III, Comment, EnvironmentalJustice: Lowering Barriers to Par-
ticipation, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1177, 1205-06.
102. See Exec. Order 12,898, 3 C.F.R § 859, § 2.2.
103. See Gerald Torres, Changing the Way Government Views EnvironmentalJustice, 9 ST.JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 543, 547-51 (1994) [hereinafter Torres, Changing the Way] (examining
benefits to be gained from the Executive Order).
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of an environmental impact statement ("EIS") in connection with all
major federal actions having a significant environmental impact.'
4
The White House memorandum on the Executive Order explicitly
states that "[e] ach Federal agency shall analyze the environmental ef-
fects, including human health, economic and social effects, of Fed-
eral actions, including effects on minority communities and low-
income communities, when such analysis is required by [NEPA]."'05
The Council on Environmental Quality, the agency responsible for
NEPA regulations, has issued an Interim Final Guidance to explain
implementation of the Executive Order in the NEPA context'
6
Similarly, the Executive Order makes clear that, under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 10 federally funded programs and agen-
cies are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or
national origin' °8 The regulations implementing Title VI indicate
that Title VI applies to activities having disparate impacts as well as
those motivated by discriminatory intent.' 9 To conform with Title
VI, federally funded programs and agencies must therefore consider
and avoid imposing disproportionate burdens.
Legislative efforts to prevent distributive inequalities in siting deci-
sions have met with mixed results. At the federal level, such efforts
included the Environmental Justice Act of 1993"0 and the Environ-
mental Equal Rights Act of 1993."' Had they been successful, these
104. See42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
105. President's Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
279, 280 (Feb. 11, 1994) [hereinafter President's Memorandum on EnvironmentalJustice];see
alsoJohnson, supra note 25, at 579-80 & n.74 (discussing Memorandum's reference to NEPA
requirements). According to some commentators, NEPA itself can be read to require consid-
eration of demographic impacts. See id. at 580-88; Ross, supra note 25, at 356-60, 366-69.
Moreover, NEPA regulations also address the problem of distributional justice-the prob-
lem of unfair concentrations of undesirable uses-by requiring consideration of cumulative
impacts. See Ross, supra, at 367-68. A cumulative impact is "the impact on the environment
which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present,
and reasonably forseeable future actions regardless of what agency... or person undertakes
such other actions." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1996). Under this reading, the Executive Order sim-
ply renders agencies' existing authority explicit.
106. SeeJohnson, supra note 25, at 575 (referring to CEQ's draft guidance).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994).
108. President's Memorandum on Environmental Justice, supra note 105, at 280.
109. See Cole, EnvironmentalJusticeLitigation, supra note 90, at 531-32 (discussing applicabil-
ity of Title VI to actions causing disparate impacts).
110. The Environmental Justice Act of 1993, had it been enacted into law, would have re-
quired the federal government to designate as "Environmental High Impact Areas" the 100
areas having the greatest quantities of toxins. If health impact studies had shown adverse im-
pacts on human health, then the legislation would have prohibited siting any additional facili-
ties that could release significant quantities of toxins in that area. See Been, Undesirable Land
Uses, supra note 24, at 1069-72 (describing proposed legislation); Been, Conceptions of Fairness,
supra note 95, at 14, 20-22 (same); Bullard, Legacy of American Apartheid, supra note 81, at 471
(same).
111. The Environmental Equal Rights Act of 1993, had it been enacted into law, would have
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bills would have protected areas that were already heavily burdened
from the siting of certain additional undesirable facilities. 12 Legisla-
tion to require consideration of environmental justice issues has had
some success in a few states." s For example, New York City has
adopted a "fair share" approach to achieve distributional equity.1 4
Under the New York City Charter, the City must consider an area's
existing burden of undesirable land uses as a factor in deciding
where to place new facilities. 5
b. Challenging distributional injustice
Once a siting decision resulting in distributional inequity has oc-
curred, the question becomes the availability of redress. A remedy
would be available only where the burdened community could articu-
late a right to a particular distributional outcome. Where the bur-
dens of undesirable land uses have not been proportionately distrib-
uted, authors in the environmental justice movement have suggested
legal remedies based on "disparate impacts." In general, they argue
that if a minority area is already subject to a heavier burden of unde-
sirable land uses than a white area and the proposed siting would in-
tensify that impact, then the proposal could be said to have a
"disparate impact."116 On its face, the disparate impact test thus for-
required the government to identify the minority or low-income areas in the country that were
the most "environmentally disadvantaged," and would then have prohibited the siting of solid
or hazardous waste facilities in those communities. See Been, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note
24, at 1083-84 (discussing proposed legislation); Been, Conceptions of Fairness, supra note 95, at
17 (same); Bullard, Legacy of American Apartheid, supra note 81, at 471 (same).
112. Professor Orlando Delogu has suggested further legislation to guide land use deci-
sions throughout the nation. See Delogu, supra note 86, at 209-18. The legislation would,
among other things, require that "NIMBY burdens" be fairly distributed. See id. at 216. He
stresses that "rural, semi-depressed, or high unemployment regions in a state" should not be
targeted. See id. at 217.
113. See Blais, supra note 10, at 92-93 (referring to state and local efforts to improve distri-
butional burdens); Torres, EnvironmentalJustice supra note 10, at 613 n.43 (summarizing state
legislative efforts).
114. SeeN.Y. CrrYCHARTER, §§ 203-204 (1989); Been, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 24, at
15-16; Ross, supra note 25, at 372. The "fair share" approach is a version of the "fair share"
principles adopted by the NewJersey Supreme Court in its Mt. Laurel decisions. In these deci-
sions, the NewJersey court struck down zoning regulations that had the effect of excluding the
development of affordable housing. See South Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 92 NJ.
158 (1983) [hereinafter Mt. Laurel fl]; South Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J.
151 (1975) [hereinafter Mt. Laurel 1]. The court held that all communities had an affirmative
duty to provide housing opportunities for all income levels. See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 214-15;
Mt. Laurel 1, 67 NJ. at 174. To effectuate the principles enunciated by the court in these cases,
the NewJersey legislature passed the Fair Housing Act of 1985, which created a Council on Af-
fordable Housing designed to determine the "fair share" of housing each community in New
Jersey would be expected to permit. SeeNJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301-29 (West 1994).
115. SeeBeen, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 24, at 15-16 (discussing NewYork City Char-
ter).
116. See Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, supra note 49, at 422 (1991) (stating that,
under disparate impact test, "plaintiffs will have to show that the site will result in a burden on
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goes an inquiry into the decisionmaking process and the attitudes
motivating the siting decision."7  It is designed to prevent a further
intensification of disparate burdens.
Disparate impact tests have been suggested in a variety of contexts.
Attorney Rachel Godsil has suggested new legislation creating a dis-
parate impact test in connection with the siting of hazardous waste
facilities.18  The legislation could be modeled after civil rights laws
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"9 which prohibits
employment discrimination.2 2 To prove a violation of Title VII, a
plaintiff need not prove discriminatory intent; disparate impact is suf-
ficient.
12 1
Other authors have explored whether existing civil rights laws em-
ploying disparate impact tests could be useful in challenging siting
decisions that create or exacerbate distributional inequities. Recent
attention has focused on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which pro-
hibits discrimination in any federally funded program, including fed-
erally funded state, local, and private entities'22 Since Title VI's im-
plementing regulations apply to disparate impacts as well as motives,
Title VI may provide a potential remedy for distributional injustice.'
the community greater than the burden on a white community due to the presence of other pol-
lutants: uncontrolled toxic waste sites, solid waste landfills, or polluting industry").
117. See id. (explaining that disparate impact tests focus on "the consequences of site selection
rather than the motivations"). Although disparate impact tests ostensibly address only distribu-
tional issues, disparate impact tests could also be seen as a "proxy" for discriminatory intent. In
that sense, a disparate impact test could be seen as indirectly addressing political as well as dis-
tributivejustice.
118. See id. at 421-24; see also Been, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 24, at 1082-83
(discussing Godsil's proposal).
119. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17 (1994).
120. See Godsil, RenedyingEnvironmental Racism, supra note 49, at 421.
121. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427 (1971); Godsil, Remedying Environ-
mental Racism, supra note 49, at 421 (discussing disparate impact test articulated in Griggs). Like
some Title VII case law which has required an employer to show "business necessity" to rebut
an employee's claim of discriminatory impact, Godsil's proposal would shift the burden to the
defendant to demonstrate that the location chosen for a hazardous waste facility is an
.environmental necessity." Id. at 422-23 & nn.211, 214.
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation, supra note 90, at 531-34;
Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 25
ENVrL. L. 285 (1995); Kuehn, supra note 71, at 644; Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice,"
supra note 49, at 834-39; James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less Travelled: Pursuing Environmental
Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 125 (1994). In his
Memorandum on Environmental Justice, published in connection with Executive Order
12,898, President Clinton reminded federal agencies of their existing duty under Tide VI to
.ensure that all programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance... do not.., dis-
criminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin." President's Memorandum on Envi-
ronmental Justice, supra note 105, at 280.
123. Thus, if a federally-funded state or local agency were to site a facility, that siting process
could be subject to the regulations' restrictions on disparate impacts. See Cole, Environmental
Justice Litigation, supra note 90, at 531-32 (discussing regulations prohibiting various federal
agencies from causing discriminatory effects); Fisher, supra note 122, at 319-20 (same); Kuehn,
supra note 71, at 645 (discussing case law concerning disparate impacts under Title VI);
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Environmental justice advocates have also considered the potential
applicability of the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968.12' The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination "against
any person in the... sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision
of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin. "'25 As with Title
VI, Title VIII does not require a showing of intentional discrimina-
tion; discriminatory effect is sufficient. To meet the Act's goal of
providing "fair housing throughout the United States,"'27 the Act has
been interpreted as prohibiting actions that would have a segregative
effect'28 To the extent that a siting decision prompts white residents
to move but leaves minority residents in place due to their lesser
housing mobility, a siting decision could be seen as having a segrega-
tive effect actionable under Title VIII.' 9
In addition, unlike the United States Constitution's Equal Protec-
tion Clause, the equal protection clauses in some state constitutions
have been interpreted to apply to disparate impactsIs ° Communities
concerned about disparate environmental impacts in these states are
urged to consider bringing state-based equal protection challenges.'3'
Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice," supra note 49, at 834-35 (same). In addition, some
authors have suggested that Title VI requires that the federal government avoid discriminatory
effects in the administration of its pollution-control programs. See, e.g., Kuehn, supra, at 646-47
(suggesting use of Title VI to address disparate enforcement practices).
124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994); see also Alice L. Brown & Kevin Lyskowski, Environ-
mental justice and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (The Fair Housing Act), 14 VA. ENVrL. L.J.
741 (1995); Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation, supra note 90, at 534-37; Lazarus, Pursuing
"EnviromentalJustice, "supra note 49, at 839-41.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
126. See Brown & Lyskowski, supra note 124, at 744-45 (discussing Title VIII's discriminatory
impact test); Cole, EnvironmentalJustice Litigation, supra note 90, at 534-35 (same); Lazarus, Pur-
suing "EnvironmentalJustice, "supra note 49, at 839-40 (same).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (providing declaration of policies).
128. See Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation, supra note 90, at 535 (discussing Title VIII's
applicability to actions that could cause or exacerbate segregation).
129. See id. at 535-37 (describing how siting decisions could be linked to demographic shifts
having a segregative effect prohibited by Title VIII); supra notes 83-84, 88 and accompanying
text (describing how the siting of undesirable land uses can cause demographic shifts). See gn-
erally Brown & Lyskowski, supra note 124 (discussing applicability of Title VIII in the environ-
mental justice context).
130. See Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41
U. KAN. L. REV. 271, 302-05 (1992) (identifying state equal protection clauses applying a dispa-
rate impact test). The federal equal protection clause does not provide a remedy based upon
disparate impacts alone; discriminatory intent must be shown. See Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 239 (1976). Discriminatory intent implicates political rather than distributive justice.
See infra Part B.2.b. Some authors have urged that federal equal protection doctrine abandon
the discriminatory intent requirement and adopt a discriminatory impact test. See Omar
Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate Impact Test and Im-
proved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 211, 225-31 (1994);
Leslie Ann Coleman, Comment, It's the Thought That Counts: The Intent Requirement in Environ-
mental Racism Claims, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 447,481-84 (1993).
131. See Reich, supra note 130, at 300-05 (discussing potential for state equal protection
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If an agency fails to consider demographic impacts as required un-
der federal or state environmental review statutes, 2 that failure could
provide the basis for asserting a claim of distributional injustice.3 s
The remedy is somewhat limited, however, because NEPA has been
interpreted to impose only procedural, not substantive, require-
ments."" Thus, decisionmakers need not show that they have elimi-
challenges); see also Kary L. Moss, Race and Poverty Data as a Tool in the Struggle for Environmental
Justice 5 POVERTY & RACE 1, 3-4 (1996) (describing challenge against proposed incinerator
based on Michigan equal protection doctrine on grounds that Michigan's equal protection
clause recognizes disparate impact as basis for claim).
132. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (discussing environmental review statute
requirements for considering demographic impacts).
133. To date, the Executive Order's requirement that demographic impacts be considered
in conection with federal actions has had an impact in several proceedings. In 1997, the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("Licensing Board") denied a license to build a uranium
enrichment facility in a poor minority community in Louisiana, in part because the project ap-
plicant had, contrary to the Executive Order, failed to consider the racial impact of the facility.
See Peter Shinkle, Race Fact in Denial of Uranium Plant, THE BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, May 13,
1997, at Al.
In Newark, NewJersey, the State Department of Environmental Protection rejected a permit
for a sewage-sludge treatment facility because, pursuant to Executive Order 12,898, the agency
needed more time to consider the environmental justice implications of the proposed project.
See MaryAnn Spoto, Activists' Cry: Don't Dump on Newark Bay; Environmental Coalition Claims that
the Region is Already Overburdened, STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 24, 1997, at 33. See generally Thomas J.
Henderson et al., Analysis of Racially Disparate Impacts in the Siting of Environmental Hazards, 5
PovERTY & RACE 5, 6 (1996). Similarly, in September 1997, the Environmental Protection
Agency ordered Louisiana to rescind air permits issued to Shintech, Inc. for a proposed plastics
manufacturing facility pending further analyses, including further analysis of environmental
justice issues. See Bill Dawson, EPA Blocks Permits Given to Plant by La., Hous. CHRON., Sept. 11,
1997, at A25; Mike Dunne, Foes Cite Pollution, Injustice: Shintech Supporters Urge Jobs for Parish,
BATON ROUGE SUN. ADVOCATE, Jan. 25, 1998, at B1. Further hearings on the environmental
justice aspects of the siting process were held in January 1998. See Chris Gray, Experts Say Shin-
tech May Not Deliver Jobs But Some Defend Plant, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 24, 1998, at
Bi. The Environmental Protection Agency is expected to rule on a complaint alleging dis-
crimination in the siting process in April 1998. See id.
Even before Executive Order 12,898's explicit requirement to consider demographic im-
pacts in the NEPA review process, one community was able to use NEPA to require the consid-
eration of an African-American community's interests. In Houston v. City of Cocoa, No. 89-82-
CIV-ORL-19 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1989), an African-American community successfully challenged
a redevelopment plan that would have converted an historically black neighborhood into a
neighborhood of office buildings and luxury residences. See Torres, Environmental Burdens, su-
pra note 29, at 446-47. In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, the court made clear that
the National Environmental Policy Act requires the consideration of a project's impacts on ur-
ban as well as natural environments. See City of Cocoa, No. 89-82-CIV-ORL-19, slip op. at 14. The
court's ruling paved the way for a negotiated settlement under which the City and neighbor-
hood residents agreed to cooperate in the planning process. The parties agreed to find ways to
preserve the neighborhood's historic buildings and ensure the continued availability of afford-
able housing. SeeTorres, Environmental Burdens, supra, at 447.
134. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980). If
an agency subject to the review requirements fails to consider demographic impacts, that fail-
ure could be seen as an actionable procedural defect. If the agency does consider demo-
graphic impacts but chooses to go forward notwithstanding a disparate burden, the courts are
likely to defer to the agency's substantive decision. See id. at 227-28 ("Once an agency has made
a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to ensure
that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot interject itself
within the area of discretion of the executive as to... the action to be taken.").
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nated disparate demographic impacts; it is sufficient for them to
show that they have considered them.' More generally, while Ex-
ecutive Order 12,898 and its accompanying memo encourage the
consideration of demographic impacts, they make clear that the Or-
der does not create legally enforceable rights to equitable distribu-
tion.' 3
2. Achieving political justice
Environmental justice advocates concerned about political injus-
tice have recommended strategies both to improve decisionmaking
processes and to obtain recourse when such processes are believed to
have been discriminatory. Strategies to improve decisionmaking
processes are generally designed to encourage widespread public
participation. Where decisions have already been made, strategies
include litigation and political organizing.
a. Improving decisionmaking processes
Professor Sheila Foster has noted that focusing solely on distribu-
tional outcomes would fail to address political inequalities skewing
decisionmaking processes.3 7  She therefore advocates activism
"geared toward ensuring public participation in compiling, and ac-
cess to, information critical to environmental decisionmaking proc-
esses." l 8 This model "equates fair process with justice."'3 9 Professor
Foster notes that environmental laws requiring the consideration of a
proposed project's impacts and encouraging public participation in
the analysis of those impacts provide an existing model for achieving
fair decisionmaking.4 ° The expectation is that participation will in-
crease the possibility that decisionmakers will consider all interests
equally.
President Clinton's February 1994 Executive Order 12,898 not
only includes mechanisms to improve distributional outcomes; it is
also designed to improve the decisionmaking process. The Order is
135. SeeJohnson, supra note 25, at 596-97; see also supra note 134 and accompanying text.
136. See Exec. Order 12,898, 3 C.F.L § 6-609 (1995); President's Memorandum on Envi-
ronmentalJustice, supra note 105, at 280.
137. See Foster, supra note 27, at 746-49.
138. Id. at 749.
139. Id. at 750.
140. See id. at 751-52; see alsoJohnson, supra note 25, at 572-76 (discussing public participa-
tion aspects of NEPA); cf. Been, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 24, at 1071-74 (discussing and
critiquing environmental "impact statement" approach as means of achieving fair decisionmak-
ing process). Professor Foster suggests giving environmental impact statements greater weight
in the decisionmaking process, and, ideally, allowing a potential host community to decide for
itself whether it is willing to bear the risks of a proposed facility. See Foster, supra note 27, at
752.
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intended "to provide minority communities and low-income com-
munities access to public information on, and an opportunity for
public participation in, matters relating to human health or the envi-
ronment.... The Executive Order requires that agencies provide the
mechanisms necessary for minority or low-income groups to partici-
pate effectively in government decisions.'42 The Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality's draft guidance on Executive Order 12,898's ap-
plication to the NEPA process encourages agencies to develop
innovative methods for reaching out to community organizations and
others who are less likely to keep track of formal notice in govern-
ment documents. 43 Environmental justice advocates expect that Ex-
ecutive Order 12,898's two-pronged approach-requiring (1) the
compilation and consideration of demographic information, and
(2) the improvement of public participation mechanisms-will result
in fairer decisionmaking.'"
b. Challenging political injustice
Once a community believes that a decisionmaking process was un-
just, the issue becomes the mechanism for challenging the perceived
injustice. Communities have two forums in which to respond to po-
litical injustice. One forum is legal: an aggrieved community can
claim that procedures intended to foster politically just decisions
were not followed or that decisionmakers discriminated against
them. The other is political: a community can work to unmask the
unfairness and hold decisionmakers accountable for their unfair
treatment.
One legal option entails bringing suit for decisionmaking proc-
esses that did not follow procedures designed to achieve politically
just decisionmaking.'" Luke Cole, an attorney with the California
141. President's Memorandum on Environmental Justice, supra note 105, at 280.
142. See Exec. Order 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 1-103(a) (1995) (requiring agency strategies to list
.planning and public participation processes ... that should be revised to... ensure greater
public participation"); id. § 5-5 (suggesting ways in which federal agencies should promote
meaningful public participation); see also President's Memorandum on Environmental Justice,
supra note 105, at 280 (stating that Executive Order is intended "to provide minority communi-
ties and low-income communities access to public information on, and an opportunity for pub-
lic participation in, matters relating to human health or the environment").
143. SeeJohnson, supra note 25, at 575 (discussing CEQ Guidance's recommendations on
providing notice to communities).
144. See Scott, supra note 14, at 10-11 (describing benefits associated with Executive Order's
public participation provisions); Torres, Changing the Way, supra note 103, at 547-51 (describing
role that Executive Order could play in changing federal agencies' decision-making patterns);
Torres, EnvironmentalJustice, supra note 10, at 614-17 (same); Pugliese, supra note 101, at 1205-
06 (discussing how Executive Order could improve public's ability to participate in certain de-
cision-making processes).
145. See Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation, supra note 90, at 529. Cole observes that a
252
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Rural Legal Assistance Foundation ("CRIAF"), presents one exam-
ple.'4 In a dispute over the siting of a hazardous waste incinerator in
a Latino neighborhood in Kettleman City, California, CRLAF
brought a successful suit challenging a state agency's failure to com-
ply with a state environmental review statute's public participation
provisions. 17 Although the agency had provided the community with
the required documents, it had not translated them into Spanish, the
only language for at least forty percent of the community. 48  The
court found that the failure to translate had effectively excluded
many citizens from exercising their statutory right to participate.1
49
Thus, to the extent that procedural violations interfere with a deci-
sionmaker's capacity to decide with equal concern and respect for all,
a lawsuit based on procedural violations may assist in the pursuit of
political justice.
The legal context for a substantive political justice claim-the
claim that a decision fails to treat a community with equal concern
and respect-is generally a claim of intentional discrimination. Un-
der certain circumstances, communities may be able to bring claims
of intentional discrimination under Titles VI and VIIIlea More gen-
erally, a community can challenge a government decision as dis-
criminatory and hence violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
To date, communities who have challenged local government sit-
ing decisions under the Equal Protection Clause have not met with
success. 15' To demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
public participation requirement in an environmental review statute "is not an end in itself.
Rather, it is the means to the larger ends of self-government and the accountability of public
servants to those they serve, the citizenry." Id.
146. See id. at 528-30.
147. See id. at 528.
148. See id. at 529.
149. See id. at 530.
150. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text (describing strategies for using Titles VI
and VIII to challenge decisions having disparate impacts). Titles VI and VIII address not only
discriminatory impacts but also discriminatory intent. Furthermore, to the extent that dispa-
rate impact is seen as a proxy for disparate intent, a case based on disparate impact may implic-
itly raise issues of political as well as distributional justice.
151. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991) (noting failure to establish
intentional racial discrimination), aff'd mem., 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880
(M.D. Ga. 1989) (finding insufficient evidence of racial discrimination), affd, 896 F.2d 1264
(11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex.
1979) (holding that plaintiffs did not establish substantial likelihood of proving that decision to
grant permit had been motivated by purposeful discrimination), affid without op., 782 F.2d 1038
(5th Cir. 1986). The environmental justice literature is replete with analyses of these cases. See,
e.g., Chase, supra note 49, at 353-58 (discussing Bean, East Bibb Twiggs, and RI.S.E.); Cole, Envi-
ronmental Justice Litigation, supra note 90, at 539-40 (same); Collin, supra note 86, at 518-33
(same); Crawford, supra note 6, at 279-90 (same); Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice,"su-
pra note 49, at 829-33 (discussing Bean and East Bibb Twoggs); Reich, supra note 130, at 290-95
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plaintiffs must prove that the defendants' siting decision intentionally
discriminated against them.52 Although discriminatory intent can be
proven through circumstantial evidence if no direct evidence is avail-
able,'53 the evidentiary burden is quite high." Because the Equal
Protection Clause provides a legal remedy for only the more obvious
and persistent instances of discriminatory treatment, it fails to pro-
vide a remedy for circumstances in which unfair treatment is more
insidious. 55
In many instances, the difficulty of bringing a legal action based on
intentional discrimination will mean that the issue of political justice
is addressed politically rather than legally. The claim will be that the
affected community was not treated with equal concern and respect.
The political objective will be to increase the accountability of deci-
sionmakers to all members of the community.
In the short-term, a community may hope to prevent a decision
that appears inevitable or to embarrass decisionmakers into reversing
their decision. Such efforts have been successful in a number of
cases ' -5 Where a complete reversal does not occur, a community may
(discussing Bean, East Bibb Twiggs, and R.S.E.); Saleem, supra note 130, at 224-25 (discussing
Bean and East Bibb Twiggs); Coleman, supra note 130, at 463-71 (discussing Bean, East Bibb
Twiggs, and R.S.E.); Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, supra note 49, at 411-16
(discussing Bean and East Bibb Twiggs); Pugliese, supra note 101, at 1182-90 (discussing Bean,
East Bibb Twiggs, and R..S.E.).
152. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
153. SeeDavis, 426 U.S. at 242. In Arlington Heights, the Court noted that although disparate
impact is a factor to be considered in determining whether a government decision was moti-
vated by an invidious discriminatory purpose, discriminatory impact alone is not dispositive. See
Arlington Heights, 426 U.S. at 266. Absent a clear expression of discriminatory intent, the Court
identified five types of circumstantial evidence that might bear on the question of invidious
discrimination. These include: (1) discriminatory impact; (2) the general historical back-
ground to the decision; (3) the specific "sequence of events leading to the challenged deci-
sion"; (4) "[d] epartures from the normal procedural sequence" or from the normal substantive
criteria; and (5) the "legislative or administrative history" of the decision. See id. at 266-68.
154. The environmental justice literature includes numerous articles discussing the envi-
ronmental justice lawsuits raising equal protection claims and the high evidentiary burden es-
tablished by Davis and Arlington Heights. See supra note 151 (listing articles).
155. The discriminatory purpose requirement and its high evidentiary standard have been
roundly criticized for providing a remedy for only the most blatant acts of intentional discrimi-
nation. See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimina-
tion Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978); Saleem, supra
note 130, at 225-31; Coleman, supra note 130, at 481-84.
Moreover, even if the equal protection doctrine were a viable method for responding to
perceived unfairness in the decisionmaking process, it still fails to provide a remedy for dis-
crimination against poor communities because "income" does not create a suspect class. See
San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (refusing to recognize "wealth" as suspect class
deserving special scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause). The Equal Protection Clause will
thus fail to provide a remedy where the discrimination is based on income rather than race.
156. See, e.g., Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism, supra note 12, at 26-38 (describing
case studies in which grassroots environmental justice groups challenged environmentally un-
desirable facilities). For example, local residents in an African-American and Latino neigh-
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be able to obtain certain compromises regarding the nature of the
use and its effects on the community.
It is in the long-term that a community's efforts to achieve political
accountability are most important. While the public exposure of un-
fair treatment may not be sufficient to generate the reversal of an in-
dividual decision, it may, in the long-run, increase the accountability
of decisionmakers to groups they had earlier ignored. 57 The more
decisionmakers feel themselves accountable to everyone in the com-
munity, the more they are likely to treat all with equal concern and
respect.
Assuming, then, the importance of pursuing political justice in the
political realm, how should such claims be raised? The difficulty of
raising such claims should not be underestimated. While unfairness
may be obvious to the affected community, it is unlikely to be obvious
to the broader body politic. For one, the discrimination is unlikely to
be blatant because most decisionmakers would not risk the associated
embarrassment. In general, then, one confronts more subtle in-
stances of unfair treatment. Second, as discussed further in Part III,
the broader body politic is likely to assume that the affected commu-
nity is simply asserting a self-interested cry of "Not in My Backyard"
under the guise of a claim for fairness. While many communities will
indeed be raising a NIMBY claim, demonstrating that their claim is
also a claim for fair treatment will require considerable effort. Third,
in some instances the claim of discriminatory treatment can be a
double-edged sword. As a community raises the charge of racism, the
decisionmakers may paint themselves as the victims of the commu-
nity's unfair accusation.'- In today's racial politics, many perceive
the "victims" as those accused of racism, not the other way around.
Since a claim of unfairness, standing alone, is rarely enough to
communicate to the skeptic, communities who believe they have
borhood in Los Angeles organized the Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles in
opposition to the proposed siting of a municipal solid waste incinerator. The political pressure
galvanized by the group prompted the mayor to rescind his initial support for the incinerator
and request that the city council "kill the project." The city council voted to stop the incinera-
tor project. See id. at 37. Similarly, the Mothers of East Los Angeles, a community group in a
Latino neighborhood, opposed the siting of a hazardous waste incinerator. As a result of the
group's political and legal actions, the siting proposal was withdrawn. See id.
157. A case in point is the siting of a solid waste landfill at issue in Bean v. Southwestern Waste
Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979). Although the community was unable to
reverse the siting at issue in the case, they were able to prompt changes in the siting process
designed to increase the fairness of future siting decisions. See BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE,
supra note 51, at 44-45.
158. Of course, in some instances the decisionmakers may be right-the claim of racism
may be erroneous. The more the charge of racism is abused, the less credible it becomes. See
Torres, EnvironmentalJustice, supra note 10, at 604. A cautious use of the term, as suggested by
Professor Torres, would serve to strengthen the claim.
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been treated unfairly will usually require some evidence to demon-
strate unfair treatment.1 That evidence can come from a variety of
sources. Where disparate impacts are present (and are not explica-
ble by post-siting demographic shifts or other factors), a community
may be able to show a link between the pattern of impacts and dis-
criminatory treatment. In addition, if there is evidence that calls into
question the rationality or legitimacy of a decision, it could be in-
ferred that the decision was based on improper motives-motives
such as race or income discrimination. Environmental laws may pro-
vide one important mechanism for obtaining such evidence.
While the environmental justice literature has recognized the stra-
tegic role environmental laws could play in obtaining a desired out-
come,o the literature has not addressed the broader role that envi-
ronmental laws could play in providing information that challenges
the legitimacy of decisions and, ultimately, their fairness. The re-
mainder of this Article looks at two questions: First, why is environ-
mental law viewed so skeptically within the environmental justice lit-
erature? Part II addresses this question by examining the history of
the relationship between the environmental and civil rights move-
ments and how that history is manifested in the depictions of envi-
ronmental law presented in the environmental justice literature.
Second, in an effort to transcend the skepticism, what can environ-
mental laws do to address one of the most important yet most insolu-
ble problems for the environmental justice movement: achieving po-
litical justice by increasing the political accountability of
decisionmakers to those who have been unfairly treated? Part III ad-
dresses this question.
II. PERCEPTIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Historical Background
The environmental justice movement did not arise in a vacuum.
Its rhetoric, perceptions, and preferred modes of action were shaped
by the civil rights movement which spawned it. As such, its character-
istics differ from the rhetoric, perceptions, and preferred modes of
action of the environmental movement and its institutional embodi-
159. Such evidence might also be important in bringing a claim of discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause. The debate in the political forum, however, can be much
broader than the more limited Equal Protection debate governed by Arlington Heights' five fac-
tors. See supra note 153.
160. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 264-79.
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ments. 6' The differing experiences of the two movements shape
their differing approaches to the problem of environmental justice.
16 2
Further, the tense history of the relationships of each to the other
may explain, at least in part, the current skepticism of the environ-
mental movement and its laws revealed by the environmental justice
literature'6s
At the beginning of this century, the environmental movement was
primarily concerned with the conservation and preservation of pris-
tine areas.' 6' The movement's emphasis on preserving scenic and
undeveloped land was complemented by a negative view of cities and
a disinterest in urban problems.' 65 Issues such as water quality, air
quality, noise, and other urban problems that are now considered
"environmental" were not within the purview of the environmental
movement as it understood itself during the first half of the cen-
161. See generally Marc R. Poirier, EnvironmentalJustice/RacismlEquity: Can We Talk?, 96 W.
VA. L. REV. 1083 (1994) [hereinafter Poirier, Can We Talk?] (discussing different traditions rep-
resented by environmental and civil rights movements and consequences of those traditions for
relationship between environmentalists and environmental justice advocates); Marc R. Poirier,
EnvironmentalJustice and the Beach Access Movement of the 1970s in Connecticut and New Jersey: Sto-
ries of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719 (1996) [hereinafter Poirier, Beach Access]
(describing how these different traditions shaped debates about access to beaches during 1960s
and 1970s); see also Barbara Dentsch Lynch, The Garden and the Sea: U.S. Latino Environmental
Discourses and Mainstream Environmentalism, 40 Soc. PROBS. 108 (1993) (arguing that percep-
tions of environment and environmental issues are culturally based, and explaining divergence
between Latino environmental discourse and mainstream environmental discourse on differ-
ing cultural backgrounds).
162. See Poirier, Can We Talk?, supra note 161, at 1084-1100 (discussing histories of civil
rights and environmental movements and differences in discourse associated with each move-
ment); see also Torres, Environmentaljustie, supra note 10, at 601-03 (observing tendency of en-
vironmental justice advocates to understand and respond to environmental problems by plac-
ing them within a familiar civil rights framework).
163. Professor Richard Lazarus has observed that "[miuch suspicion and resentment cur-
renfly exists between the two social movements." Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice," su-
pra note 49, at 853; see also Bullard, Introduction, supra note 5, at 7 (observing traditional envi-
ronmental movement's failure to respond to placement of undesirable facilities in minority
communities);Jordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 103 (discussing minorities' skepticism of envi-
ronmentalists' commitment to environmental justice in light of environmentalists' historic lack
of concern); Poirier, Can We Talk?, supra note 161, at 1083-96 (explaining civil rights move-
ments' historical skepticism of environmental movement and its consequences for the envi-
ronmental justice movement); A. Dan Tarlock, City Versus Countryside: Environmental Equity in
Context, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 461, 467 (1994) (stating that gap between environmental justice
movement and mainstream environmental movement can be explained by history of environ-
mental movement).
164. See ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 19-35 (1993); Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 634;
NEWTON, supra note 6, at 15-16. The goals of "conserving" and "preserving" were not always
compatible. Conservationists advocated conserving land in order to save it for a variety of hu-
man uses, including resource development and recreational uses. Preservationists, in contrast,
advocated preserving land based on its wilderness value, independent of possible human uses.
See GOTTLIEB, supra, at 26-29; Bullard, Introduction, supra note 5, at 9-11; Cole, Empowerment as
the Key, supra note 13, at 634.
165. SeeGOTTLIEB, supra note 164, at 29-30; Tarlock, supra note 163, at 470-71.
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While there is little evidence that early environmentalists' interest
in conservation was generally borne of hostility to minorities or the
poor, in certain instances these environmentalists did discriminate.
Minorities were excluded from some of the parks and public beaches
created at the behest of environmentalists, '67 and some environ-
mental groups excluded minorities from membership.'o Professor
Gottlieb illustrates environmentalists' elitist tilt by reference to their
position on hunting: conservationists criticized hunting for food due
to its impact on wildlife while extolling the virtues of sport hunting
for recreational pleasure.'66 During the 1940s and 1950s, the envi-
ronmental movement continued to struggle with resource develop-
ment issues, adding concerns about population growth and its associ-
ated need for resources as a new dimension to its traditional focus on
the preservation of natural and scenic areas. '70
166. That self-described environmentalists were uninterested in the urban environment
does not mean that the urban environment was ignored. SeeTarlock, supra note 163, at 472-77
(noting that during first part of this century, urban planners attempted to improve physical and
social environment in emerging modem city). Many reformers in the nation's cities addressed
the public health issues that resulted from increasing urbanization and industrialization. See
GAY, supra note 11, at 17 (noting presence of programs to improve urban environment dating
from the early 1900s); GOTTI=EB, supra note 164, at 47-80 (detailing reformers efforts to im-
prove public health in cities from late 1900s to 1950s).
While we would now call these activities "environmental," they have not been considered a
part of the history of the current mainstream "environmental movement," whose roots were
based in preservation rather than public health or planning. See GAY, supra note 11, at 17-18;
GOTrLIEB, supra note 164, at 6-8. Even today, grassroots environmental justice groups are per-
ceived of as having developed "outside" of the mainstream environmental movement. See
Bullard, Introduction, supra note 5, at 11-12. Thus, the realm of environmental action has long
been much larger than the actions of the environmental groups as traditionally conceived. See
id. at 9 (noting that people of color have long framed their struggles on environmental prob-
lems as "social problems"); Guerrero & Head, supra note 89, at 11 (stating that people of color
historically have dealt with environmental issues as community, labor, or civil rights issues);
Poirier, Beach Access, supra note 161, at 723-24 (observing that what is labelled as an
.environmental" issue is contingent upon "customs" that derive from historical circumstances);
Lynch, supra note 161 (observing that Latino environmentalism is not a part of mainstream
environmental discourse).
167. SeeJordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 76 (describing nature preserves' racist prohibi-
tions"); Poirier, Beach Access, supra note 161, at 741 (describing long history of segregated
beaches).
168. See GAY, supra note 11, at 18 (stating that"[m]ost environmental organizations deliber-
ately excluded nonwhites and non-Christians"); Jordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 76
(describing discriminatory Sierra Club chapter membership policies); Poirier, Can We Talk2 ,
supra note 161, at 1087 (discussing minority membership in environmental organizations); see
alsoJordan & Snow, supra, at 107 (stating that"[t]he roots of exclusion in the American conser-
vation-environmental movement reach back to the overt racism prevalent at the turn of the
century").
169. See GAY, supra note 11, at 18 (analyzing environmentalists' fears that immigrant hunters
would hurt wildlife); see also GOTrLIEB, supra note 164, at 30-31;Jordan & Snow, supra note 12,
at 77 (observing early conservationalists' belief that immigrant hunting customs depleted wild-
life populations).
170. See GoTrLIEB, supra note 164, at 35-41.
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The 1962 publication of Silent Spring, Rachel Carson's book on the
risks associated with pesticides, prompted the environmental move-
ment to move beyond the protection of scenic and natural resources
and consider the increasingly pervasive problem of pollution.
7
1
Meanwhile, the civil rights and anti-nuclear struggles of the 1950s
and the 1960s created models for the widespread environmental ac-
tivism of the 1960s.1' Although the conservation groups which had
comprised the environmental movement continued to pursue their
preservationist agenda, others discovered environmental issues as a
subset of the broader anti-establishment rhetoric of the 1960s.173 By
the late 1960s, the developing environmental movement appeared
poised to reach out to others, such as civil rights and social justice
groups, who similarly espoused an anti-establishment agenda.'74 The
connection never occurred.
Many civil rights leaders remained skeptical of the new environ-
mental activists.'75 Although these activists did not ignore civil rights
and socialjustice issues, 76 civil rights leaders were concerned that the
burst of attention to the environment would distract the nation from
the pressing problems of poverty that had just begun to receive atten-
tion through the War on Poverty.'7 They feared that the impetus to
address environmental problems might shift the nation's priorities-
and resources-away from socialjustice. 78
Environmentalists did little to allay the civil rights leaders' con-
171. See id. at 81-86 (discussing Carson's SILENT SPRING and its effects on environmental
movement); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 3 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that publication of SILENT SPRING was one factor in stimulating
environmental movement of the 1970s).
172. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 164, at 93; Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice," supra
note 49, at 789.
173. See GOTrLIEB, supra note 164, at 4. While this rhetoric did integrate environmental
issues with structural social issues, its primary focus was on the role of industrial America in ru-
ining the environment. See id. at 96-97 (describing activists' critique of industrial corporate
society). Environmental activists shared the anti-establishment tenor of those in social justice
movements, but did not focus on issues of poverty or civil rights.
174. See Poirier, Beach Access, supra note 161, at 724-25 (noting that late 1960s and early
1970s were period of "great flux" accompanied by uncertainty as to the relationship between
the mainstream environmental movement and other social change movements).
175. See Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice, "supra note 49, at 788-89 (detailing negative
reaction of minority community leaders to environmentalism in 1970s).
176. SeeJordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 78 (noting that first Earth Day in 1970 included
many speakers from the civil rights movement).
177. SeeGAY, supranote 11, at 19 (observing that members of the civil rights movement sus-
pected that "environmentalists wanted to divert public attention and funding away from equal
justice issues"); Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice," supra note 49, at 788-89 (discussing
minority community leaders' fear that environmentalism would take public attention away
from social justice issues).
178. See GOTTIEB, supra note 164, at 254 (describing civil rights leaders view that environ-
mental issues should not take priority over poverty issues).
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cerns. Some environmentalists contributed to the skepticism by ar-
guing that the environment was the most pressing public cause,
thereby suggesting that other public issues, such as poverty, had a
lower priority.179 Moreover, the "establishment" embraced environ-
mental concerns, thus muting the "anti-establishment" approach that
might have provided more common ground between the civil rights
and environmental movements. By 1970, Congress and the Republi-
can Administration were suggesting federal legislative action to ad-
dress environmental problems and members of the business com-
munity were sponsoring Earth Day events.'8 0
The momentum continued. In the 1970s almost all existing fed-
eral environmental laws were promulgated. 8' A key feature of these
laws was that they focused primarily on reducing aggregate pollution
levels, rather than on the distribution of pollution.le To the extent
that distributional consequences were considered, it was assumed
that reducing aggregate pollution levels would make everyone better
off.ss When distributional issues were raised, federal institutions de-
clined to consider the connection between environmental protection
and race or other socioeconomic issues.1
179. SeeJordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 77-78 (observing, for example, that some envi-
ronmentalists had asserted that one could not both protect environment and provide housing
for minorities); see also Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 5, at 70 (criticizing environmentalists
for advocating preservation of species while opposing investment in human development);
Poirier, Beach Access, supra note 161, at 747 (noting that environmental legislation was seen as
hindering availability of affordable housing).
180. By the end of 1969, Congress had passed the first major federal environmental legisla-
tion, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). On New Year's Day 1970, four months
before Earth Day, President Nixon signed NEPA into law. See PERCIVAL, supra note 171, at 4.
Just three weeks before Earth Day, President Nixon gave a strongly pro-environment State of
the Union address. SeeGoTTLIEB, supra note 164, at 108-09.
181. PERCIVAL, supra note 171, at 5 (noting that Congress enacted "nearly all of the basic
environmental legislation" between 1970 and 1976).
182. See Tarlock, supra note 163, at 461-62 (describing "national" focus of federal environ-
mental laws); cf Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice," supra note 49, at 814 (describing
Clean Air Act's focus on "general embient air quality concerns" rather than particular "toxic
hot spots").
183. SeeTarlock, supra note 163, at 462 (observing that it was "easy to assume that the bene-
fits... [of environmental protection would be] equally distributed across the population"). To
the extent that there was any recognition that minority or low-income communities might suf-
fer from a disproportionate burden of pollution, advocates for reducing aggregate pollution
levels might have assumed that such reductions would benefit such communities in proportion
to the greater harm they suffered. According to empirical studies, however, minority commu-
nities do not appear to have benefitted from environmental laws in proportion to the greater
environmental burdens they have been shown to experience. See Lazarus, Pursuing
"EnvironmentalJustice," supra note 49, at 792-806 (describing evidence of inequalities in distri-
bution of environmental laws' benefits and burdens).
184. See Poirier, Beach Access, supra note 161, at 753-54 (describing several incidents in which
federal agency officials refused to link environmental and poverty issues). As Professor Torres
has explained, "[i]n 1975, the United States Commission on Civil Rights chided the United
States Environmental Protection Agency... for its failure to recognize its responsibility" for the
impact of its sewage treatment program on minorities. See Torres, Environmental Burdens, supra
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Participating in these legislative efforts was the "second wave" of
the environmental movement." The second wave organizations
were highly professional, staffed primarily by lawyers and scientists.' 8
After participating in the development of many of the federal envi-
ronmental laws during the 1970s, they then turned to litigation to in-
terpret and enforce them.8 7
Thus, in the 1970s the paths of the civil rights and environmental
movements had once again diverged. The mainstream environ-
mental movement had shed much of the anti-establishment rhetoric
that briefly characterized it in the 1960s.Is The environmental
movement had become much more centralized and professionalized
than the contemporaneous civil rights and social justice movements.
Professor Gottlieb has illuminated the contrast between the main-
stream environmental and social justice groups-and the conse-
quences of their differences-by exploring their respective cam-
paigns to minimize exposure to lead.' 89 In the 1960s, numerous
urban community groups organized around the issue of lead poison-
ing from exposure to lead paint, a problem that was particularly se-
vere in poor communities due to the presence of flaking lead paint
in deteriorated housing." Issues of "social justice" were prominent
in the debate.' 9' At that time, the lead paint problem was not per-
note 29, at 431-32. EPA responded that "it was not responsible" for making sure that sewer
services were developed equally in minority and other communities. See id. at 432.
185. Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 633 (coining term "second wave" to de-
scribe new type of environmentalists). The second wave was composed of environmental
groups who formed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, such as the Natural Resources Defense
Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. See id. at
634; see also GOTTLIEB, supra note 164, at 117-61 (describing development of mainstream envi-
ronmental groups in the 1970s). Traditional environmental organizations, such as the
Audubon Society and the Sierra Club, also began to include advocacy against pollution on
their environmental agenda. See GOTTLIEB, supra, at 129-30 (describing Audubon's and Sierra
Club's partial shift in focus toward pollution).
186. See Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 635 (discussing professional make-up
of second wave);Jordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 86 (stating that second wave organizations
became more "professionalized").
187. SeeCole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 636;Jordan & Snow, supra note 12, at
91.
188. See Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 5, at 69-70 (describing environmentalists shift
"from more radical protest and activism to acceptance as a mainstream public-interest group").
189. Professor Gottlieb provides a similar example by exploring the movement's respective
approaches to the problem of pesticides. When the risks of pesticides first came to public at-
tention through Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, environmentalists focused on the impact of pes-
ticides on wildlife. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 164, at 240. Meanwhile, farmworkers were organ-
izing to limit farmworker exposure to pesticides in the field. See id. at 240-44. Although the
Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF"), a mainstream environmental group, did join farm-
workers in bringing suit to ban DDT, EDFjoined in order to advance its concerns about wild-
life. See id. at 242-44. Farmworker and "environmental" interests were not opposed, but the
cooperation reflected a marriage of convenience rather than a deeper mutuality of purpose.
190. See id. at 244-48 (describing movement against lead in environment).
191. See id. at 247 (noting that groups were interested in lead paint as both an environ-
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ceived of as an "environmental" problem, and the mainstream
"second wave" environmental groups were not active on the issue."
In the 1970s, however, as studies showed high levels of lead in the
ambient air (due largely to leaded gasoline), the mainstream envi-
ronmental movement became concerned about lead. 93 In contrast
to the community groups' focus on lead paint in poor areas, the en-
vironmental groups focused on concentrations of lead in the ambi-
ent air.194 As a result, regulatory attention and resources were di-
verted from reducing exposure to lead paint and towards reducing
ambient air concentrations. 195 The environmental groups did not
work overtly against the interests of minorities or the poor;'9 instead,
their success as an interest group may have resulted in the diversion
of regulatory resources toward their environmental goals at the ex-
pense of the issues raised by other, less powerful, constituencies.
At a more general level, the few efforts made by the environmental
movement in the early 1970s to establish ties with civil rights or social
justice causes were unsuccessful. In 1971, for example, the Sierra
Club surveyed its members on their interest in having the Club ad-
dress social justice issues. When asked, forty-one percent of the
members "strongly disagreed" with the statement that the Club
should "'actively involve itself in the conservation problems of such
special groups as the urban poor and the ethnic minorities.' 1 97 In
1972, the Conservation Foundation convened a conference to ex-
plore the relationship between the environment, race, and socialjus-
tice.19 The Foundation invited representatives of the environmental
movement as well as community activists, many of whom were people
of color.'" Many environmental groups were unresponsive, however,
and the Foundation's efforts were halted in 1973 with the termina-
tion of the head of the organization and his replacement by a leader
with a narrower "environmental" focus. 2 0 While there is little evi-
mental issue and a social justice issue).
192. See id. at 248.
193. See id. at 248-49.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. Cf Jordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 73 (observing that the elitist, professional, and
white nature of the environmental movement exists "through no conspiracy, no conscious de-
cisions to create policies of exclusion, no malice").
197. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 164, at 253-54 (quoting Sierra Club survey); see also NEWrON,
supra note 6, at 17 (discussing Sierra Club poll);Jordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 78 (referring
to 1973 poll with similar results).
198. See GorLIFB, supra note 164, at 253 (discussing 1972 Conference).
199. See id. (suggesting that purpose of diversity of invitees was to encourage environmental
organizations to incorporate socialjustice themes).
200. See id. In 1979, the National Urban League and the Sierra Club sponsored a "City
Care" conference to bring together environmentalists and civil rights activists. The dialogue
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dence that the mainstream environmentalists were actively opposed
to social justice, they do not appear to have perceived of poverty and
civil rights as "their" issues.20'
According to Professor Gottlieb, the divide between the move-
ments was exacerbated by the stands taken by some environmentalists
on the issues of population and of immigration. By the 1960s, popu-
lation control had become a central issue for many conservation or-
ganizations.2 Just as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring had exposed the
dangers of pesticides and focused national attention on pollution,
Paul Ehrlich's 1968 book, The Population Bomb, focused attention on
exponential population growth and its consequences for natural re-
sources2H Although population control advocates denied any racial
overtones to their efforts, civil rights leaders nonetheless viewed the
campaign as implicitly racist."
Civil rights groups, particularly those comprised of Latin Ameri-
cans, were also alienated by some environmental groups' anti-
immigration efforts in the 1970s .2 5 Although environmentalists' at-
tention to population and immigration issues faded by the 1980s,21
6
the experience during the 1960s and 1970s created what Professor
Gottlieb has called a "legacy of conflict" between the civil rights and
environmental movements.
20 7
As issues of environmental justice gained prominence in the 1980s,
grassroots activists directly confronted the mainstream professional
environmental organizations and institutions about their role, or lack
thereof, in environmental justice issues. In 1990, an environmental
they achieved, however, was "short-lived." Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 5, at 67-68.
201. Professor Marc Poirier observes that the environmental and civil rights movements
have developed very different paradigms of discourse and action that limit their ability to rec-
ognize and act upon shared concerns. He identifies two paradigms in modem environmental
law- concern with natural ecosystems and concern about maximizing overall welfare. Neither
of these paradigms easily incorporates distributional concerns. See Poirier, Can We Talk?, supra
note 161, at 1088-89. Nor do the environmental paradigms easily incorporate the deeper chal-
lenges to the political process that are inherent in the environmental justice movement's con-
cern about fair treatment in the political process. See id. at 1093.
202. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 164, at 256. Earlier conservationists had also expressed con-
cers about population growth, often in explicitly racist terms. See id. at 254-55. These views
receded during the Depression but began to reappear in the late 1940s. See id. at 255.
203. See id. at 256-58 (discussing THE POPULATION BOMB and its effects on environmental
movement).
204. See id. (describing ways in which population control proposals raised the spectre of
racism and population control advocates' discomfort with these charges); Lazarus, Pursuing
"EnvironmentalJustic4" supra note 49, at 852 (noting perception by some minorities that envi-
ronmentalist population control proposals "are principally intended to limit the growing popu-
lations of people of color").
205. See GOTLI.EB, supra note 164, at 258-59 (describing environmentalist anti-immigration
sentiments and initiatives and minority perceptions of their racist implications).
206. See id. at 259.
207. See id. at 259-60.
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justice organization known as the Southwest Organizing Project sent
a letter to the ten most prominent environmental organizations ex-
pressing their concern about the organizations' failure to consider
the participation and interests of communities of color affected by
the environmental groups' positions." In 1991, the Southwest Net-
work for Environmental and Economic Justice wrote to EPA Admin-
istrator William Reilly contending that the EPA had failed to be ac-
countable to communities of color and suggesting improvements in
EPA's approach.m
These pointed criticisms, along with an increase in public aware-
ness of environmental justice problems, had important consequences
in government and the environmental movement. Many mainstream
environmental groups are now actively considering the environ-
mental justice implications of their environmental advocacy and as-
sisting communities of color in their challenges to adverse environ-. • •... 211
mental conditions.
Government environmental efforts are also more attuned to distri-
butional issues. The EPA's Environmental Equity Workgroup pub-
lished its report, "Environmental Equity: Reducing Risk for All
Communities," in 1992.21 President Clinton's February 1994 Execu-
tive Order 12,898 requires all federal agencies to consider environ-
mental justice issues .212 Furthermore the EPA has established an In-
teragency Work Group involving participants from a range of federal
agencies, a national Office of Environmental Justice to coordinate
the agency's environmental justice efforts, and a grants program for
communities that is designed to foster their ability to address envi-
213ronmental justice issues.The growing cooperation is evident from the more recent history
208. See Gauna, supra note 6, at 11, nn.39 & 42 (summarizing "Group of Ten" letter); Guer-
rero & Head, supra note 89, at 11 (detailing letter); Jordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 72
(discussing letter and its call for efforts to diversify environmental organizations' staff).
209. SeeGauna, supra note 6, at 11, n.38.
210. See GAY, supra note 11, at 20 (noting that major environmental groups are now devel-
oping environmental justice programs and building ties to grassroots groups); Bullard, Anatomy
of Environmental Racism, supra note 12, at 24-26, 31, 39 (discussing increasing role of main-
stream environmental organizations); Gauna, supra note 6, at 21-22 (detailing actions of certain
environmental organizations with respect to communities of color). In general, leaders of
mainstream environmental groups have expressed concern about their lack of diversity. See
Ferris & Hahn-Baker, supra note 5, at 70;Jordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 71-73.
211. EPA's report has, however, been criticized by some in the environmental justice com-
munity. See Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism, supra note 12, at 195-203; Foster, supra
note 27, at 735-38; Gauna, supra note 6, at 13-17.
212. See supra notes 97-109, 141-44 and accompanying text (discussing Executive Order
12,898).
213. See Olga L. Moya, Adopting and EnvironmentalJusticeEthic, 5 DICK.J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y
215, 246-54 (1996) (describing these federal initiatives).
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of the lead paint issue. In the 1980s, community groups concerned
with lead paint poisoning in the inner city once again placed that is-
sue on the public agenda. This time, as attention to environmental
justice issues was beginning to surface, the mainstream environ-
mental movementjoined in their effort. 4
The recent efforts made by environmental groups and agencies
represent a sea change from the virtual absence of interaction fifteen
years earlier. That said, however, the distance between the main-
stream environmental establishment and the grassroots civil rights
community has not yet been bridged.2"5 As one observer of the envi-
ronmental movement has observed: ' Vith change comes tur-
moil.... For the Movement, this is not only an age of transition; it is
an age of conflict, contradiction, and ambiguity.'216 The remainder
of this Section is devoted to exploring the nature of the criticisms of
environmental law and environmental organizations expressed in the
environmental justice literature.
B. The Environmental Justice Movement's Perception of the Environmental
Movement
The environmental justice movement's perspective on the main-
stream environmental movement reflects the historical development
of both movements. The environmental justice literature frequently
contrasts the participants in the mainstream environmental move-
ment with the participants in the environmental justice movement.
21 7
214. See GoTTLIEB, supra note 164, at 249-50. For example, the Environmental Defense
Fund has played a significant role in national debates about lead paint poisoning. See id. Addi-
tionally, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, the American Civil Liberties Union,
and the Natural Resources Defense Council have successfully sued the state of California to
obtain lead tests for poor children under the Medicaid program. See Bullard, Anatomy of Envi-
ronmental Justice, supra note 12, at 24-25.
215. See NEWrON, supra note 6, at 18 (describing doubt as to ability of mainstream envi-
ronmentalists to respond to concerns of people of color); Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental
Justice, supra note 12, at 38 (discussing limitations to and possibilities for relationship between
grassroots minority organizations and mainstream environmental movement);Jordan & Snow,
supra note 12, at 93, 106 (noting common struggle faced by mainstream environmentalists and
minorities, but cautioning that divisions between them cannot be overcome "overnight");
Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice," supra note 49, at 850-52 (noting steps that environ-
mental movement must take to meaningfully address social justice issues).
216. Bullard, Introduction, supra note 5, at 5; see also id. at 16-18 (describing current state of
flux marking environmental movement).
217. The term "environmental movement" references the mainstream "second wave" of the
environmental movement. Not included are the grassroots environmental groups which arose
in the 1970s and 1980s, largely in response to toxic contamination issues. See GAY, supra note
11, at 47-50 (detailing beginnings of grassroots environmental movement in 1970s and 1980s);
Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 636-39 (describing grassroots environmental
groups and characterizing them as the "third wave" of environmental activism); Poirier, Can We
Talk?, supra note 161, at 1095 (describing grassroots environmentalists). For most of their his-
tory, these third wave groups have not been considered a part of the mainstream environ-
1997] 265
THE AMERICAN UNrVERSriY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:221
The typical member of the environmental movement is described as
white, well-educated, and middle- to upper-class.218 The same is true
of the leadership of most mainstream environmental groups.2 ' 9 The
environmental justice literature observes that the mainstream envi-
ronmental movement's agenda reflects the interests of its members:
preservation of nature, outdoor recreational opportunities, and, in
recent years, a concern with ambient environmental conditions.22
Environmental justice writers note that the absence of poor and mi-
nority members and leaders has meant that the mainstream envi-
ronmental groups generally do not focus on environmental problems
specific to poor and minority groups, or on the distributional impli-
cations of environmental pohces.'
More fundamentally, some writers observe that the distance be-
tween the movements is based on deep differences in the cultural
and moral perspectives held by mainstream environmentalists and
minority groups.2 Writing about the Latino community's perspec-
tive on environmentalism, Professor Barbara Deutsch Lynch has ob-
served that the environmental movement's newfound concern with
distributional outcomes will not suffice to address environmental jus-
tice without a deeper opening to Latino conceptions of the environ-
mental movement. See Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 637-39.
218. See BUL.ARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 51, at 1, 11, 12, 90-91 (1990); GAY, supra
note 11, at 18; NEWTON, supra note 6, at 17;Jordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 71-72, 92; Poirier,
Can We Talk?, supra note 161, at 1086; Linda R. Prout, Toxic Avengers-Teenage Mutant Crusaders
Against Pollution, inWE SPEAK FOR OURSELVES, supra note 12, at 36; Gauna, supra note 6, at 7.
219. See GAY, supra note 11, at 18 (observing that most leaders of environmental groups are
.primarily affluent white people"); Collin, supra note 86, at 517 (noting that mainstream envi-
ronmental groups have few minorities on staff or on their boards of directors);Jordan & Snow,
supra note 12, at 72-73 (discussing environmental groups' lack of minority hiring).
220. See, e.g., Alston, supra note 89, at 3 (observing that "[e]nvironmental justice groups
have considered the major national environmental organizations to be predominantly inter-
ested in leisure and recreation, wildlife and wilderness preservation, and similar issues");
Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice, "supra note 49, at 814-15 (describing ways in which the
environmental groups' objectives were an expression of the priorities of its participants).
221. See generally NEWTON, supra note 6, at 17 (indicating that"mainstream environmentalist
groups traditionally have had little interest in issues faced by poor minority, urban people");
Alston, supra note 89, at 3 (observing that people of color perceive of the environmental
movement as "insensitive to the needs and agendas of minorities"); Austin & Schill, supra note
12, at 71-72 (contrasting interests of mainstream environmental groups with interests of minor-
ity communities); Bullard, Introduction, supra note 5, at 13 (observing that lack of minority rep-
resentation among environmental decisionmakers "has biased environmental decisionmaking
in favor of white, middle-class communities"); Jordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 71-72, 77
(remarking that conservation leaders realize that their organizations have little to offer most
people of color); Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice," supra note 49, at 788 (describing
minority leaders' perception of environmentalism as selfish middle-class imposition); id. at 811-
22 (discussing lack of minority involvement in environmental movement and among environ-
mental policymakers); id. at 824-25 (noting that minority communities' conception of envi-
ronmental priorities often differs from that of mainstream environmentalists).
222. SeeLynch, supra note 161, at 116-18.
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ment.2 Similarly, Professor Robert Williams has observed that the
mainstream environmentalists' conception of the environment disas-
sociates environmental and human needs while Indian conceptions
of the environment integrate environmental and human needs.24
The differences between the participants of each movement lead
not only to differing agendas, but to differing methods for addressing
concerns. The environmental justice literature notes that the main-
stream environmental movement has become highly professional-
ized. Most of the work of the movement is accomplished by special-
ists, be they lawyers or scientistsY2 Environmentalists frequently
interact with government agencies, or handle technically compli-
cated litigation. 7 The primary purpose of the membership is to raise
funds and generate broad political support for the environmental
groups' initiatives.m From the viewpoint of the environmental justice
community, those environmental organizations which actively engage
their members tend to organize "expressive" activities, such as recrea-
tional events, rather than "instrumental" activities, such as protests,
rallies, boycotts, and the like.29 When it comes to a particular envi-
ronmental dispute, the environmental justice movement's response
to environmental concerns frequently includes an explicitly political
component often absent from the more scientific and technical na-
ture of mainstream environmental discourse.2 Environmental jus-
tice advocates observe that the mainstream environmental move-
223. Seeid.at 118.
224. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Large Binocular Telescopes, Red Squirrel Pinatas, and Apache Sacred
Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a Multicultural World, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1133
(1994).
225. See Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 635-36; Gauna, supra note 6, at 12,
n.40;Jordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 73-74, 88-92.
226. See Gauna, supra note 6, at 12, note 40 (observing that mainstream environmental
groups deal with administrative bureaucracies); Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice,"supra
note 49, at 812-14 (noting centralized nature of environmental policymaking in Washington
D.C. and its "inside the Beltway" culture).
227. See, e.g., Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 636.
228. SeJordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 73.
229. SeeBULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 51, at 4;see also NEwrON, supra note 6, at 16
(noting that hiking and other outdoor activities "were the preferred activities of those who
called themselves 'environmentalists' until the mid-twentieth century").
230. See Austin & Schill, supra note 12, at 71-74 (observing that environmental justice
groups link environmental problems to broader issues of race and class); cf. Poirier, Beach Ac-
ss, supra note 161, at 729-36 (contrasting "property" against "civil rights" approaches used in
addressing beach access disputes). According to some commentators, grassroots groups focus
on political solutions while the mainstream environmental organizations focus on technical
solutions. SeeJordan & Snow, supra note 12, at 88-89. The mainstream emphasis on technical
solutions renders it difficult for the mainstream to incorporate social justice concerns. See id. at
89. But see id. at 82-83 (noting that some minority groups have engaged in grassroots political
action rather than professional activities due to lack of resources rather than cultural or politi-
cal preference).
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ment's orientation and mode of action are quite alien to the more
participatory and overtly political thrust of the grassroots environ-
mental justice movement.231
There are signs of change, however. As discussed above, at least
some in the environmental movement are beginning to embrace dis-
tributional issues and to assess their own membership and leadership
232strategies. Nonetheless, much of the environmental justice litera-
ture reflects the historical division between the goals and method-
ologies of the mainstream environmental and the environmental jus-
tice movements.m
C. Environmental Laws as the Cause of Environmental Injustice
The environmental justice literature suggests that environmental
and land use laws have provided more environmental benefits to the
white and the affluent while providing fewer benefits to or worsening
the environmental conditions of the poor and communities of
color.23 In that sense, environmental laws are seen as a "cause" of
environmental injustice. The skewing of benefits and burdens occurs
in a variety of ways, ranging from the policy-making process to the
differing abilities of differing groups to take advantage of the protec-
tions environmental laws are intended to offer.
1. Environmental laws'failure to consider distributional consequences
results in disproportionate effects
According to some authors, environmentalists' failure to consider
distributional consequences has led to environmental strategies that
serve and harm communities disproportionately.2 In general, the
focus on reducing ambient levels of pollution has failed to address
the concentrations of pollution to which many minorities are ex-
posed. 6 Moreover, some environmental laws reduce general pollu-
231. See Austin & Schill, supra note 12, at 75-76; Collin, supra note 86, at 539-40; Gauna, su-
pra note 6, at 12 n.40.
232. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
233. Professor Poirier observes that differences in history and rhetoric will appear wherever
disparate groups come together. He states that: "To work together means to come up against
the very limits that make strategies of resistance possible in the first place, and the challenge
posed by the diverse traditions and rhetorics that undergird specific struggles needs to be ac-
knowledged and addressed." Poirier, Can We Talk?, supra note 161, at 1099.
234. See, e.g., Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustie, " supra note 49, at 792-93 (explaining
that environmental justice concerns are raised by disparities in the distribution of environ-
mental benefits and burdens by race and class).
235. See, e.g., Bullard, EnvironmentalJusticeforAl supra note 23, at xv-xvi ("The current sys-
tem provides greater benefits and protection for middle- and upper-class whites while shifting
costs to the poor and people of color.").
236. See Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice, "supa note 49, at 814-15; A. Dan Tarlock,
Environmental Protection: The Potential Misfit Between Equity and Efficiency, 63 U. COLO. L. REV.
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tion levels by concentrating the pollution-a solution that may pro-
vide overall benefits to most but which creates a greater burden
where the concentration occurs. 7 Professor Richard Lazarus uses
the clean up of hazardous waste as a case-in-point3 m As toxic wastes
are removed from hundreds of sites around the country, they are
transported to the nation's few hazardous waste disposal facilities.
According to several studies, these facilities are disproportionately lo-
cated in minority or poor communities.2 9 Although most communi-
ties benefit from the cleanup, the poor and minority communities
with waste disposal sites may be harmed. The benefits and burdens
are not equally distributed; an issue of distributive justice is raised.
Market-based pollution credit trading systems present another type
of environmental strategy that may distribute the benefits and bur-
dens of environmental controls poorly. Under market-based systems,
a company may exceed applicable standards if it makes up for its ex-
tra pollution by buying the equivalent "right to pollute" from another
facility that has reduced its emissions by more than the amount re-
quired to meet its applicable standard.40 Although the net pollution
871,874 (1992) (noting that environmental laws focus on aggregate welfare rather than on wel-
fare of particular groups).
237. This discussion focuses on the relative distribution of environmental benefits and envi-
ronmental burdens. The analysis could also be extended to the distribution of the non-
environmental benefits and burdens associated with environmental policies. See Blais, supra
note 10, at 100-04, 102 n. 113 (considering both environmental and non-environmental benefits
and burdens associated with the siting of undesirable land uses); Lazarus, Pursuing "Environ-
mentalJustice, " supra note 49, at 792-806 (describing both environmental and nonenvironmen-
tal benefits and burdens of environmental policy).
238. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Meaning and Promotion of Environmental Justice, 5 MD. J.
CO,,EMP. LEGAL IssuEs 1, 4 (1994) [hereinafter Lazarus, The Meaning and Promotion of Envi-
ronmentaljustice]. Another example involves air pollution controls. In order to reduce sulphur
dioxide emissions, many facilities have been required to install an air-cleaning technology aptly
named "scrubbers." While effective at reducing emissions into the ambient air, new environ-
mental problems may arise in connection with the disposal of sludge generated by the process.
Thus, the general problem of air pollution is converted into a potential hazardous waste prob-
lem at sludge disposal facilities. While the benefits of improved air quality may be broadly dis-
tributed, the environmental burdens may be concentrated in a few areas. See Lazarus, Pursuing
"EnvironmentalJustice, "supra note 49, at 794-95.
239. See Lazarus, The Meaning and Promotion of EnvironmentalJustice, supra note 238, at 3-4; see
also supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (describing studies indicating the disproportion-
ate concentration of hazardous waste sites in poor or minority neighborhoods).
240. See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Prac-
tice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 369 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn & Hester, Marketable Permits]
(describing emission trading systems). The market is driven by the disparities in the cost of
compliance. Some facilities may be able to adopt pollution-control measures more easily and
cheaply than others. If they can go beyond the control level required by law, then market-
based systems will allow them to obtain sellable credits for the amount by which they exceed
regulatory levels. Facilities which find it much more expensive or difficult to comply with regu-
latory requirements can then buy these credits. The credits will permit these facilities to emit
more than would otherwise be allowed. See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All
the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6YALEJ. ON REG. 109, 110-13
(1989) [hereinafter Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go?] (describing how efficiency
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reduction achieved is the same, the distribution of the pollution may
shift. If facilities which find it expensive to adopt pollution control
equipment are located in the same geographic area and tend to buy
pollution credits that permit them to increase their emissions above
otherwise applicable levels, then these areas could see a significant
increase in pollution emissions. To the extent that older facilities
might find it more economical to purchase the "rights to pollute"
than adopt new pollution control techniques, these areas are less
likely to benefit from the restrictions imposed by environmental laws
and may, in some instances, be harmed by them. As a corollary,
those communities with facilities which choose to reduce emissions
by more than the amount required by applicable standards and sell
the resulting "rights to pollute" will receive disproportionately
greater benefits from the trading system. To the extent that the
older facilities choosing to buy pollution credits rather than adopt
pollution control techniques are disproportionately located in poor
or minority areas, these communities will receive less of the benefits
and more of the harms of environmental regulations than other
communities.24'
2. Environmental laws exacerbate existing disparities: the case of
grandfather clauses
The failure to consider the distributional consequences of envi-
ronmental laws is particularly evident in the "grandfather" clauses in-
cluded in many environmental laws. 42 Grandfather clauses either
exempt or create more lenient standards for existing facilities. The
stricter standards imposed by the legislation apply only to new facili-
ties, while grandfathered facilities may be permitted to continue pol-
gains of trading policies generate a "market" in rights to pollute). See generally Richard B.
Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. OF ENV'L. L.
153 (1988) (describing and analyzing market-based environmental control strategies).
241. See Gauna, supra note 6, at 72 (noting possibility that emissions trading programs could
.open the possibility of increasing concentrations of emissions in one part of an air basin
through trading pollution credits from another part of the basin, thereby potentially creating
'hot spots' in poor and minority communities"); Lazarus, Pursuing 'EnvironmentalJustice, "supra
note 49, at 848-49 (arguing that reliance on market incentives to control pollution would likely
lead to "pollution 'hot spots' in racial minority communities and low income neighborhoods");
see also Stewart, supra note 240, at 165 (recognizing that market-based systems "may be inap-
propriate in dealing with situations where localized concentrations of pollution must be strictly
controlled").
242. The term "grandfather clause" arose from provisions in southern voting laws that re-
stricted the vote to those who could prove that their grandfathers had voted. The clauses es-
sentially disenfranchised newly freed slaves. See Gerrard, Role of Existing Legislation, supra note
90, at 561; Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, If Your Grandfather Could Pollute So Can You: Environmental
'Grandfather Clauses' and Their Role in Environmental Inequity, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 131, 131-32
(1995). While not explicitly discriminating against minorities, the grandfather clauses of today
are once again implicated in questions of sociajustice.
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luting at prior levels.24 The new environmental standards may there-
fore do little to improve environmental quality for those living near
grandfathered facilities.
To the extent that grandfathered facilities are concentrated in low-
income or minority communities, these communities will receive lit-
tle benefit from the more protective standards imposed on new facili-
ties.244 In addition, the presence of grandfather clauses may skew the
private decision-making process. An enterprise deciding whether to
continue production at an existing polluting facility or to build a
newer, cleaner facility may be more likely to continue using the exist-
ing facility due to the more lenient pollution control requirements
imposed on it. 2' As a result, grandfather clauses in environmental
legislation may intensify the differences in environmental conditions
between areas containing grandfathered facilities and areas in which
new facilities choose to locate. Assuming that existing facilities are
located in low-income or minority areas, the two-tier structure im-
posed by grandfather clauses in environmental laws has implications
for distributive justice.246
3. Consequences of "Not In My Backyard"
Writers in the environmental justice movement have observed that
white and affluent communities often organize to oppose efforts to
site undesirable facilities in their communities. Their opposition,
dubbed the "Not In My Backyard" ("NIMBY') syndrome,247 has been
quite successful in protecting such communities from undesirable sit-
ing decisions. 28 Environmental laws are frequently used to accom-
plish this end.249 Even if the environmental statutes do not require
243. See Robertson, supra note 242, at 141-52 (discussing grandfather clauses in hazardous
waste facility regulation and siting statutes); see also id. at 152-58 (discussing disparity in stan-
dards for existing and new facilities under Clean Air Act).
244. See generally id. (arguing that grandfather clauses make it difficult to reduce risk pre-
sented by polluting facilities that exist in low-income minority communities).
245. See id. at 134, 169-70 (suggesting that grandfather clauses may encourage continued
operation of older polluting facilities and retard development of new, cleaner facilities).
246. Seegenerally id. The impact of grandfather clauses on environmental justice is generally
considered an unintended consequence of their structure rather than an intentional affront to
those living near existing facilities. Grandfather clauses are largely motivated by such concerns
as fairness to business entities, overall economic considerations, and the political realties of
passing cost-imposing legislation. See id. at 167-69.
247. See Bion, supra note 24, at 438 (defining and describing NIMBY phenomeon). The
distinction between NIMBY claims and claims for justice is addressed infra notes 297-301 and
accompanying text.
248. See Collin, supra note 86, at 509-10 (observing successful use of 'NIMBY" strategies);
Delogu, supra note 86, at 199 (noting frequent success of NIMBY efforts); Gauna,supra note 6,
at 31-33 (finding that wealthier and politically more powerful communities are often successful
as keeping noxious facilities out of their communities).
249. For example, the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") requires that a com-
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that a project be halted outright, they give those groups having suffi-
cient resources the opportunity to increase the cost and delay of the
siting process, factors which are sometimes enough to block the pro-
posed facility.an
The result, environmental justice writers contend, is that the envi-
ronmentally undesirable facilities that white and affluent residents
have successfully resisted are instead sited in poor or minority neigh-
borhoods.25' These neighborhoods have fewer financial or profes-
sional resources to oppose the facilities in question and may not be
accustomed to organizing around environmental principles. Siting
in such communities presents the "path of least resistance. " 25 Ac-
cording to Professor Robert Bullard, NIMBY leads to "PIBBY '-
"Place in Blacks' Backyard. "2m
The process feeds upon itself. Zoning laws frequently permit new
development that is consistent with current land uses. When noxious
uses are already located in a poor or minority area, then additional
prehensive environmental impact statement be completed for all major actions that are per-
formed or funded by the Federal Government, and which are likely to have important envi-
ronmental consequences. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1994). Many states have equivalent statutes
that govern state actions, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 38.50.130 (Michie 1996);CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 21,000 (West 1997), and, in some instances, private actions as well. See HAW. REV. STAT. ch.
343; MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 301;MICH. COMP. LAws § 691.1204 (imposing environmental review
requirements on private actions affecting the environment). If the opposed facility is proposed
for wetlands, regulations may also be marshalled to prevent the siting. Filling wetlands is pro-
hibited unless the project proponent obtains a permit. See 40 C.F.RL § 230.10 (1996)
(establishing rules for permits to fill wetlands).
250. NEPA imposes procedural rather than substantive obligations. See Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (holding that NEPA does not im-
pose substantive constraints on agency's decision-making). Federal wetland regulations create
a presumption against siting many uses in wetlands, but establish a difficult and time-
consuming permit process that would in some cases allow wetlands to be filled. See 40 C.F.RL
§ 230.10(a).
251. See GAY, supra note 11, at 23 (describing shift in site for medical incinerator from sub-
urban community to poor urban neighborhood); Bullard, Introduction, supra note 5, at 10
(finding that "NIMBY... actions have.., intensified the pressure on poor communities and
communities of color... [to be] the dumping grounds for polluting industries and other lo-
cally unwanted land uses"); Foster, supra note 27, at 728 (pointing out success of white affluent
communities in shifting undesirable sitings to other areas, namely low-income, minority com-
munities).
252. See Collin, supra note 86, at 511-13 (noting that because poor minority communities
have fewer resources and connections, they are less likely to be able to participate in siting
processes and avoid selection); Foster, supra note 27, at 728 (recognizing that poor, minority
communities lack resources necessary to resist undesirable sitings); Gauna, supra note 6, at 31-
32 (asserting that unwanted land uses are shifted to communities that lack resources to resist
them).
253. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 51, at 4-5; see also Michael B. Gerrard, The Vic-
tims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 495-96 & nn.2-3 (1994) [hereinafter Gerrard, Victims
of NIMBY] (describing PIBBY argument and its adherents). Others have disputed this conclu-
sion. See Blais, supra note 10, at 86 (quoting study which concludes that "PIBBY" oversimplifies
the complex set of factors that drive siting decisions); Gerrard, supra, at 514-16 (arguing that, in
context of recent sitings of waste disposal facilities, there is little evidence of "PIBBY").
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undesirable uses will be considered consistent with the existing uses,
thus leading to greater and greater concentrations of undesirable
land uses.2 According to the environmental justice literature, the
successful NIMBY efforts of certain communities, combined with the
tendency of zoning laws to intensify existing uses, presents another
way in which environmentalists and environmental laws have created
distributional injustice.
4. Environmental laws serve the wealthy better than the poor
As described in the environmental justice literature, environmental
laws may exacerbate unequal environmental conditions because
communities with ample resources are able to use environmental and
zoning laws in ways that those with fewer resources cannot. As sug-
gested above, when it comes to the siting of undesirable land uses,
affluent communities are more likely to have the resources to par-
ticipate effectively in environmental review and other environmental
proceedings than poorer communities.2" Wealthy communities can
afford to hire experts to analyze government documents, appear in
public hearings, and bring suit against the decision makers on both
procedural and substantive issues.
The importance of resources is no less relevant when it comes to
the enforcement of environmental laws. At a general level, commu-
nities with resources find it easier to become involved in and are bet-
ter equipped to lobby for governmental enforcement of environ-
mental regulations in their communities.2 More specifically, when
the government is unable or unwilling to pursue enforcement actions
to a community's satisfaction, a wealthy community has the ability to
use its resources to pursue enforcement directly through the "citizen
suit" provisions contained in many environmental laws. One of the
254. See Lord, supra note 81, at 729 (describing how Boston zoning ordinance, which ap-
pears neutral on its face, perpetuates and exacerbates existing concentrations of undesirable
land uses). Even if a poor or minority community is able to change local zoning laws to stop
undesirable uses in the future, they are unlikely to be able to affect existing uses through zon-
ing. See Robertson, supra note 242, at 158-60 (discussing how zoning doctrines permit "prior
non-conforming uses" to continue and allow for "natural expansion" of existing uses that per-
petuate presence of undesirable facilities).
255. See supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text (discussing role of resources in success-
ful NIMBY campaigns).
256. See Gauna, supra note 6, at 35-36 (observing that wealthy communities' ability to en-
gage with agency and enforcement process may improve enforcement efforts relative to en-
forcement where such participation is lacking); Lazarus, The Meaning and Promotion of Environ-
mental Justic, supra note 238, at 5 (observing that agencies' enforcement discretion is often
affected by attention "to individuals who have the access, clout or basic know-how of agency
operations"); cf. Kuehn, supra note 71, at 666-67 (discussing difficulty faced by those lacking
financial or professional resources in participating in or affecting enforcement actions).
257. See generally Gauna, supra note 6 (discussing citizen suit provisions in environmental
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purposes for the citizen suit provisions is to make up for shortfalls in
the government's ability or commitment to ensure compliance by all
regulated facilities with environmental regulations.m These citizen
suit provisions permit citizens to pursue enforcement actions against
facilities or agencies violating environmental laws.""
Bringing a citizen enforcement action, like bringing any litigation,
requires significant resources-both to detect and analyze suspected
violations and to pursue successful litigation.26 Wealthy communities
are thus more likely to bring private citizen suits than poor neigh-
borhoods. 26' Assuming that government enforcement is evenly dis-
tributed,262 the presence of additional private enforcement efforts in
wealthy areas could result in an overall enforcement pattern that var-
ies according to the communities' private resources. 2'0 Thus, al-
though the citizen suit provisions in environmental laws do provide
citizens with recourse if they are concerned about environmental
compliance in their neighborhood, the unequal use of these provi-
sions by communities could exacerbate the disparity in environ-
mental conditions among neighborhoods. In this sense, the use of
laws and use of such provisions by those with sufficient resources).
258. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.4, at 171-74 (2d ed. 1994) (stating
that citizen suit provisions exist to enforce environmental regulations when government fails to
do so); Lazarus, The Meaning and Promotion of Environmental Justice, supra note 238, at 4-6
(observing shortfall in enforcement resources and role of citizen suits in maximizing enforce-
ment).
259. For example, section 505 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994),
allows citizens to sue to enforce violations of the CWA section 304 of the Clean Air Act
(-CAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994), allows citizens to sue to enforce violations of the CAA; and
section 7002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6972,
which regulates hazardous and solid waste, permits citizens to sue to enforce violations of
RCRA and to stop activities that present "an imminent and substantial endangerment to health
or the environment."
260. See Gauna, supra note 6, at 46 (discussing initial difficulty of detecting hazards and as-
certaining violations), 46-49 (discussing Clean Water Act citizen enforcement suits); id. at 49-60
(discussing Clean Air Act citizen enforcement suits); id. at 60-62 (discussing citizen suits under
Superfund Law); id. at 62-69 (discussing citizen suits under Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act).
261. See id. at 43-44 & n.152 (noting that complexity and expense of environmental cases
often preclude low income communities from successfully using environmental laws to their
advantage); Lazarus, The Meaning and Promotion of Environmental Justice, supra note 238, at 6.
Although successful plaintiffs are generally eligible for attorneys' fees, the amount attorneys
can receive is limited. SeeGauna, supra note 6, at 76-77 (stating that attorneys' fees in successful
suits are calculated as a product of reasonable hours by the reasonable rate for attorneys in the
area where the suit took place, and that the rate cannot be adjusted for contingency nature of
many lawsuits). Communities that cannot pay a lawyer in advance may, therefore, have diffi-
culty finding attorneys willing to represent them on a contingency basis. See id. at 78-79.
262. As discussed above, the evenness of government enforcement has been questioned,
with some alleging that government enforcement efforts are less rigorous in poor and minority
areas. Seesupra note 71 and accompanying text.
263. See Gauna, supra note 6, at 4-6 (arguing that private enforcement efforts by wealthy
communities could lead to their having better environmental compliance than communities
which cannot affort to initiate private citizen suits).
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environmental laws could constitute one cause of the uneven distri-
bution of environmental problems.
D. Environmental Laws as a Limited Mechanism for Addressing
EnvironmentalJustice Concerns
1. The benefits of environmental laws
Notwithstanding the role of environmental laws in causing envi-
ronmental injustice, the environmental justice literature does ac-
knowledge that environmental litigation may be an effective tool in
challenging an undesirable facility. Since many facilities are undesir-
able due to their environmental consequences, environmental laws
regulating the siting process or facility operations provide a natural
basis for challenge.2 Moreover, environmental laws may be the most
promising method for achieving legal redress due to the limited cov-
erage of civil rights laws and the high evidentiary burdens associated
with the Equal Protection Clause.2 5 The literature refers to the rela-
tively frequent success of environmental lawsuits brought to resolve
environmental justice conflicts.
2a
The environmental justice literature acknowledges the potential
role for both the substantive and the procedural elements of envi-
ronmental laws in remedying environmental injustices.267 Substantive
environmental laws and their implementing regulations impose cer-
264. See generally Gerrard, Role of Existing Legislation, supra note 90 (describing environ-
mental laws and ways in which they could be used to address undesirable environmental con-
sequences). Some authors have stressed particular strategies under environmental laws. See,
e.g., Crawford, supra note 6 (discussing medical monitoring suits under CERCLA); Gauna, su-
pra note 6, at 40-76 (discussing ways to increase use of private citizen suits to achieve environ-
mental justice); Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice, "supra note 49, at 827-28 (arguing that
lawsuits based on non-compliance with environmental statutes could be effective way for mi-
nority communities to prevent undesirable sitings in their communities).
265. See Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation, supra note 90, at 526 (arguing that environ-
mental laws provide a more promising basis for blocking facilities than civil rights laws); Torres,
Environmental Burdens, supra note 29, at 437 (maintaining that environmental laws have been
more effective than civil rights laws in providing redress for perceived environmental injustice).
As attorney Michael Gerrard has stated: "If the only tool that you have is a hammer, then the
only things you can deal with are nails. If the only laws that you have are laws that say you can-
not site facilities in endangered species' habitats or in wetlands, then that is what you look for."
Gerrard, Role of Existing Legislation, supra note 90, at 559.
266. See Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation, supra note 90, at 526-30 (describing successful
use of environmental law suits); Gerrard, Role of Existing Legislation, supra note 90, at 558
(recognizing relatively high success rate of lawsuits based on environmental laws); Robertson,
supra note 242, at 137-38 (finding that suits based on environmental law have succeeded in de-
laying and preventing construction of new polluting facilities).
267. See Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation, supra note 90, at 526-30 (discussing potential
for both substantive and procedural elements of environmental law as means to blocking unde-
sirable sitings); see also Foster, supra note 27, at 749-52 (discussing importance of environmental
laws' procedural public participation provisions to environmental justice efforts).
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tain requirements on polluting facilities. For example, the Clean Air
Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act established permitting processes for air emissions,m water
discharges, 20 and hazardous waste, respectively.270 New facilities must
go through a permitting process and, once sited, must conform to
the terms of their permits. Communities concerned about the facili-
ties can participate in the initial permitting process, monitor compli-
ance once permits have been issued, and bring lawsuits if they believe
that the permitting process failed to conform to the mandated re-
quirements or that the facility does not comply with the permit.2'
The environmental justice literature also acknowledges that the
complex procedural requirements imposed by many environmental
laws can assist communities concerned about environmental prob-
lems. Environmental review statutes, such as NEPA2'7 and its state law
analogues, 273 require proponents of major federal or state actions to
complete environmental impact statements. 274 The statements gener-
ate a great deal of information about a project's environmental and
socioeconomic consequences and about possible alternatives to a
proposed project.2 75 NEPA and its state equivalents also provide ex-
276tensive opportunities for public hearings and participation. If these
procedural requirements are violated, they then present a basis for
legal claims. 7
268. 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (1994) (describing permit requirements for facilities in areas that
have attained national air quality standards); id. § 7503 (describing permit requirements for
facilities in areas that have not yet attained national air quality standards).
269. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (establishing permitting process for water discharges).
270. 42 U.S.C § 6925 (establishing permitting system for facilities that treat, store, or dis-
pose of hazardous waste).
271. See generally Gerrard, Role of Existing Legislation, supra note 90 (discussing how environ-
mental laws can be used to further goals of environmental justice movement). Many states
have assumed responsibility for implementing these programs. In such instances, communities
would participate in a state-run permitting program that conforms to the federal requirements.
272. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370.
273. SeeJohnson, supra note 25, at 566-67 (referring to state environmental review statutes);
Reich, supra note 130, at 305-15 (identifying and discussing state environmental review stat-
utes).
274. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
275. See Gerrard, Roe of Existing Legislation, supra note 90, at 556, 561-62 (describing infor-
mation-gathering value of environmental laws establishing environmental review procedures);
see alsoJohnson, supra note 25, at 576-78 (describing how that environmental impact statements
provide communities with extensive information about a proposed project).
276. See Foster, supra note 27, at 749-52 & n.145 (describing importance of environmental
provisions requiring public participation and need to improve upon participatory provisions
already included in existing environmental laws); Johnson, supra note 25, at 572-76
(maintaining that public participation provisions, like those in NEPA, provide communities
with a vehicle for participating in the decisionmaking process).
277. See Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation, supra note 90, at 528-30 (describing lawsuit
which successfully alleged procedural deficiencies); see also Godsil, Environmental Struggles, supra
note 17, at 7-8 (discussing successful campaign to force agency to complete required environ-
276
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Some environmental justice authors note that environmental law-
suits not only help to ensure that those siting or operating facilities
comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of all ap-
plicable laws, but also provide a mechanism for increasing the delay
and expense associated with a proposed project.278 The delay and
expense may discourage the project proponent from pursuing the
planned action in that particular geographic area or at all.2
2. Environmental law as a necessary evil
While the environmental justice literature generally acknowledges
the strategic value of environmental litigation, some of the literature
argues that this remedy fails to address the deeper roots of the prob-
lem: discrimination.2 8 The underlying issue is the political and eco-
nomic status of the affected community and the extent to which that
community is treated fairly. Strategies like bringing an environ-
mental lawsuit or participating in environmental proceedings are un-
likely to address these basic concerns.
Furthermore, the environmental justice literature portrays the
technical nature of environmental laws as alienating to the communi-
ties enlisting their aid.2  Because of the complexity of environmental
mental reviews).
278. See, e.g., Gerrard, Role of Existing Legislation, supra note 90, at 557 (noting that environ-
mental statutes can stop, "or at least ... delay severely" the siting of waste disposal or industrial
projects); Godsil, Environmental Struggles, supra note 17, at 7 (describing delay that can be
achieved through invocation of environmental review requirements); Johnson, supra note 25,
at 578-79 (describing benefits of delays caused by compliance with environmental review stat-
utes).
279. This "cost and delay" strategy mimics the strategy successfully used by traditional envi-
ronmentalists. See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text (discussing environmentalists'
"NIMBY" tactics); cf. Delogu, supra note 86, at 199 (noting and criticizing NIMBY activists for
engaging in delay strategies). It should also be noted, however, that many of those writing in
the environmental justice literature espouse the goal of reducing the overall number of unde-
sirable uses, rather than simply shifting them from one area to another. See, e.g., GAY, supra
note 11, at 50 (noting that environmental justice groups increasingly argue that toxic facilities
should be "Not in Anyone's Backyard"); Chavis, supra note 6, at 5 (emphasizing that environ-
mental justice movement seeks to remove environmental hazards from not just minority com-
munities but rather from all communities).
280. See Cole, Empowermnt as the Key, supra note 13, at 647-49; Torres, Environmental Burdens,
supra note 29, at 450-51.
281. See Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 647-49 (discussing failure of legal
remedies to address political problems at root of environmental injustice); Torres, Environ-
mental Burdens, supra note 29, at 450-51 (arguing that the pursuit of legal remedies fails to ad-
dress deeper political and economic problems faced by communities); cf. Williams, supra note
224 (noting that environmental laws such as Endangered Species Act force attention onto one
narrow issue-survival of particular species-rather than on broader issue-the importance of
land to particular communities).
282. In some cases, communication between relevant agencies and minority communities
may be stymied by the agencies' confusion as to who represents a particular group. The pro-
cedure for soliciting and responding to the public's concerns may fail to correspond with the
authority and communication structures of a minority community. See Williams, supra note
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laws and the likelihood that community residents will not have the
experience or training to use them, the expert lawyer might dictate
litigation strategy or engage in the administrative process without the
participation of the non-expert community.ss When the locus of the
dispute is moved to the courtroom or an administrative agency, the
community group is on unfamiliar turf. Use of environmental laws
could thus disengage and disempower the affected community.
E. Conclusion
In many low-income and minority communities, environmental
laws are looked on with suspicion. First, environmental laws (and
environmental lawyers) often cause or exacerbate environmental in-
justice. Second, despite the potential for some environmental laws to
provide a legal basis for challenging an environmental problem, the
use of environmental laws does not address the deeper issues of jus-
tice that are at stake. In some cases, using environmental laws might
harm rather than help the affected community's quest for justice.
The goal of this Article with respect to the first claim-that envi-
ronmental laws cause environmental injustice-is simply to identify
the negative perception, its roots, and its role in the environmental
justice movement's attitude toward environmental laws. As to the
second claim, this Article intends to move past the concerns about
the relationship between environmental laws and the pursuit of jus-
tice to explore more fully the ways in which environmental laws can
contribute to social justice.2
224, at 1157-63 (describing agency's failure to determine who "speaks for" Apaches in Arizona
land dispute).
283. See Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 649-51 (suggesting that bringing en-
vironmental lawsuits deprives communities of control over their dispute and shifts debate to
forum--courts-where communities are likely to be at a disadvantage); Gauna, supra note 6, at
22 n.73, 60 n.218 (noting that technical nature of citizen suits creates battle of experts in which
communities tend to give control to lawyers); Poirier, Can We Talk?, supra note 161, at 1101
(acknowledging possibility that "[p]rofessional analysis and control can deform and even derail
a grassroots fight"); Torres, Environmental Burdens, supra note 29, at 451 (arguing that lawsuits
shift debate to fora where minority groups lose control and where they have insufficient re-
sources relative to their opponents). Despite their criticisms of the nature and process of envi-
ronmental litigation, many environmental justice advocates acknowledge that environmental
litigation, if handled with the requisite sensitivity to the broader issues at stake and the partici-
patory needs of the community, will not necessarily distract or disempower the communities
being served. See Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra, at 661-73; Gauna, supra, at 39-40; Poirier,
Can We Talk, supra, at 1101-04.
284. See Crawford, supra note 6, at 302-03 (discussing need to move past historic barriers
between environmental and civil rights movements to consider various opportunities that envi-
ronmental laws can provide); see also Foster, supra note 27, at 721-25 (discussing relationship
between civil rights and environmental groups and suggesting that civil rights groups consider
framework provided by environmental laws); Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice," supra
note 49, at 853-55 (discussing how environmental and civil rights movements need to move
beyond their past tensions to affirm and address "common ground" they share).
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III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND POLITICALJUSTICE
Environmental laws play three different roles in the pursuit of en-
vironmental justice. The first is instrumental: environmental laws
may provide a legal "hook" for suits against a project, even if that
"hook" does not explicitly relate to the question ofjustice2ss Second,
environmental laws could serve, rather than hinder, the pursuit of
distributive justice. New requirements that demographic impacts be
considered in connection with government decisions affecting the
environment provide one mechanism for addressing distributional
justice. Passing legislation requiring greater distributional equity
would be another.287 Third, environmental laws may assist in the pur-
suit of political justice. While the first and second roles have received
some attention in the environmental justice literature,ss the role of
environmental laws in the pursuit of political justice has not received
sufficient attention. The remainder of this Article addresses this is-
sue.
The role of environmental justice in pursuing political justice is
explored in connection with environmental justice disputes involving
the siting of undesirable land uses. Although siting disputes involve
only one aspect of the many environmental problems faced by poor
and minority communities, they are of crucial importance.2,9  The
environmental consequences of a siting decision are, of course, a
285. Seesupra notes 90-94, 264-79 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text (discussing Executive Order 12,898 and
its requirement that federal agencies consider distributional implications of their decisions).
287. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text (discussing federal and state legislation).
288. See supra note 264 (listing articles discussing instrumental use of environmental laws),
and note 133 (discussing role of environmental laws in pursuing distributive justice).
289. Professor Torres has suggested that the environmental justice movement may spend
more time than it should on siting disputes. See Torres, Environmental Justice, supra note 10, at
618 (arguing that "there are many other threats of environmental quality that will continue to
place many communities at risk regardless of the reform of the siting process"). As recent stud-
ies have suggested, siting processes may not be the cause of all disproportionate burdens and,
even if they are a cause, they are only one factor in explaining current disproportionate im-
pacts. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. Improving distributional results will there-
fore require more than fixing the siting process. SeeTorres, Environmental Justice, supra, at 618.
In other words, creating fairer siting processes would not necessarily improve long-term distri-
butional justice because a distributional injustice may arise after, and as a consequence of, an
initially fair siting decision. Thus, if one's primary goal is the reduction of environmental dis-
parities, attention to siting processes may not solve the problem.
If one perceives political justice as a central concern and goal of the environmental justice
movement, however, a heightened focus on siting disputes is neither surprising nor inappro-
priate. Even thought local siting disputes may not be the most important determinant of the
distribution of environmental harms, they often present a manifestation of perceived political
injustice. The siting decision becomes a vehicle for responding to a deeper sense of systemic
"racial subordination." At the grassroots level, the environmental justice issue in a siting dis-
pute can be as much about continuing the debate on race discrimination as it is about improv-
ing environmental quality.
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central concern to many communities. But when the fairness of a sit-
ing decision is challenged, much more is at stake than the placement
of a facility. To many communities, a siting decision may be symbolic
of a deep lack of respect given to the affected community and may
reflect the community's low social and political status. As described
by Professor George Wright in the context of siting hazardous waste
facilities, the injuries of concern to a community are notjust the pub-
lic health risks associated with such facilities.m They also include the
"stigmatic injury" of being selected as the site for undesirable facili-
ties.29 The argument about the fairness of siting a facility in a poor
or minority neighborhood therefore raises not only the practical
consequences of the facility, but also the enduring question of the
social, political, and economic status of poor and minority communi-
ties.
A. Asserting Claims of PoliticalJustice: The Challenge
The legal approach for claiming political injustice is generally a
suit under the Equal Protection Clause or, where applicable, a suit
for discriminatory intent under Titles VI or VIII of the Civil Rights
Act.f2 As discussed earlier, however, the evidentiary burden for a
claim based on the Equal Protection Clause is high.2s Where the
evidence of unequal treatment is relatively insidious, the Constitution
may fail to provide a legal remedy.24 Titles VI and VIII are relatively
limited in their applicability as well.25
What remedy, then, exists for communities who believe they have
been discriminated against and who are unlikely to find legal re-
course? The primary remedy will be the long, slow process of politi-
cal and cultural change. Communities who believe they have been
treated unfairly must find ways to communicate their cause in a
manner that stimulates the broader community to greater account-
ability. To the extent they are successful in unmasking discrimina-
tory treatment, affected communities may gain a new recognition
290. See generally R. George Wright, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the Problems of Stigmatic and
Racial Injury, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 777 (1991).
291. See id. at 784-87. Professor Wright notes that stigmatic injuries "may reflect a lack of
respect and may tend to undermine the bases of the self-respect of the adversely affected com-
munity." Id. at 787.
292. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. Professor Blais' condusory statement that
intentional race-based discrimination would be "unconstitutional," Blais, supra note 10, at 81,
fails to acknowledge the possibility that the constitutional test may be underinclusive.
295. See supra note 122 (Title VI applies only to federally funded programs and agencies),
and note 125 (Title VIII applies only to siting decisions affecting housing).
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and standing in the political and social structures within which they
exist.
The struggle for political justice in the political forum is not an
easy one.2 Where injustice has occurred, the unjustly treated com-
munity is not viewed with equal concern and respect. With a lack of
respect as a backdrop, a claim of unfair treatment is unlikely to be
received with responsive sympathy. The difficulty is compounded by
the likelihood that the discrimination will be subtle rather than overt.
The days of explicit and unapologetic discrimination are now largely
over. Furthermore, an accusation of unfair treatment is a serious
charge. To the extent it is not believed, the decisionmakers accused
of discriminating may be seen as victims of the unfair accusations of
the burdened group.
Ultimately, when a burdened group's assertions are not believed,
their objection to the siting decision may be seen as just another in-
stance of the widespread "Not In My Backyard" phenomenon.2 7
NIMBY is seen as a selfish position: don't bother us; bother someone
else. NIMBY claims do not, on their own terms, raise questions of
political justice.m Consequently, the community will inevitably con-
front the following questions: Is the claim for environmental justice
simply a way to mask self-interested NIMBY attitudes in politically-
correct clothing? Is a claim in opposition to a facility a claim for jus-
tice simply because it is expressed by a minority or low-income com-
munity? Without an answer to these questions, a community will not
be able to demonstrate political injustice.
Some environmental justice advocates argue that their NIMBY
claims are not selfish because they are not trying to impose the bur-
296. Professor Poirier observes that a race or class-based analysis of land use decisions is a
.counternarrative" to the dominant environmental and property-based rhetoric used to evalu-
ate most land use decisions. Basing litigation and negotiation on race or class-based claims is
likely to be "problematic... because of political and economic resistance to change, bolstered
by the conflict of the counternarrative with the categories of the dominant narrative." Poirier,
Beach Access, supra note 161, at 799. Some groups, therefore, make a tactical decision to sup-
press such potentially divisive issues and focus on more traditional and generally acceptable
positions, such as those based on environmental or property theories. See id. at 803 (referring
to NewJersey Public Advocate's strategy for obtaining beach access for minorities). Obscuring
race- or class-based elements of a claim, however, "undermines the effectiveness of the coun-
temarrative as an organizing tool and as an eventual long-term strategy for shifting the domi-
nant discourse." Id. at 802. This Article acknowledges the difficulty of making claims of dis-
crimination and suggests a method for using the dominant discourse (of environmental law) to
demonstrate the veracity of the counternarrative (of unfair treatment).
297. The "NIMBY" responses of wealthy and powerful communities are considered one of
the causes of the disproportionate distribution of undesirable facilities in poor and minority
areas. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
298. See Torres, EnvironmentalJustice, supra note 10, at 612-13 (suggesting possibility that
claim of "environmental justice" could be abused to achieve "what is essentially a NIMBY re-
sult").
1997]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSI[Y LAw REvIEw [Vol. 47:221
den on anyone else. Instead, their position is "NIABY': Not in Any-
body's Backyard. m For example, in fighting the siting of a hazardous
waste facility, a community might urge reductions in the use of haz-
ardous chemicals rather than placement of the facility near another
community. There is evidence that such opposition has prompted
reductions in the generation of municipal and hazardous waste.N
But while NIABY may be a plausible position in connection with op-
position to certain types of facilities, in connection with other types
of facilities the argument becomes strained. Many undesirable uses,
like hospitals, jails, and waste disposal facilities serve important and
necessary functions. NIABY will not be a plausible or desirable re-
sponse to these types of necessary land uses. Thus, where a commu-
nity opposes a particular land use, and where NIABY is not a plausi-
ble response, the community cannot avoid the "NIMBY' label.3'
Nonetheless, the fact that a community does not want a particular
land use in its backyard does not mean that its claim of unfairness is
illegitimate. No community wants an undesirable use located in its
backyard. The issue, then, is not whether the claim is motivated by
NIMBY. The question is whether the burdened community is raising
a claim for political justice in addition to NIMBY. The NIMBY part of
the claim is the community's dismay over the proposed siting. The
political justice part of the claim asks the question of fairness:
whether it is just to put that particular use in that particular backyard.
Therefore, the central issue in the environmental justice context is
whether, in addition to its natural opposition, a community is raising
an issue of fairness.
The answer to the question of political injustice will be strongly
contested. Unlike the legal forum, an absolute answer to the ques-
tion of fairness is unlikely; winning or losing the political debate will
be a matter of degree. The degree to which an affected community
can convince the broader community that it has been treated unfairly
will depend on how well it can support its claim in terms comprehen-
sible to the broader community. If a community provides a convinc-
ing argument that a siting decision has been made unfairly in a par-
299. See supra note 279 (discussing NIABY).
300. See Gerrard, Victims of NIMB, supra note 253, at 516-20. Attorney Gerrard observes
that society may sometimes benefit from local communities' NIMBY. In particular, he notes
that local opposition to municipal and hazardous waste facilities has prompted greater efforts
to reduce waste, thus providing a benefit to all, not just to the community resisting the noxious
use. See id. at 517-20.
301. See Delogu, supra note 86, at 198-201 (describing adverse consequences to society that
result from self-interest associated with NIMBY syndrome); Gerrard, Victims of NIMBY, supra
note 253, at 522 (concluding that NIMBY attitudes toward low-income housing and social serv-
ices have negative social consequences).
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ticular instance, then that success could improve the community's
political status and its long-term prospects for fair treatment.'
B. How Environmental Laws Help Identify Injustice
How, then, does a community demonstrate that it has been treated
unfairly? In the face of allegations of discriminatory treatment, most
decisionmakers will attempt to articulate a nondiscriminatory basis
for their siting decision. To demonstrate unfair treatment, the ag-
grieved community will have to show that the proffered basis for the
unfair treatment is merely a "pretext" for a discriminatory motive.
The arguments a community could raise in the political forum are
similar to the legal arguments a plaintiff would raise in a "disparate
treatment" claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.sss
Under Title VII, a complainant must first make a prima facie case
demonstrating unfair treatment.3 To make a prima facie case, the
complainant must present evidence of disparate treatmentY5 In the
absence of direct evidence, the complainant may present circumstan-
tial evidence showing that he or she was not selected for the em-
ployment in question despite having the requisite qualifications.
30
6
By analogy, affected communities may have direct or circumstan-
tial evidence of unfair treatment. Where communities have direct
evidence of discrimination, the process of communicating to the
broader community will be easier than if the evidence is only circum-
stantial . 7 A more prevalent and more difficult situation arises when
302. In fact, a community may make political progress through a debate about environ-
mental justice even if it fails to achieve tangible results-in other words, even if it fails to
change a siting decision. While the community may remain burdened from a distributional
standpoint, if the debates about the siting have raised doubts about the credibility of the deci-
sionmakers and increased the broader community's awareness of and concern for the affected
community, the affected community may have progressed in the incremental process of politi-
cal and cultural change that is necessary to achieve fair treatment. See Michael Guerrero &
Louis Head, Infonned Collective Action-A Powerful Weapon, in WE SPEAK FOR OURSELVES, supra
note 12, at 34 (noting that, despite ultimate failure in particular matter, community's active
opposition to undesirable facility meant that "none of those involved would every try to shine
off the community again").
303. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Once again, this Article uses Title VII case law only by way
of analogy, not as a formal model for a legal action.
304. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (describing require-
ments for presenting prima facie case).
305. See, e.g., Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir. 1996).
306. The complainant generally must show
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for ajob
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
McDonnellDouglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. The specific requirements for aprimafacie case may
vary depending upon the particular factual circumstances presented. See id. at 802 n.13.
307. In addition, with direct evidence of discrimination, the community may be able to
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a community lacks direct evidence, but nonetheless believes that it
has been treated unfairly. To present a prima facie case based on
circumstantial evidence, the aggrieved community would have to
make the opposite showing of that required under Title VII: instead
of showing that a site should have been selected based on the site's
qualifications, the aggrieved community would need to show that it
should not have been selected because it did not have the requisite
qualifications for the facility in question.
Under Title VII, once a prima facie case has been made, the de-
fendant has the opportunity to "articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee's rejection."" Similarly, a deci-
sionmaker responsible for selecting a site would be expected to
articulate a neutral justification for the siting decision in response to
a community's contention that the siting was motivated by unfair
treatment."°
In the case of Title VII, the employer's articulation of a nondis-
criminatory basis does not end the litigation. The complainant has
the opportunity to respond and demonstrate that the employer's al-
leged basis for rejecting the employee was simply a "pretext."10 Un-
der Title VII, a "' [p] retext... means a lie, specifically a phony reason
for some action."'3 Numerous means can be used to demonstrate
that the employer's alleged rationale is pretextual. The complainant
can prove that the rationale is not based in fact,312 or, even if it is
based in fact, that it is not the "real" motivation, 3 or that the reason
provided is not sufficient to explain the action taken.1
mount a successful legal challenge under the Equal Protection Clause or, if applicable, under
Title VI or Title VIII.
308. McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
309. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
310. McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
311. Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Russell v.
Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995)).
312. In Suggs v. Servicemaster Education Food Management, 72 F.3d 1228 (6th Cir. 1996), the
appellate court upheld the trial court's findings that the facts failed to support the employer's
rationales for terminating the plaintiff. See id. at 1232-33.
313. See Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 95 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that
finding of pretext "does not require that the facts presented by the defendant as the reason for
its employment action not be true, only that they not be the reason").
314. See Johnson, 91 F.3d at 931 (citing Lenoir v. Roll Coater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1130, 1133 (7th
Cir. 1994)). A number of courts, using these factors, have found that an employer's stated ra-
tionale is pretextual. For example, in Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 90 F.3d 1160 (6th
Cir. 1996), the appellate court upheld the trial court's findings that the employer's proffered
justification was a pretext. The justification lacked credibility in light of evidence that the em-
ployer had shifted its factual assertions as the litigation progressed. See id. at 1167. In Emmel
the court noted that the defendant's purported explanation of its decision not to promote the
plaintiff had shifted over time, suggesting that the explanation was a post-hoc rationalization
for the decision designed to mask a discriminatory motive. See Emmel 95 F.3d at 634-35. In
Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., 954 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1992), applying the analogous Age Discrimi-
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By analogy, in a community's debate about the fairness of a siting
decision, the community would need to show that the articulated ba-
sis for the decision was merely a "pretext" masking discriminatory
treatment. The community would need to demonstrate that the de-
cisionmakers responsible for the siting had misstated the relevant
facts associated with the siting process, or that the facts, though true,
did not provide the "real" justification for the siting decision, or that
the purported justification simply fails to provide a credible explana-
tion for the siting decision.
In a Title VII case, if a plaintiff proves that an employer's rationale
is a pretext, the jury may infer from the evidence that the real motiva-
tion for the employment decision was discriminatory. Similarly, in an
environmental justice dispute, a burdened community which can
show that the decisionmakers' rationale was a pretext allows for the
inference that the real explanation for the decision was discrimina-
tion. When the purported rationale for a decision does not add up,
the natural question becomes: "Why here?" The evidence may then
illustrate that the decisionmakers did not site the facility near the
burdened community because it was a good place for the facility. In-
stead, the evidence may suggest that the decisionmakers avoided si-
ting the facility near communities of political concern to them. If so,
the siting decision would fail to treat the burdened community with
equal concern and respect.315
In a Title VII suit, a jury decides the credibility of the complain-
ant's and the employer's assertions. By contrast, there is no final ar-
biter in a siting dispute carried out in public debate, and there will be
no final answers on the question of whether the decisionmakers' al-
leged bases for their decision were pretextual or sincere, or on
whether the true explanation lies in unfair treatment. However,
there are likely to be better and worse answers, answers that have
more credibility and less credibility, answers that have more evidence
to support them and answers that have less.16 The political forum
nation in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, the trial court found, and the appellate court
agreed, that the employer's proffered justifications were pretextual. The trial court found that
the facts did not support the employer's assertions, and those facts that were true (that the em-
ployee was "rude and uncommunicative") did not appear to offer the "real" motivation for the
termination decision or explain the decision (since these characteristics had been present and
accepted during the preceding 14 years). See Giacoletto, 954 F.2d at 426-27.
315. It is possible that ajury could conclude that the employer's rationale was a pretext but
that the motive, though illicit, was not discrimination. The same could be true in the environ-
mental justice context. See infra notes 378-79 and accompanying text.
316. It is quite possible that the political debate will reveal that the decisionmakers had
mixed motives. They may have selected a site for a number of reasons, with a lack of concern
and respect for the burdened community as one explanation. Whatever the impact of a
.mixed motive" in a civil rights' case, recognition of the illicit motive would still present an ad-
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presents a sliding scale ofjustice. The degree to which a community
can communicate its perception that it has been treated unfairly will
vary with the strength of the evidence it can muster.
Environmental laws can assist in debates about justice by facilitat-
ing the collection of circumstantial evidence to demonstrate the sit-
ing equivalent of "disparate treatment."01 7 Information gleaned
through environmental laws and environmental review procedures
can assist in generating a "prima facie case" that the site is not
"qualified" and can assist a community's challenge of the justifica-
tions offered by decisionmakers. The identification of irrationalities
or inconsistencies in the siting process may strengthen the inference
that the decision was motivated by a disregard for a community, and
increase the evidence supporting the claim that a community's oppo-
sition goes beyond NIMBY to include a demand for fairness. ' 8
C. Specific Mechanisms by Which Environmental Laws May Support
Claims of Injustice
Different environmental laws, and different sections within a given
environmental law, provide a range of tools that can assist in debates
about justice. First, some environmental laws establish substantive
criteria whose violation may signal an irrational and possibly dis-
criminatory siting decision. Second, some environmental laws pro-
vide extensive information regarding the expected consequences of
the siting. Even if these laws do not establish substantive criteria,
they may reveal enough about the decision-making process to impli-
cate the legitimacy of the decision. Third, some environmental laws
require a consideration of alternative siting options. The additional
information regarding alternative sites, and a comparison of the de-
cision-making processes used to reject the alternative sites, may pro-
vide evidence of the irrationality of selecting the site located in the
vance for a community in a political debate about fair treatment. Even if the decisionmakers
were motivated only in part by discrimination, the burdened community would be making the
political point that they were unfairly treated. They would be closer to the goal of holding de-
cisionmakers accountable to all than they would be if they were unable to show any invidious
motive at all.
317. Environmental laws are not the only way to develop circumstantial evidence of dis-
crimination. Evidence of past disparate impacts may be one source of circumstantial evidence
pointing toward a pattern of discriminatory treatment. Other irregularities in the siting proc-
ess-independent of irregularities discovered in connection with environmental or land use
laws-might also provide circumstantial evidence casting doubt on the legitimacy of the siting
decision.
318. Again, numerous inferences can be drawn from the discovery that the decisionmakers'
rationale is pretextual. Discrimination is just one possibility. The likelihood that the true pur-
pose was discriminatory will depend on the entirety of the circumstances. See infranotes 378-79
and accompanying text.
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poor or minority neighborhood. The more a siting in a poor or mi-
nority neighborhood does not make sense, the more likely that an-
other factor, such as discrimination, motivated the decision.
1. Violation of substantive criteria
Many laws governing the siting of undesirable facilities establish
certain substantive criteria. For example, the federal regulations
governing the siting of hazardous waste treatment, storage, or dis-
posal facilities prohibit the siting of any such facility within 200 feet
of a geologic fault line that has been active within a certain period of
time." 9 The violation of such an easily verifiable, objective standard
would give an aggrieved community a strong legal basis for challeng-
ing the siting of a facility within 200 feet of an active fault. 20 The vio-
lation of an objective standard, however, might also provide indirect
evidence of discrimination. An aggrieved community would ask:
Why did the developer choose, as its place for development, a site
that was environmentally unsuitable? Was the developer drawn by
the hope that the poor and minority neighborhoods in which it pro-
posed its development would be less likely to oppose the facility?32'
Evidence that a developer or decisionmaker has ignored important
substantive criteria would support the inference that the decision was
motivated by an improper motive.
In light of the federal government's general reluctance to engage
in regulating the land use decisions that must be made in the siting
context,sa the examples of substantive criteria governing the siting
process burgeon when one considers state laws and regulations."
319. See 40 C.F.R. § 264.18(a) (1) (1996) ("Portions of new facilities where treatment, stor-
age, or disposal of hazardous waste will be conducted must not be located within 61 meters
(200 feet) of a fault which has had displacement in Holocene time.").
320. See supra notes 264-71 and accompanying text (discussing environmental litigation in
environmental justice context).
321. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing Cerrell Associates report).
322. See Delogu, supra note 86, at 202 n.15 (observing that most land use decisions are
made at local level).
323. For regulations establishing substantive criteria in connection with siting hazardous
waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities of various forms, see, e.g., 30TEx. ADMIN. CODE
§ 335.204 (West 1996) (providing location standards for hazardous waste, storage, processing
or disposal); id. § 334.493 (providing location standards for facilities storing or processing pe-
troleum-contaminated substances); UTAH ADMIN. CODE § R315-8-2.9 (1996) (establishing loca-
tion standards for hazardous waste management facilities); Arkansas Environmental, Health
and Safety Regulations, ERM AR 264-18 (1996) (providing standards for location of hazardous
waste facilities); Connecticut Environmental, Health and Safety Regulations, ERM CT 22a-122-1
(1989) (providing requirement that hazardous waste facilities be located at minimum distance
from other land uses); Mississippi Environmental, Health and Safety Regulations, ERM MS
264.S2.3 to 264.S2.7 (1994) (providing requirements for siting hazardous waste management
facilities, including hydrological, geological, natural resource, historical, zoning, proximity to
other land uses, and aesthetic factors); South Carolina Environmental, Health and Safety Regu-
lations, ERM SC R.61-1-4-V (1991) (providing locations criteria, including geologic, hydro-
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Under Texas' health and safety regulations, for example, municipal
and solid waste facilities cannot be located in wetlands, 24 must be
"located at least 500 feet from all public water wells and at least 150
feet from private water wells, ' s5 and must be a certain distance from
all forms of surface water.3 26 If a local city council in Texas decided to
site a waste disposal facility in a wetland within 100 feet of private and
public wells and in the vicinity of the city's minority community, that
community could argue that the site was chosen despite it's failure to
meet the requisite qualifications for a landfill. The city's violation of
the health and safety standards would provide a strong legal basis for
challenging the siting decision. Additionally, the city's transgression
of such clear and important criteria would be relevant to the debate
about the fairness of the siting decision. The site's failure to meet
necessary qualifications could suggest that the city council was moti-
vated by improper motives.
logic, proximity to water sources and other land uses); West Virginia Environmental Health
and Safety Regulations, ERM WV-57-1-A-3a (1994) (providing location standards for obtaining
approval for siting commercial hazardous waste management facilities, including proximity to
water sources, wetlands, and geologic characteristics); Wisconsin Environmental, Health and
Safety Regulations, ERM WI 630.18 (1991) (providing standards for location of hazardous waste
storage, treatment and disposal facilities); id. at 718.01 to 718.14 (providing location standards
for placing solid wastes excavated in connection with environmental remediation); Wyoming
Environmental Health and Safety Regulations, ERM WY-2 (chapter 10) and ERM WY-3
(chapter 6) (providing standards for location of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and dis-
posal facilities).
For regulations establishing substantive criteria in connection with siting municipal or solid
waste disposal facilities of various forms, see, e.g., Minnesota Environmental, Health and Safety
Regulations, ERM MN 7035-28.25 (1996) (providing similar standards for demolition debris
land disposal facilities); Oklahoma Environmental, Health and Safety Regulations, ERM OK
252:510-7-2 (1995) (providing similar standards for solid waste disposal facilities) and id. at
252:520-7-2 (same); Utah Environmental, Health and Safety Regulations, ERM UT R315-302-1
(1995) (providing location standards for solid waste facilities, including restrictions on proxim-
ity to other land uses, geologic characteristics, and proximity to water sources); West Virginia
Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulations, ERM WV-47-38-3 (1996) (permitting require-
ments for solid waste facilities, including restrictions on proximity to water sources, proximity
to other land uses, and geologic characteristics); Wisconsin Environmental, Health, and Safety
Regulations, ERM WI 504.04 (1988) (providing regulations regarding proximity to water
sources and other land uses); Wyoming Environmental, Health and Safety Regulations, ERM
WY-3 (chapters 2-4) (providing standards for locating sanitary industrial, and construc-
tion/demolition landfills, including restrictions on proximity to water sources, other land uses,
and geologic characteristics).
For regulations establishing substantive criteria in connection with siting other types of un-
desirable land uses, see, e.g., Illinois Environmental, Health and Safety Regulations, ERM IL
830.203 (providing locations standards for landscape compost facilities); Texas Environmental,
Health and Safety Regulations, ERM TX 309.13 (providing location standards for wastewater
treatment plants, including proximity to water sources and buffer zones); West Virginia Envi-
ronmental, Health and Safety Regulations, ERM WV 47-38D-3 (1996) (providing geologic and
other standards for use and disposal of sewage sludge); id. at 47-38E-3.2 (providing location
standards for yard waste composting facilities).
324. See30 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 332.36(3) (West 1996).
325. See id.
326. See id. § 332.36(5).
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Some regulations include both environmental and social factors in
their substantive criteria. For example, Texas regulations governing
hazardous waste storage, processing or disposal facilities prohibit the
issuance of permits "if the boundary of the unit is to be located
within one-half of a mile (2,640 feet) of an established residence,
church, school, day care center, surface water body used for a public
drinking water supply, or dedicated public park. 3 27 Not only would
the violation of these standards call into question the rationality of
the siting process, the standards themselves directly address the qual-
ity of life issues central to an aggrieved community's opposition.
2. Generation of information about the selected site
Another significant type of environmental law, exemplified by
NEPA,'" establishes an environmental review process that can pro-
vide useful information to a community questioning the wisdom and
fairness of a siting decision.32 NEPA requires that all federal agencies
proposing actions" that could have significant environmental conse-
quences prepare an environmental impact statement ("EIS")."' Un-
like the types of environmental provisions described in the preceding
section, NEPA does not impose substantive criteria on the decision-
maker.332 NEPA imposes only a procedural requirement: that the
agency analyze and consider environmental impacts!33 Thus, an ag-
grieved community cannot sue an agency for its failure to base its de-
327. Id. § 335.205; see also id. (prohibiting storage or treatment facilities for petroleum-
contaminated substantances within a certain distance from "residence, church, hospital,
school, licensed day-care center, or dedicated public park").
328. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370d (1994). Many states have NEPA-equivalents governing state
actions and, in some cases, private actions as well. See Blais, supra note 10, at 125 (observing
that there are at least 13 states with NEPA-equivalents); id. at 126 n.215 (quoting casebook ob-
serving that 20 states have NEPA-equivalents);Johnson, supra note 25, at 566 (observing that 16
states have enacted NEPA-equivalents and that several more have implemented executive or-
ders mandating NEPA-like environmental review processes); Ross, supra note 25, at 369-71
(observing that 28 states have enacted NEPA-like legislation).
329. SeeJohnson, supra note 25, at 576-78 (describing NEPA's usefulness as information-
gathering tool and use of information in political action).
330. Federal actions include not only projects initiated by the federal government, but also
actions funded by the federal government and actions requiring federal permits. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.18(b) (1996). Its reach is therefore somewhat broader than its phrasing implies.
331. See42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
332. SeeJonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental Policy
Act's Posfor Citizen Participation, 26 ENVrL. L. 53, 68 & n.1 10 (1996) (explaining that NEPA
.establishes no substantive environmental standards").
333. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (hold-
ing that NEPA imposes only procedural, not substantive, requirements on an agency's deci-
sionmaking processes); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1980) (declaring that NEPA imposes procedural requirement on agency); Vermont Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (stating that NEPA's directive to agencies is
.essentially procedural").
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cision on a particular environmental consequence?" However, the
opportunities for increased information and participation that NEPA
provides could facilitate a community's ability to understand and cri-
tique an agency's decisionmaking process.
Under NEPA, a project proponent must provide notice that it in-
tends to complete an EIS and must allow the public to provide input
into the scope of issues that should be covered by the EIS.s The EIS
must discuss the purpose and need for the proposed action,- the al-
ternatives to the proposed action,ss? the environment to be affected
by the proposed action,' and the environmental consequences of
the proposed action.339 The analysis of the environmental conse-
quences includes both directs0 and indirect effects,34' and makes clear
that the EIS must consider impacts to "urban quality, historic and
cultural resources., 342 The draft EIS must be made available to the
public for comment. 5  In addition, federal, state, and local agencies
with expertise in or jurisdiction over the environmental impacts of
the project must be provided an opportunity to comment m The
agency's final EIS must respond to any resulting comments.3 Fi-
nally, the agency must issue a "record of decision" ("ROD") explain-
334. Even though NEPA and its state equivalents do not provide a means to challenge the
substantive basis for a governmental action, aggrieved communities can challenge an agency's
failure to comply with NEPA's procedural mandate. See Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note
13, at 673-79 (describing successful litigation that challenged the siting agency's failure to con-
form to requirements of California's environmental review process); Henderson et al., supra
note 133, at 4-6 (describing challenge to uranium enrichment plant based on failure to follow
environmental review procedures). A suit of this nature would not necessarily address the fair-
ness of a siting decision.
335. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(a) (1); see alsoJohnson, supra note 25, at 573 (detailing procedures
for determining "scope" of EIS).
336. See40 C.F.R. § 1502.13.
337. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (iii) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14;see also infra notes 360-63
and accompanying text (discussing alternatives analysis).
338. See40 C.F.R. § 1502.15.
339. See42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (i)-(ii) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16.
340. See40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(a).
341. See id. § 1502.16(b).
342. See id. § 1502.16(g).
343. See id. § 1502.19. The draft guidance on implementing NEPA in light of Executive
Order 12,898 encourages agencies to engage in innovative approaches to reach out to con-
cerned communities. SeeJohnson, supra note 25, at 575 (explaining that draft suggests public
outreach through religious organizations, minority businesses, and neighborhood watch
groups, among others). In addition to the standard Federal Register notice, agencies are en-
couraged to contact neighborhood organizations and other local groups who might have an
interest in the proposed action but would not be likely to become aware via traditional notice
mechanisms.
344. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1. The Council on Environmental Quality regulations do not
specify a set time period for comments. Instead, they encourage agencies "to set time limits
appropriate to individual actions" subject to the minimums established by 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10.
See id. § 1501.8.
345. Seeid.§ 1502.9(b).
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ing the basis for its decision.
NEPA requires that a wide range of possible impacts be considered
in an EIS. These include consequences that are "ecological... , aes-
thetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, or health, whether direct,
indirect, or cumulative.",3 7 The agency completing the EIS must also
consider the extent to which these consequences fall on minority or
low-income communities~m8  The reference to cumulative effects
means that the existing burden already experienced by the commu-
nity must be taken into consideration in evaluating the impact of the
proposed project."
An EIS may reveal that a proposed project has highly detrimental
ecological, social, or cultural consequences. It may also reveal that
these impacts will be suffered to a disproportionate extent by minor-
ity or low-income neighborhoods. That information alone may be
sufficient for a burdened community to demonstrate the site's un-
suitability and the unfairness of imposing a project with such signifi-
cant environmental effects on that-or any other-residential com-
munity.
The EIS and ROD also provide information for assessing the verac-
ity of the decisionmakers' purported rationale for a siting decision. °
If the final EIS or ROD contain conclusions about the impacts that
are inconsistent with the information provided in the draft EIS or
submitted as comments in connection with the EIS, the community
may be able to show that the agency's decision is based on a pretext
because the purported rationale is not based in fact. A stark example
would be an outright falsehood. The final EIS or ROD might state
that the agency has selected a particular site for a particular project
because the project's expected air emissions will not have any impact
on residential neighborhoods. The draft EIS may, however, docu-
ment emissions that will affect the neighborhood. Moreover, other
agencies reviewing the draft EIS, such as a state agency responsible
for air quality, might have submitted comments into the public rec-
346. Seid. § 1505.2(a)-(c).
347. See id. § 1508.8 (indicating broad range of effects to consider when preparing EIS).
348. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (discussing assessment of demographic
impacts as part of environmental review process).
349. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing cumulative impact analysis).
350. But see Poisner, supra note 332, at 85 (stating that a "'black box' ... surrounds the ac-
tual decision as far as the public is concerned" and that final EISs rarely reveal the true reasons
for decision). Mr. Poisner may be correct that the final EIS and the ROD rarely provide the
true reason for the decision. However, the information gathered during the decisionmaking
process may nonetheless give a community a greater ability to challenge the veracity of a deci-
sionmakers' purported rationale than would be the case absent the environmental review
process.
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ord indicating that air emissions could affect residential neighbor-
hoods. In this instance, the agency's contention that it selected the
site because it would not result in residential exposure to air pollu-
tion could be seen as contrary to fact and therefore a pretext.""
Even absent an outright falsehood, the EIS process may generate
information that challenges the veracity of the agency's explanation
for its decision. For example, an agency may be contemplating a pro-
ject that generates significant amounts of traffic. The agency may
conclude in a final EIS or ROD that an important reason for its selec-
tion of the site in question is that the expected impact of the pro-
posed action on traffic in residential areas is minimal. The data in
the draft EIS may reveal that the existing traffic problems in a resi-
dential area are so severe that the marginal increase relative to the
existing traffic flow is relatively small. While the relative increase is
small, the proposed action will only exacerbate an already serious
problem. The agency's conclusion of minimal traffic effects would
therefore be misleading. The conclusion of minimal traffic impacts
could be considered contrary to fact or, even if plausibly accurate,
could indicate that the absence of traffic impacts was not the real mo-
tivation for the selection of the site. Low traffic impacts would thus
appear to be a pretext for the agency's siting decision.
Any information gathering authority-whether provided through
an environmental review statute like NEPA or through another
source-is likely to assist a community in its ability to question the
real motivations for a siting decision. In Louisiana, a community
group called Citizens Against Nuclear Trash ("CANT") challenged a
private company's license application for a uranium enrichment
plant on numerous grounds."5 2 In discovery, CANT obtained infor-
mation about the site selection process. The information "revealed
not the meticulous process touted by [the company], but largely un-
organized and incomplete documentation, missing and inaccurate
calculations and site scores .... The evidence demonstrated that the
'process' was anything but objective and methodical and, instead, was
easily subject to manipulation."3 A badly prepared EIS can provide
similarly useful information about the bona fides of a decision-
351. If the analysis contained in the conclusion contradicts the information contained in
the EIS, then the community may also have a basis for a legal challenge to the decision. Cf.
Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983) (where the EIS
contained evidence that the information underlying the decision was inadequate, the court
held that "a decision made in reliance on false information, developed without an effort in ob-
jective good faith to obtain accurate information, cannot be accepted as a 'reasoned' deci-
sion").
352. See Henderson et al., supra note 133, at 4.
353. Id. at 4-5.
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maker's purported basis for a decision. 5 In sum, a community may
be able to use an EIS to show that the selection of the proposed site
does not make sense, whatever the purported rationale of the deci-
sionmaker. Using the Title VII analogy, the responses in the final
EIS and in the ROD are similar to the employer's attempt to provide
a nondiscriminatory rationale. The information developed through-
out the environmental review process may show that the purported
rationale is simply a pretext masking a discriminatory decision.
NEPA and its state equivalents not only provide information for
communities to use to assess the rationality of the decisionmaker's
decision and its purported rationale, but they also provide an oppor-
tunity for the public to participate openly in the decisionmaking
processss5 In many instances, the decisionmaking agency will hold a
public hearing in connection with the review of the draft 
EIS.-5
While the public hearings are designed to provide the agency with
additional information, they also bring the debate about the project
into the public sphere. As one commentator has noted, "[c]itizen
participants... routinely use hearings as the setting for a broader po-
litical maneuver. They use it as an opportunity to make their case
not to the EIS agency, nor to the opposing side, but to the broader
public through the lens of the media.017 NEPA and its state equiva-
lents thus provide a forum for a community to link the information
in the environmental review process to the political considerations
associated with the siting decision.
3. Generation of information about alternative sites
The third type of environmental provision that can illuminate the
fairness of the siting process is a requirement that the decisionmaker
consider alternatives to the proposed project. The environmental
impact statement required under NEPA, mentioned above, must de-
scribe not only the project's environmental impacts, but also poten-
tial alternatives to the project.3- In evaluating each alternative, the
354. CANT's legal challenge included claims based on NEPA. The NEPA claims turned
largely on the EIS' failure to consider the demographic impacts of the project as required by
NEPA and Executive Order 12,898. See id. For the current status of the case, see supra note
133.
355. See Johnson, supra note 25, at 572-76 (describing public's role in decision-making
process under NEPA).
356. See 40 C.F.tR § 1506.6 (1996) (indicating conditions under which agency should hold
public hearing).
357. See Poisner, supra note 332, at 87 (citations omitted). It should be noted that Mr.
Poisner is critical of the use of the public hearing as a forum for political maneuvering rather
than as an opportunity for more constructive engagement in the decisionmaking process.
358. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (iii) (1994) (requiring agency to consider "alternatives to
the proposed action"). Many "mini-NEPAs" at the state level also require alternatives analyses.
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agency must facilitate comparison by considering all of the factors
evaluated for the proposed action, including a description of the af-
fected environment and an assessment of environmental conse-
quences.' Upon making a final decision, the agency's ROD must
explain why the agency chose the alternative in question and why it
rejected the other alternatives. m If a siting decision was fueled by ul-
terior motives, a comparison of the information provided about the
alternative sites with the information provided on the selected site
may reveal that the selected site is less qualified for the use than al-
ternative sites or options.3 6' For example, a local government might
reject an alternative site for a landfill in a white suburban neighbor-
hood due to its impact on endangered species and concerns about
open space for community recreation. If construction of the landfill
on the selected site, located in a poor minority section of town,
would have a greater impact on endangered species and would sacri-
fice the neighborhood's last available open space, then that informa-
tion may suggest that the decisionmakers' articulated basis for their
siting decision was a pretext.
The contrast may not always be as obvious as in the example pre-
sented. The pros and cons of various sites may not be directly com-
parable. Development of one site may affect open space while devel-
opment of the selected site does not. But even under this scenario,
the comparison between a selected site and alternatives may still be
revealing. If the EIS shows that an alternative was rejected due to its
impact on open space, while the selected site was chosen notwith-
standing significant environmental effects such as odor, potential
ground or surface water contamination, and potential impacts on
endangered species, then the community may be able to show that
the environmental consequences of the selected site outweigh the
State-equivalent statutes and regulations requiring an alternatives analysis include: California
Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100, 14 CAL. CODE REG. § 15132, 15130;
Connecticut Environmental Policy Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-1 (b); District of Columbia En-
vironmental Policy Act, D.C. CODEANN. § 6-983; Hawaii, HAw. ADMIN. RuLES § 11-200-17; Mary-
land Environmental Policy Act, MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-301 et seq.; Massachusetts Envi-
ronmental Policy Act, MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.26; Minnesota Environmental Policy Act,
MINN. R. pt. 4410 et seq.; Montana Environmental Policy Act, MONT. ADMIN. R. 16.2.626(2);
New York State Environmental Quality Review Act, 14 N.Y.E.L.C. § 8-0109(5); North Carolina
Environmental Policy Act, N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1, r. 25.0502; Puerto Rico Environmental Act,
EIS Regulations § 5.3.2; Virginia Department of Environmental Quality Act, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 10.1-1188; Washington Environmental Policy Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 43.21C.030(2)(c);
Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act, Wis. STAT. § 1.11 (2) (c) 1-6.
359. See4OC.F.R.§ 1502.14.
360. See id. § 1505.2.
361. If an agencyselects one site ratherthan alternativesto thatsite, the EIS is likelyto portray
the alternativesas inadequate. Nonetheless, a close reading of an EIS may be able to detect bias
if such bias exists.
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various environmental consequences of alternative sites. While there
is no way to quantify the relative importance of various types of im-
pacts, the rationality of the decision may be compromised by a close
look at the analysis. In the political debate about the fairness of the
decisionmaking process, the information about the decisionmakers'
other options may cast doubt on their true motives for the siting de-
cision.
NEPA and its state-equivalents are not the only environmental laws
requiring an analysis of alternatives. If a site with wetlands is se-
lected, regulations governing the permit process for filling wetlands
require that applicants conduct a rigorous alternatives analysis.s 2
The regulations make clear that an application for a permit to fill
wetlands will be denied "if there is a practicable alternative to the
proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact on the
aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have other sig-
nificant adverse environmental consequences."0 The regulations
state further that "[a]n alternative is practicable if it is available and
capable of being done after taking into consideration cost, existing
technology, and logistics in light of overall project purposes.
"3
Where the permit is for a land use that is not dependent upon access
to water, then the regulations presume that a practicable alternative
to the selected site exists. A decisionmaker selecting a site located
in wetlands thus has the burden of proof in demonstrating that it
cannot find another practicable site with less impact on wetlands. To
overcome the burden of proof, the permit applicant will have to pro-
vide quite extensive information about all plausible alternative sites-
information that may be helpful to a community trying to assess
whether it has been treated unfairly.
If, for example, a careful analysis of the alternatives reveals that
other sites without wetlands were as or more practicable as the site
selected, then the decisionmakers' motive for selecting the site may
be suspect.m As with a NEPA or NEPA-like altematives analysis, the
comparison may not be direct. One site might be more practicable
362. See33 C.F.R § 230.10. Section 404 of the Clean WaterAct requiresa permit in order to
fill wetlands. S&-33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
363. 33 C.F.R§ 230.10(a).
364. Id. § 230.10(a)(2). Moreover, the regulations indicate that a site is considered
.practicable" even if it is not currently owned by the applicant, so long as it"could reasonablybe
obtained, utilized, expanded or managed... [so as] to fulfill the basic purpose of the proposed
activity." Id
365. Seeid. § 230.10(a)(3).
366. If a permit is issued notwithstanding the availability of practicable alternatives, the
community may have a legal claim against the permitting agency as well as a political claim
about the fairness of the decisionmaking process.
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based on location while another might be more practicable based on
cost. Nonetheless, if the problems associated with the selected site
appear to be greater than those associated with alternative sites, then
the decisionmakers' conclusion that the alternative sites were
"impracticable" may be suspect. Furthermore, if practicable alterna-
tive sites were ostensibly rejected because of the development's im-
pact on wetlands, but the impact in connection with the other sites
was smaller than the impact predicted in connection with the se-
lected site, then the community may have reason to question the se-
lection of the site in their neighborhood.
Thus, whether required by NEPA or in connection with a permit
application to fill protected wetlands, alternatives analyses provide in-
formation not only about the site selected, but about other possible
sites or alternatives. Where that information suggests that the site se-
lected by the decisionmakers makes little sense in light of alternative
possibilities, then the community may have evidence that the deci-
sion is being driven by ulterior motives.
Under the types of circumstances presented environmental laws
may have a more positive role to play in addressing environmental
injustice than that currently recognized. Environmental laws can do
more than provide a somewhat-distasteful legal hook. The insights
gained from environmental laws and environmental review proce-
dures can enrich political debates about political justice.
D. Environmental Laws and Community Engagement
Identifying the positive contributions of environmental laws to de-
bates about political justice does not erase the concerns about using
environmental laws expressed in the environmental justice litera-
ture.3 67 The literature observes that engaging in environmental pro-
ceedings requires considerable expertise-both scientific and legal.M
One concern is that burdened communities will not have sufficient
resources to pay for the scientific expertise necessary to realizing the
potential presented by environmental laws.3 A second concern is
367. See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing environmental law as necessary evil).
368. See, e.g., Been, Undesirable Land Uses, supra note 24, at 1065-68; Cole, Empowerment as the
Key, supra note 13, at 650; Johnson, supra note 25, at 600-02.
369. See, e.g., Austin & Schill, supra note 12, at 71. Professors Austin and Schill observe that
.poor minority communities face some fairly high barriers to effective mobilization against
toxic threats, such as limited time and money; lack of access to technical, medical, or legal ex-
pertise; relatively weak influence in political and media circles; and cultural and ideological
indifference or hostility to environmental issues." Id.; see also Gauna, supra note 6, at 46
(observing, in context of citizen suits, that communities with few resources may find it difficult
to discover environmental violations, a necessary first step to bringing citizen suits); James S.
Freeman & Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk: Incorporating Community Perceptions Into Envi-
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that communities will not have sufficient legal resources necessary to
realizing the potential presented by environmental laws.370 A third
concern is that, even if resources can be obtained, "experts" will take
over the process, leaving community residents as disengaged by-
standers. 7'
With respect to the necessity of scientific expertise, the effective
use of environmental laws does not always require highly specialized
knowledge. The conclusions of an environmental analysis are often
comprehensible even to those who do not understand the scientific
methodology used to achieve them. A statement of increased air or
water pollution, data regarding increased traffic congestion, informa-
tion on the close proximity of the facility to important historic, cul-
tural, or social features-all of these present examples of information
that an interested lay person could readily understand and employ to
question the true motives for a siting decision. While a technical
analysis will usually be helpful, it is not always necessary. Moreover,
in the case of NEPA, the statutes implementing regulations require
that the environmental impact statement be written in "plain lan-
guage" readily comprehensible to the public."'
That said, there are undoubtedly circumstances in which technical
assistance could be of crucial importance. For instance, the conclu-
sions of an EIS may not accurately reflect the gathered data. The EIS
might state that "air quality impacts are expected to be minimal"
when a deeper analysis of the data might reveal that air impacts
would, in fact, be significant. Under this scenario, the lack of exper-
tise could interfere with a citizen's ability to use the EIS process to re-
veal accurate information.
With respect to the necessity of legal expertise, it should be
stressed that the ability of environmental laws to demonstrate politi-
cal injustice does not require the expensive enterprise of undertak-
ing a lawsuit. Using environmental laws to pursue political justice in-
volves taking advantage of participation opportunities and
ronmental Risk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URn. LJ. 547, 554-58 (discussing, in NEPA context, ex-
tent to which inequalities in financial and professional resources leave communities unable to
compete with well-financed and technically proficient private and governmental project pro-
ponents); Johnson, supra note 25, at 600-01 (noting that "highly technical nature of environ-
mental review documents" will necessitate having scientific and legal experts to explain docu-
ments to community).
370. See, e.g., Austin & Schill, supra note 12, at 21 (referring to poor minority communities
"lack of access to... legal expertise").
371. See, e.g., Cole, Empowerment as the Key, supra note 13, at 649-52 (explaining that envi-
ronmental lawyering puts the experts in charge, effectively disempowering the community the
lawyering is designed to serve).
372. See 40 C.F.RL § 1502.8 (1996); see also Johnson, supra note 25, at 600-01 (discussing
NEPA's plain language requirement).
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information that are provided as a matter of course. While pursuing
an environmental lawsuit may be desirable as a mechanism for affect-
ing a particular action, it is not necessary for a political debate about
fair treatment.
Nonetheless, if a lawsuit bringing environmental claims is desired,
or if the technical nature of the project exceeds the capacities of
those not trained in the subject matter, professional and financial re-
sources are crucial. Developing mechanisms to improve the ability of
burdened groups to take advantage of environmental laws needs to
be an important goal of the environmental justice movement. Tech-
nical assistance grants for communities are one such mechanism.s
Environmental groups could also use their legal and scientific knowl-
edge to assist burdened communities.3 Recognizing the need for
legal assistance to groups seeking environmental justice, one author
has urged the environmental bar to adopt a "Bill of Rights and Law-
yer's Creed" to stimulate pro bono assistance.375
To the extent that lawyers and scientists do contribute to grass-
roots' efforts to seek environmental justice, the next question will be
whether that participation inevitably marginalizes the communities
from the process. That marginalization is a risk, but it is not inevita-
ble. A conscious effort to involve the "client" community and to pro-
vide information and service rather than dictate strategy will be re-
quired. With such consideration, the technical or legal intricacies of
environmental justice disputes need not deprive a community of its
central role 76
E. Limitations to the Argument
Environmental law is merely a tool that may, in some cases, provide
information that sheds light on the relative 'Justness" of a siting deci-
sion. It cannot provide a one-step litmus test of a siting decision's ra-
tionality or fairness.
1. Environmental irrationality is not always indicative of injustice
The fact that a siting decision does not appear to be justified in
373. See Moya, supra note 213, at 251 (describing federal community grants program for
environmental justice activities); Johnson, supra note 25, at 601 (proposing that NEPA be
amended to provide technical assistance grants to communities evaluating ETS's).
374. See, e.g., Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice, "supra note 49, at 850 (indicating need
for mainstream environmental groups to "lend expertise to local communities in need of fi-
nancial, legal, and technical assistance").
375. See Moya, supra note 213, at 218, 255-63.
376. See supra note 283 (discussing authors' acknowledment that expert assistance in con-




light of environmental consequences does not mean that the siting
decision necessarily discriminates against low-income or minority
communities. Compliance with environmental standards or other
relatively "objective" factors may not and probably should not be the
only determinant of a siting decision. For instance, a site selected for
a city landfill may not be environmentally ideal. However, it may be
the only land in close proximity to the areas served and to the high-
ways used. Thus, it is possible that a decisionmaker could convinc-
ingly justify a siting decision for reasons unrelated to and considered
more important than the environmental factors that would otherwise
point toward a suspect decision.37 In other words, to continue the
Title VII analogy, a community may be able to show that the given
site is not qualified for selection based on standard environmental
criteria, but may not be able to show that the nondiscriminatory justi-
fication given to explain the decision is a pretext. The nondiscrimi-
natory justification may provide a valid explanation for the siting de-
cision.
Moreover, while environmental laws may indicate that a site is not
qualified to be selected, and a community may be able to demon-
strate that the stated justifications are pretextual, the basis for the de-
cision may nonetheless be unrelated to discriminatory influences." 8
Another illicit motive, unrelated to discrimination, may explain the
apparently unreasonable decision.37 For example, the owner of the
land in question may desire the development and may have signifi-
cant influence over the decisionmaking body based on factors other
than the suitability of the site. The developer may be an important
377. One might argue that the environmental values are not receiving sufficient weight in
the decisionmaking process. That, however, is a very different question from whether the siting
decision is based on a lack of "equal respect and concern" for the community surrounding the
site selected.
378. The same is true in the Title VII context. A plaintiff could demonstrate a prima facie
case of discrimination, the employer could provide a nondiscriminatory motive, and the trier
of fact could determine that the employer's explanation was a pretext for illicit motives. How-
ever, the fact that the employer's rationale for the decision was a pretext does not necessarily
demonstrate that the true motive was discriminatory. A trier of fact could find, based on the
totality of the evidence, that the employee had failed to prove that discrimination was the illicit
motive prompting the employer's action. See Saint Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993) (holding that court's rejection of employer's rationale for its actions does not permitper
sejudgment for plaintiff).
379. In St. Mary's, the district court found that, "although [respondent] has proven the exis-
tence of a crusade to terminate him, he has not proven that the crusade was racially rather than
personally motivated." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508. The Supreme Court accepted the District
Court's analysis. In so doing, the Court rejected the appellate court's contention that once the
employer's rationale is determined to be a pretext, the court must,"as a matter of law," find for
the plaintiff. See id. at 508-09. As in the Title VII context, a determination that the rationale
used for siting an undesirable facility is a pretext does not necessarily mean that it is a pretext
for discrimination.
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campaign donor, or may control resources of importance to the con-
stituency served by the decisionmaking body. Thus, the fact that a
decision appears irrational and the reasons given to justify the deci-
sion appear pretextual does not necessarily prove that the true moti-
vation was discriminatory. Different inferences could be drawn from
the same set of facts. The information gleaned from environmental
laws can enlighten the debate about justice, but it cannot, in any final
sense, resolve it.
2. Environmental rationality is not always indicative ofjustice
The role of environmental law in ferreting out instances of injus-
tice may be more powerful than its role in identifying ajust decision.
The fact that a siting decision met all relevant environmental criteria
would not necessarily demonstrate that the siting was 'just." For ex-
ample, decisionmakers may be presented with numerous environ-
mentally suitable options for the facility in question. Motivated by a
lack of equal concern and respect for a particular community, they
might site the facility in that neighborhood. Under these circum-
stances, the fact that the site was environmentally suitable provides
no evidence as to whether the siting process was politically just.
CONCLUSION
This Article is intended as a beginning. The environmental justice
movement raises infinite questions about the nature and role of the
environmental and civil rights movements, and of environmental and
civil rights laws, in identifying and addressing not only legal ques-
tions, but also the important social and political questions implicit in
the distribution of societal burdens. By exploring the potential of
environmental laws to contribute to debates about political justice,
this Article is intended to provide one bridge across the boundaries
that have historically divided the environmental and civil rights
communities.
